Harvard Professor Warns of the Next Phase of Trump’s War: We’re Approaching a Dangerous World

First of all, thanks so much for doing. this. >> Nice to be here. >> So, let's start at the end, the. anticipated end. When and if the United. States resolves its role in these two. wars against Russia and against Iran, what does the world look like, do you. think? I. >> I think it looks like a a substantially. more dangerous world actually than we've. seen for say most of. >> after the wars. >> Yeah, after the worse. Well, it's going. to leave the world in a in a I think a. more precarious condition and for sort.

of larger, more enduring reasons than. just these conflicts. I mean, the. relationship with Russia is not going to. improve for a while, even if the war. formally comes to an end. There's lots. of suspiciousness on both sides now. So, that's going to be a problem. Uh, China. is going to continue to improve its. military power. It's going to continue. to grow economically. it's going to. continue to challenge uh the United. States and others for influence around. the world. So that's going to be a.

source of tension. Um we have I think in. the world today you're seeing other. powers, you know, lesser powers being. more active uh and not always. constructively. Think of the role that. the UAE has played in the civil war in. Sudan. Um so they're involved in fueling. conflicts in a variety of other places. So you're going to see a tripolar world, Russia, China, the United States as the. three main powers um with some. unresolved tensions among them. Uh.

continued I think concerns about what's. going on in Asia and what China's. ambitions uh might be there and in a. situation where uh no one really trusts. America's judgment anymore. Uh and. that's I think a artifact of the war. especially the war in Iran. Let me point. to one other thing that I think people. sometimes forget about and that that's. that we've seen I think a pretty. dramatic erosion in the normative.

environment surrounding the use of. force. Um and I you know I'm a good. realist so I don't think norms in. international law are everything but. they're not irrelevant. Um so one of the. things we've seen is essentially a. collapse of the norm against. assassination. Uh you know for a long. time in world history governments didn't. try to assassinate each other. Leaders. of other countries didn't try and kill. each other uh in conflicts. Uh this was.

a common practice 500 years ago and it. gradually fell from favor and a norm uh. emerged against it. You can understand. why you it was in everybody's. self-interest. if you were a king, if. you were a prime minister, not to be. trying to kill each other. Moreover, great powers like this norm because it. meant that conflicts would be decided on. the battlefield where they had all the. soldiers and all the wealth and could. could win. Assassination is a tool of. weaker powers, right? >> Asymmetrical, of course,

>> right? Um and beginning at the end of. World War II when the allies began to. hold leaders accountable, Nuremberg. trials, the Tokyo Warheims trials, this. idea that what you did as a statesman. was sort of separate uh began to erode. Once that began to erode, then going. after a leader, going after Muar. Gaddafi, going after Saddam Hussein. begins to look morally preferable. Why. not just take out this troublesome.

leader as opposed to. >> spare the population? >> Yeah, spare the population. You could. make this argument. >> Of course, this is a very dangerous road. to go down because now it's becoming a. much more common practice. Look at what. the United States and Israel do at the. beginning of the Iran war. They take out. all of Iran's senior leaders. There's at. least two problems here. First of all, you don't know who's going to replace. them. And of course, we're now having. trouble with a more hardline faction in. Iran. It also erodess any possibility of.

trust. I mean, how can you sit down and. negotiate a peace agreement with a. regime that has killed your senior. leaders and might do something again. subsequently? And then finally, as that. norm begins to erode, others are going. to use it too. Others will start using. similar tactics. and leaders, including. American presidents, are going to have. to worry much more about this than they. did uh necessarily in the past. All. right, you put all of those things. together, uh continued great power.

competition, um eroding norms against. the use of violence in a variety of. different ways, and I think you end up. with a much more dangerous world. And I. think unfortunately the world agrees. with that because if you look at the. last 20 years or so the in in constant. dollars defense expenditures have. basically doubled in in the world over. the last 20 years because. >> not just in the US. >> not just in the United States you see. this happening in Asia you see this. happening in uh in Europe now uh.

belatedly but finally happening and I I. think that's all evidence that around. the world people anticipate a much less. secure environment than the one we've. had. >> not what we were promised. We were. promised by certain factions in American. politics. peace based on global trade. Globalizing. the economy was supposed to guarantee. stability because you don't go to war. with your trading partners. That's what. they told us, >> right? And and I should have mentioned. that. I mean, the other thing that's. happening is we're seeing the onset of.

not an end to global trade, not even a. complete end to globalization, but. certainly a retreat back from it. raising of trade barriers, uh, increased. protectionism, particularly in, uh, high. technology, things like that. And I. don't think that's going to go away, uh, anytime soon. You're going to see a a. much more competitive uh, economic. environment. Um, and what um, has been. called weaponized interdependence, people trying to gain political. advantage by using others.

vulnerabilities or others dependence. The way the United States has weaponized. the role of the dollar in the. international financial system imposing. sanctions, the way Iran has weaponized. everyone's dependence on the straight of. form. Yes. >> To advance political agenda. So all of. that's going to contribute. >> But can we can we put those cliches to. bed that you know democracies don't go. to war against their neighbors that. trading partners don't have wars? Like. that's just not none of that's true. >> Well, you want to be careful here. Um,

there is some evidence that democracies. are less likely to fight each other. It's it's soft evidence. I don't I. wouldn't want to base my entire foreign. policy around that assumption, but you. don't want to completely throw it out. Um, and secondly, the the again big. macro studies will show you that in fact. high levels of economic interdependence. do make international conflict between. the partners less likely. that is. there's a statistical relationship.

there. It is not however an absolute. guarantee. The fact that you have an. extensive economic relationship with. someone doesn't mean you won't fight. them. It just makes it somewhat less. likely. Also, you can make the reverse argument. arguably even more powerfully. It's not so much that interdependence. causes peace. It's rather that peace. causes interdependence. >> Yes. Exactly. >> When you have a stable political. environment, >> Thank you for saying that. No, when you. have a stable political environment, people don't think war is very likely.

than they're willing to trade with. someone else much more readily. They're. willing to invest in a foreign economy. without worrying that somehow that's. going to get nationalized or seized. because a conflict emerges. And once. people begin to see that conflict is. likely, they quite and I'm talking to. investors here, they quite naturally. begin to pull back and governments. encourage them to pull back because. they're worried about what the balance. of power is going to be, etc. So the. optimism of the say early 1990s that.

we're going to head into this wonderful. uh you know Fukuyama and Freriedman. world of globalization, peace and. harmony. Um there was a grain of truth. in that. If the world had remained. peaceful and tranquil then. interdependence looks more attractive. But once the world look starts to look. more dangerous people begin to worry. more about security than they do about. wealth. You know, one thing that might. make you feel a little better about your. life is buying life insurance because.

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good. Why have American policy makers. been unwilling to be realistic about the. rise of China? It seems like everything in the last 20. years, the subtext of a lot of it is. like a total unwillingness to deal with. the fact that we're not in charge of. everything because China has this. enormous economy. >> Yeah. Uh I think there's a lot of. factors that went into this. I mean. first there was a certain degree of just. general American hubris particularly. post war. We've won uh we've won the.

cold war. We have the magic formula. We. have the model for how you organize a. modern society. It's got to be a. market-based uh economy. It's got to be. based on rule of law. It's got to be. opened uh to trading with others. That's. the modern world. And this is what you. get when you read, you know, Frank. Fukyama who is in my view a fine scholar. but was wrong about that and some others. in the 1990s. That's what we we. generally believed. And it was. bipartisan. Republicans and Democrats.

largely all subscribed uh to this idea. And a key part of that was because we. had found the magic formula. This was. the answer. China had finally embraced. markets and would inevitably become. democratic because its citizens would. get wealthier. There would be a middle. class. That middle class would want. freedom and political rights and it. would insist upon being able to express. itself, etc., etc., etc. You could tell. yourself a pretty good story for how. this is all going to work out. And then. once China's a liberal democracy and all.

engaged with everyone and a member of. all these international institutions. like the World Trade Organization, we're. going to have not a perfect world, but. the best world we've ever had. Again, nice story and there was a coherent. logic to it. It turned out to be wrong. The Chinese Communist Party was not. about to liberalize. They uh put a. premium on political control and had. lots of ways of doing it. and we were. too eager and too hasty to bring them. into all of these institutions to engage.

them and help them grow. So one factor. was just hubris on our part and over. confidence that we really had the answer. and they would inevitably adopt our. system or something like our system. Um, second part was of course the short-term. interests of American corporations who. could make lots of money by shifting. production uh to China and were in my. view so eager to do that that they were. willing to accept terms that they.

probably shouldn't have about technology. sharing about letting the Chinese uh, you know, basically learn to do what we. had had learned to do. And I should be. clear here, I don't think the United. States should have tried to strangle. Chinese economic development. um we. shouldn't have tried to encourage it uh. as much, but that would have had costs. for us. We all benefited from embracing. China the way we did. You and I got. cheaper goods than we would have had. otherwise. Some Americans, a minority of. Americans were really badly hurt by.

this, the so-called China shock. So, there were industries, there were. communities that were decimated, but the. vast majority of Americans ultimately. benefited economically. What those all those Americans, including you and me, forgot was that. this was also going to ultimately begin. to shift the balance of economic power. in ways that were more beneficial to. China than they ultimately were to us. And that was going to have consequences. down the road. China was going to grow. once China embraced markets, once China.

got rid of Mauism and got serious about. real, they were going to catch up. But. it would have been better for us and I. think probably better for everyone if it. had happened or at least for most of us. if this had happened more slowly more. gradually than it did. >> But once it happened. >> Oh yeah. >> And you know you look up and China has a. bigger by some measures a bigger economy. than the United States vastly bigger. population. Like you're going to have to. deal with China. You you can't continue. to tell yourself it's unipolar in any.

sense. >> Yeah. This. >> and why wouldn't they have a sphere of. influence? Um well there's two points. here. Uh one let's get to the sphere of. influence point in a second but um to me. one of the great call it tragedies is. that beginning in the Bush. administration um there there's a real. recognition that China is now uh. emerging as a potential peer competitor. You see this in the national security. strategies written in the Bush.

administration. Um, and I know inside. the Pentagon, there were real serious. efforts made to start preparing for. this. Uh, the problem is that 9/11 came. along and completely blew uh the Bush. administration's agenda. Instead of. focusing on great power relations and on. China, they focus on the global war on. terror. Right? And ever since then, you've had every single American. president saying they were going to. focus laser-like on China. We're going. to pivot to Asia. We're going to focus.

on China. We're going to crack down on. Chinese practices. And every one of. those presidents, I think this is true. of Bush, this is true of Obama. This is. true of Trump one. This is true of. Biden. They get blown off course by. events elsewhere, usually in the Middle. East. And trouble in the Middle East and. America's inability to stay out of that. trouble has been a great benefit because. it's never allowed the United States. >> benefit to China. >> Benefit to China. Sorry. Uh it's uh.

because it's never allowed the United. States to do what serious people in the. government wanted to do, which was to. focus a lot more attention on that. problem. Second question is the sphere. of influence issue. Um so if I were the. Chinese, I would like to have a sphere. of influence in Asia. I would like to. have the United States out. who wants. the world's most powerful country or. arguably the world's most powerful. country allied with all of your. neighbors and with substantial military. forces nearby. If I were China, I would.

prefer a situation where the United. States is essentially out of Asia. And I. don't want to conquer Japan. I don't. want to conquer Korea. I don't want to. conquer Vietnam. That's not necessary. Too much work. I just want relations of. difference. I want those countries to. not be a security threat to me. I want. them to uh pay close attention to my. wishes. In other words, I would like a. relationship with most of my neighbors. in Asia, similar to the relationship the. United States has with most countries in.

the Western Hemisphere where they're. very careful how they interact with the. United States because we tend to be. pretty heavy-handed in dealing with them. for all those reasons. That's what I. would like if I were China. Now, if. you're the United States, the question. is, is that something you should be. happy with? And my view is no. That a. China that was as secure in Asia as we. are in the Western Hemisphere, we face. no serious rivals in the Western. Hemisphere. There's no enemy armies. about to invade the United States from.

anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. We. can run around the world getting into. trouble in lots of places because we. don't have to worry about defending our. borders. That's etc. A China that was in. a similar position would suddenly be. much freer to roam around the world. getting into trouble in lots of places. Maybe the Chinese are smarter than we. are. Maybe they wouldn't do that. But. the possibility would become much more. viable. And that might even include. starting to form strategic partnerships.

with countries in the Western. Hemisphere. Not just economic. partnerships, but strategic. partnerships. If China depends on. economic resources, maybe it would like. to have a military role here. Maybe it. would like to form a alliance with. Brazil. This is not something the United. States has ever really wanted. That's. what, you know, the Monroe Doctrine was. all about and it's been a great benefit. to American security. So, I think the. United States should do what it can to. prevent China from dominating Asia the.

way we dominate uh the Western. Hemisphere. I think that's possible to. do, but I worry that we're doing all of. the things that you shouldn't do if that. was your goal. >> Well, decisions made in Washington have. done a lot to tank the Japanese economy. >> I think that's my read and the. president's recent comments about the. South Korean president. suggest in both in both countries, which. are the the key countries that you're. talking about, like a withdrawal of.

American support to some extent. >> Yeah, it's it's quite remarkable. I mean. the the the business with North Korea is. or North Korea and South Korea is truly. baffling. Uh and we can get into that in. in. >> some summarize your view of it if you. don't mind. I'm confused. >> Yeah. I don't get it at all. I mean it's. I mean South Korea is first of all been. a very stalwart ally for the United. States for a long time. and moreover South Korea is a great. success story when you think about it.

from broader American interests. This is. a country that when we allied with them. initially it was a military dictatorship. under Singman and not a very nice. military dictatorship but for strategic. reasons we backed them in the Korean war. and subsequently and then over time. South Korea becomes a quite successful. democracy and it does this by the way. not because we send the 82nd airborne to. do a regime change but because the South. Koreans as they developed economically. decided they wanted to become. democratic. They were also many of them.

had been to the United States. They had. studied here. They liked what they saw. etc. And so South Korea on its own. initiative becomes a democracy with some. encouragement from the United States but. not with us telling them what to do or. anything like that. So it's a great. success story for the United States. And. now to suddenly say, well, I've got a. great relationship with Kim Jong-un, you. know, a truly odious dictator. And. that's the reason why I want to suspend.

military exercises with South Korea. This is nuts. This is. >> What is it, though? What's driving this? >> Um, partly I think it's the a perennial. Trump tendency to want to distract. people from whatever the problem is that. he's caused. and he's a genius at this. at always changing the subject, getting. us talking about something else instead. of some, you know, what whatever is. going wrong. Um, I think he still wants. to go down in history being remembered.

as some kind of peacemaker and he still. believes maybe he can pull off some. miracle with North Korea, alter that. relationship. Uh, I think that's. fanciful. Um, and third, and this I. think has been a a problem throughout. Trump's presidency, is he has this. exaggerated ability in his own personal. qualities as a negotiator and um, dealmaker that if he can just get in a. room with people, somehow the force of. personality will turn the tide. And this.

didn't work in his first term. Kim. Jong-un picked his pocket in his first. term. Kim Jong-un got something that's. worth something in world policy. He got. a state visit. He got several of not a. state visit. Got a personal one-on-one. visit with the US president. Right? Nothing he'd ever No North Korean leader. had ever gotten anything like that. before. And what did he give up in order. to get that? What concessions did he. make in order to get that one-on-one. meeting with the US president? Zero.

Absolutely nothing. He didn't compromise. on his nuclear program. didn't. compromise on his attitudes towards. South Korea, didn't do any of those. things. He got the meeting and walked. away, right? And so Trump, having gotten. his pocket picked by Kim the first time. around and now wants to go back and do. this again, I I can't put a rational. explanation behind it. Home ownership. has always been at the center of the. American dream. It is an actual asset, a. place people work their entire lives to. build, a place of stability and security.

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Why do you why do you think we're at war. with Iran? >> Um I mean they're the they're the. reasons, you know, there are many layers. uh and levels on which we could say true. things, but what is the what's the bait? What's the bedrock here? >> Um. I I I'll just go through my my laundry. list. I mean there has been um a bad. relationship between the United States.

and Iran for 40 plus years. We all know. that in my view Iran has on number of. occasions in the past tried to improve. that relationship. They've made the. initiative. They did so in the '9s. They. did so in the early as after 9/11. And. each time ultimately they get the back. of our hand. We sometimes have flirted. with it but um but never did uh anything. uh substantial and eventually rejected. their their overtures. I think most of. that is a function of the US commitment.

to Israel. The fact that Israel and the. United and Iran are deeply at odds with. uh each other for various reasons. Um. and therefore the political price in the. United States has been pretty high. uh. and not all but some parts of what you. know I have called uh the Israel lobby. um have been pushing for a military. action against Iran for a long time. Again, it's important to say not all. parts. For example, J Street condemned.

uh the war when it began uh this time. around. Uh and that's that's terrific. Uh good good for them. So, that's part. of it. There's been a sort of thumb on. the scale pushing for it. Um now, why. are we at war with Iran now? It's not. because Iran was about to get a nuclear. weapon. It's not because Iran was. suddenly about to launch some military. operation that was a great danger. Uh. the approximate cause I think was uh. first of all Benjamin Netanyahu's visit. to the White House which you he came and.

gave this elaborate briefing uh about. how Iran was teetering on the edge and. you know sort of all it would take would. be a sharp wrap. you the regime would. collapse and we'd have a new day, new. opportunities to have a different. relationship with Iran, get rid of. whatever's left of its nuclear program, etc. And he was able to persuade Donald. Trump that this was correct. Um, the. first time he's successful. Netanyahu's. made similar pitches in the past to. Biden, to Obama, to Trump, I think in.

the first term, etc. and all private or. American presidents had said no this is. a bad idea this time around Trump did it. now why he did it I'm not inside his. head so I don't know but I think part of. it was the success of the Venezuela. operation the kidnapping of Maduro a. very different operation of course. special forces just snatching someone. and removing them uh etc but he began to. believe that you know he really had. great judgment and that the American.

military could accomplish lish uh. wonderful purposes. There was no, as near as I can tell, no. strong dissents within the. administration in part because it is an. administration made up mostly of yesmen. Uh we'll tell the president what what he. wants to hear. There may have been some. mild well are you sure kind of comments. Um, and then finally, I think this is. uh, you know, Trump at the uh, end of. his political career, we think, um, and.

near the end of his life, who's playing. for the history books, and I think he. saw this as possibly a way to kind of. run the table. You know, I've gotten rid. of Maduro in Venezuela. That was always. a headache. I'm working on Cuba. I'll. probably get that one. Um, I'll get. Greenland sooner or later. Uh, so. that'll be terrific. And Iran's been a. problem for 40 years. and I will be the. president that has solved it and bring. you know wonderful new opportunities uh. to the Middle East and put all that.

together and because he believed again. this is where Netanyahu helped persuade. him that it was going to be cheap quick. fast few days of bombing regime. collapses get some new people in there. every be fine I don't think Trump if if. Trump had had any clear idea that he. would be where he is today when he. started it I don't think he would have. done. But he persuaded himself or was. persuaded that this would be just like. other operations he has authorized.

Short, quick, discreet, cheap, and he. turned out to be badly wrong. >> Yeah. I I don't I don't know the answer. Um I I think that Trump understood fully. well the consequences, but um but. whatever the cause. >> I'm sorry. You think you think he. understood the. >> I know. Yeah, I know he did. He. understood the consequences. Yeah, of. course he the potential consequences for. sure he did. Yeah. No, he was told and. he agreed that that those were real. risks. >> and the risks so far outweighed the. potential upside.

>> that it does make you wonder. But I I. don't I don't have the answer. But but. we do know it wasn't just Trump. There. have been no anti-war protests. >> Mhm. >> So what does that tell you? It tells you. that Trump's organized opponents aren't, you know, they they don't like the way. it's going. Nobody does. But they were. not against regime change in Iran. So. why is everybody in the political. establishment fund Chuck Schumer's for. it? Like he may have done it better than. Trump or whatever, but conceptually. they're on the same page. Why? >> Yeah. You want you want to be clear. here. Not everybody in the political.

establishment. And I think for Democrats. this is puts Democrats in an interesting. position. A number of them have been of. course outspoken saying this this is a. crazy idea condemning the president etc. Um whether I again I'm not inside their. heads. Whether they. would love the war to be over because. that would be good. I think you know. that's where Bernie Sanders is. If you. gave Bernie Sanders a button said you. can press this button and the war would. stop tomorrow, he would press it. immediately. I think there are plenty of. Democrats and a few Republicans who.

would who would do that now. Um but. there may be a few Democrats who also. say, "Well, if this sort of drags on. into the fall, that looks good for us.". So there may be some ambivalence and you. want to criticize the president but um. why why there haven't been protests. I. think this gets back at something um uh. that's been true now for a long time. I. think uh relying on the all volunteer. force. >> uh has made it easier for presidents to.

get our get us into military operations. because everyone is doing and. volunteered for service. No one's being. drafted. No one's being hauled out of. it. And you got in in the forever wars. in Iraq and Afghanistan, you did start. to get push back from military families, particularly people in the reserves who. really didn't expect to suddenly be. doing repeated deployments uh overseas. as well. Um it is also true that the. casualty figures have been relatively. low. Um so you don't see people uh.

concerned about that. Um, and most of. the consequences have been economic and. I think we are going to see those play. themselves out in elections. That's. where people don't have to necessarily. go protest the war. They're going to. vote people out of office. But very. quickly after the March 2003 invasion of. Iraq, there were protests and there were. organized protests. >> against that war, I think. >> Yeah, there were some. And there have. been some protests. I don't think. they've been in large scale. And I don't.

know again I don't know if there's been. a certain amount of you know battle. fatigue almost that we've had a series. of the so-called no kings rallies which. were quite substantial quite large and. are sort of. >> across the horizon protests against. where the administration is going. Uh. whether or not this is just one more. thing um and maybe some of that energy. has been sapped or some of that energy. is going into gearing up for the. midterms. I just don't I don't have a.

good sense of why that might be the. case. >> I I don't I don't either, but I think. it's interesting. We're often assured. that Christians are safe in the Holy. Land. Is that true? Well, the. descendants of the very first. Christians, these are families who have. worshiped in the land of Jesus for. centuries, for millennia, are now facing. enormous pressure to flee their own. homes. War and anti-Christian terrorism. are driving them out and untold numbers. of innocent people are left feeling lost. and without hope. This is why we are.

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interesting that the president ran on. explicitly ran on a promise to end the. war between Russia and Ukraine, which we. were then saying was between Russia and. Ukraine. It's not, but whatever. He. said, "I'm going to fix this. I can fix. this.". >> Yeah. >> And he did. So why. >> why didn't he fix it? >> Yeah. >> Well, first of all, it was laughable to. think, you know, he was saying they came. out, I can solve it in 24 hours. And. this is just part of, you know, the. Trump uh mystique, this that he's this.

magical person with these amazing dealm. qualities. And I fully concede the guy. is an absolute genius at persuading. people of things that are not true. There was no evidence of this from his. business career and there was no. evidence of this from his political. career that he was this sort of master. manipulator, master diplomat who could. pull these things off. So maybe you. could get a peace deal in Ukraine, but. it wasn't going to be 24 hours because.

there are really serious issues here and. really difficult problems to resolve and. there's lots of stakeholders and lots of. parties in there. And getting them all. to agree when they're as far apart as. they are was never going to be easy. It's possible if Trump had put a really. good team together and put a si. sophisticated plan in place to pressure. both sides, get the Ukrainians to back. off some of the things they wanted, get. the Russians to back off some of what.

they were doing. You might have been. able to pressure them to a deal, but you. were never going to be able to do this. by sending Steve Whit and Jared Kushner. off to talk to Putin and think you could. get a deal that way. you were never. going to do this by getting Zalinsky. into the Oval Office and sort of putting. a gun to his head saying you have to. concede. It was never going to be that. easy. Zullinsky wasn't in a position to. do that. If he had gone back to Kev and. said, >> "We're going to have to run up the white. flag and cut a deal." He would have been. deposed. He would have been removed from.

power. The Ukrainians would not have. gone along with that, you know. So, it. was completely unrealistic for Trump to. promise any such deal. And if that's. what he wanted to do, he was going to. have to get serious, put the right. people in charge, and be somewhat more. patient than he's able to be. >> What would it take to resolve it now? >> Um, I don't know. Uh, what I my take on. where we are now is, um, and there are. some parallels, by the way, with the war. in Iran, which we may get to. Uh, we're.

in what, you know, I would call a. hurting stalemate. uh the uh Ukraine is. suffering uh both from missile strikes. and continued losses along the front and. Russia is suffering from losses along. the front and the Ukrainian retaliation. and both of them are I think paying a. substantial price. My guess is that the. price is worse for the Ukrainians and. Russia's continuing to make at very high. cost some incremental advances in the. Donbos. um.

when you're in a hurting stalemate, both. sides are basically betting that they. can last longer, that they're going to. outweight the other side. And I think. from a macro point of view, you'd say, well, Russia's probably got the. advantage there because his resources. are still substantially, much bigger. population, etc. >> But you don't know. I mean, nationalism. is a very powerful force. I think the. Ukrainians care more about fighting for. what they regard as their country than. the Russians care about taking the next.

50 kilometers of Donbas. Uh Putin may. care, but I'm not sure the Russian. population does. So, if it were up to. me, and I assure you it's not, um I. think the United States should be. continuing to back Ukraine while saying. that there are real limits to what we're. willing to support. you know, uh, you. have to explain to the Ukrainians, no, you're not going to get Crimea back. Uh, no, you're not going to get, uh, most of. the Donbos back, at least not anytime.

soon. Maybe in the fullness of time. Maybe some point, but the you don't have. the military capabilities of pushing. Russia out. And we're not going to give. them to you. Even if we gave you more. stuff, you wouldn't be able to do it for. a variety of reasons. and the risks of. doing that are too great for us. So, but. I would keep uh Ukraine in the game and. then I would also go to the Russ and. that's the leverage you have with Russia. that you can continue to help Ukraine.

Um, and the leverage you have with uh. Ukraine is that they're going to have to. lower their ambitions. And the Russians. have to get some of what they want to, and that's the part that sticks in the. western craw. And my terms would be. roughly that Ukraine has to become a. neutral country. It's not going to join. NATO. It it drops any insistence on. that. The trickiest part uh and that's I. think again was the precipitating cause.

was the belief that Ukraine was drifting. into NATO over time. Uh. >> and that's the core Russian demand from. what I can tell. >> I think that's the most important thing. It's not the only thing. There's some. other issues about rights of minorities. and in Russia and those can I think be. be addressed. The trickiest part um at. least as I look at this is what's the. security arrangement going forward for. Ukraine. Um it's not acceptable to.

Ukraine understandably to be disarmed or. to be allowed only a minimal amount of. defense forces. It's going to be a. sovereign country. It should be able to. defend itself as well. So if NATO. membership is off the table, that's. gone. It's going to be a neutral. country. It's going to have a military. Can it buy weapons from other countries? I would think so. As a sovereign nation, um, if it buys weapons, say, from. Sweden, um, can the Swedes send some. people to help train the Ukrainians on. how to use those weapons? How many? How.

long can they stay? >> And what kind of weapons? >> And what kind of weapons maybe? So, and that and of course there's a point. at which that starts to look like you're. becoming a de facto member of NATO, even. if you're not a formal member. If it. gets too far, that's a very tricky. negotiation. So zero is not acceptable. to Ukraine and too much wouldn't be. acceptable to Russia and you start the. war again. Right? That's a long and. complicated negotiation. Another reason. why Trump was blowing smoke when he said.

he could end this thing. There's some. serious security issues that have to be. worked out there and you'd need really. good people taking some time and care to. do that kind of a negotiation. in order. to make it work and to have it be. something where it might last. >> If you speak to European politicians or. well educated Europeans, a lot of them, you know, in Spain, Germany,

you certainly UK, they seem convinced. that Russia has like plans to invade. them. >> Yeah. >> From my perspective, that's insane. But. I I want to run it by you. >> Yeah. No, I think that's uh I'm not sure. I'd use the word insane, but I think. it's completely wrong. >> It's so implausible. They can't they. can't they can't take all of Donbas. So. like. >> Yeah, exactly. The u the idea that. Russia has had so much trouble dealing. just with Ukraine is going to launch. some kind of major assault on on Europe. Uh there's no incentive for them to do.

so. And I think there's no possibility. they could pull that off. >> Europeans seem to really think that. though. Well, I do think there's a. history uh that people still to some. degree uh invoke. I think that they are. legitimately concerned by let's call it. gray area hybrid warfare things that. Russia has been doing for a variety of. reasons for quite some time and are, you. know, violation of all sorts of. international legal rules and a.

worrisome indication of. malign intent. Let's call it call it. that way. So if I were Swedish, if I. were in the Baltic states and I'm seeing. this kind of interference on a constant. basis, if I am observing some of the. sabotage, I think credibly linked to. Russian intelligence that have taken. place in other parts of Europe, I would. say, how can you expect us to trust you. and not worry about what you might try. to do if you keep doing this sort of. stuff? We're not doing that back in.

Russia. We're not uh setting fire to. things in uh you know uh St. Petersburg. So why are you doing that uh to us? >> Well, they are setting things on fire in. St. Petersburg. >> Not the Ukrainians are setting fire on. things in the. >> NATO drones. Yeah. I mean the the drones that just. hit. >> they. >> a school in Russia were made in Germany. >> Okay. Made but they were not fired by. Germans.

>> No, but I mean the whole the whole it's. targeted by the CIA and it's it's run by. other countries. Yeah. >> Okay. But but again if. country A sells to country B and country. B then shoots it there is some. responsibility there but I would put the. principal blame on country B that you. know is actually firing it. Um in any. event the there are reasons for uh. Europeans I think to be concerned about. Russian intentions and most people in. the military uh business do a lot of.

worst case planning. If if you saw I. mean for example I didn't think Putin. was going to invade Ukraine the way he. didn't cuz I thought it was going to be. the kind of disaster he's ended up with. for Russia by the way. Um so I didn't. think he would do it. So I think it'd be. crazy for him to launch an assault on. NATO countries. I think it would fail. But can I be totally confident that he. wouldn't do something that stupid? I'd.

at least think about it. And if I were a. European, I would start hedging against. the possibility while also asking myself. with some frequency over time, what can. we do to try and improve this situation? Because it's it gets back to our first. question. Where's the world headed? It's. not good to have this many points of. friction, this many points of conflict. between major power centers. And if we. can resolve as many of them as possible.

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is the address. Battalion.com/tucker. to learn more. If this if the world shakes out as you. have predicted where it's like more. volatile and there more there are more. tensions and we're ever closer to the. use of non-conventional weapons and it. just gets continuously crazier. How can. you sustain the global network of our. economy? >> It it becomes harder. It's not. impossible. I mean states sometimes even.

trade with each other in wartime uh when. they're both dependent on on the. relationship as well. And I think uh the. senus of international trade are going. to continue. We're not going to go back. to otterarchy or anything like that. Um. you I think may see a lot more regional. concentration. Uh you're certainly. already seeing trends towards so-called. friend shoring trying to do do more. economic deals with states that you. think are friendly and more or less.

aligned with you as well. So the sort of. wide openen globalization of the '9s and. and early as may be over, but I don't. think we're going back to a world where. states are not going to trade with each. other substantially. The cost to that. would be so great that I think people. will try to stay away from. >> I I think that sounds right. How how is. the war with Iran resolved and when? Uh well, you know, if if I wish I knew.

Um I don't I don't see a solution to. that that doesn't ultimately involve a. tacit admission of on the United States. that this was a huge mistake. Uh we made. a mistake. We shouldn't have done it. And you don't make mistakes without. paying a price for it. Uh and fair and. obviously, you know, the administration. will spin whatever end to the war is as. a victory of some kind. Uh but it's not.

it's it's likely to be a defeat. I. believe they are still flailing around. for some formula that will put. sufficient pressure on Iran that Iran. will then give them something so big and. tangible they can claim, you know, this. is our this is our great victory. And I. don't think they're going to get that. Um and the central problem is is is. political. The motivation of the two sides are. totally different. This was a war of.

choice for the United States. There was. no imminent need to do this. This was. not a vital interest we were uh. defending. It's one of the reasons why. Trump was willing to do a very short, quick, cheap war. Why nobody seriously. contemplated sending ground troops to. invade it. anything that would be really. uh really expensive because it wasn't a. vital interest. Well, optional war for. the Iranian regime, right? This is a war. of survival. This is absolutely. existential. Uh because our stated goal.

at the very beginning was to topple. them. We're trying to get rid of them. That's the. >> He demanded quote unconditional. surrender in the first week. >> Right. So their resolve, their. willingness to suffer in order to win or. at least come out of this uh intact is. much greater than ours. Right? And I. think you see that in the fact that. they're willing to do all sorts of. things in including things that involve. real price for the Iranian people and. for themselves, risks to the regime, risks to the leaders of the regime.

because for them this is an absolutely. existential uh existential affair and. it's not for us. And that's the central. yes. >> central problem that we face here. And. secondly, compounding that is the fact. it turned out they had real options. They're much weaker than us. They have. much less global influence than the. United States. We've done enormous. amounts of damage to them. We've. significantly hurt their military. capability the way uh Secretary of. Defense Hegath likes to boast all the.

time. But the fact is they could close. the straight of Hormuse or effectively. close it and they could cause. significant damage to American military. facilities in the region and to other. American partners in the region. in the. Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, uh. conceivably also even Israel as well. So. suddenly they have escalatory potential. And when you're dealing with an. adversary who cares more than you do, is. willing to bear greater costs, run. greater risks than you are, you have to.

worry that they might start exercising. some of those options. And so every time. Trump has threatened them, the Iranians. can basically say, you know, you do this. to us, we'll do something back to your. side, and you won't like it. and each. time so far Trump has backed off. I'm. glad he did because the consequences of. escalating this further would be quite. severe. So, you know, we had a deal of sorts in. June, the memorandum of understanding.

Um, it was badly constructed, badly. negotiated by some people who didn't. know what they were doing, but it was. basically a surrender. It was the United. States saying, "This was a mistake. We. shouldn't have done it." um and we're. going to agree to a set of terms that. are actually pretty favorable to you. Trump is immediately pillaried, right, by the supporters of the war and some. others for negotiating a bad deal. And. the United States pretty quickly begins. to try and skirt around it in various.

ways over access in the straight of. Hormuz. um and the Iranians see what. he's doing and they go back to war. essentially that he's trying to evade. the terms as they understood them in the. in the agreement. Um there's one final. point I need to make here though. I said. a while back that there's zero trust. between the United States and Iran at. this point and therefore a peace. arrangement with someone you don't trust. is really hard to pull off because. you're always assuming they're going to.

>> uh they're going to reig on it. And. that's especially true for the Iranians. What the Iranians have to worry about is. what, you know, what the Israelis would. call the mowing the grass phenomenon. that all right, we we bombed Iran last. summer, then we started a war with them. in 2026, >> so we get a deal of some kind and we. agreed to some negotiations on their. nuclear uh stuff. Um, what's to stop the. United States from bringing its ships. home, refitting them, rearming them,

sending them back, and starting this up. again in a year? If you're the Iranians, you would think long and hard about. this. >> Yes, you would. >> How does How do we How do we agree to. end a war with the United States and be. confident that the United States won't. start this again at some convenient. point down the road? And my reasoning is. if I were Iran, I'd be saying I need to. make sure the United States pays a. significantly large price for this that. they learn not to do it again. I can't.

trust their promises, but I can hope. that I can trust that they might be able. to learn that this was a huge mistake. And that means an incentive to actually. make sure that, you know, we all pay a. sufficiently large price that the next. president, Democratic or Republican, or. Trump in his last term, decides that. starting something like this again is a. bad idea. >> All of those things, I think, is. extremely difficult to solve. >> And and the Iranians, if you watch their. media, are saying that, right? I mean,

they're saying that they they don't they. don't trust that a peace agreement won't. become just a pause. Well, remember we. were negotiating with Iran on its. nuclear program when the war started and. here we have some negotiations their. head of state. I do remember that. >> Exactly. You know, this is not exactly. the way you instill confidence in your. adversary that maybe diplomacy is the. way to go here. >> This is what you do when your goal is. unconditional surrender, >> right? >> But what happens when you can't achieve. unconditional surrender? Where does that.

leave you? So, but my question to you is. how does Iran provide those incentives. to United States? Like how does it. extract what kind of cost does it need. to extract in order to get this not to. happen again? >> I I'm not sure. I mean, I think that um. I don't know how the Iranians are are. thinking about this, but certainly. anything that imposes significant costs. on the American economy, which of course. we've already seen, um I think the. Iranians would be delighted uh if the.

midterm elections, you know, go south. Uh from uh from Trump's point of view, they may do that for multiple reasons, of course, not just the Iran war. Um but. that would be a lesson to future. American presidents. don't do uh things. like this. Obviously, the more pressure. that is placed on the United States by. others in the region, and we've seen. that happen now on a number of. occasions. Um that's again, all of this. feeds back into the American political. system and foreign policy machinery, you.

know, don't do this kind of thing again. One one final aspect to this again I've. not thought long and hard about but. >> I mean there is a danger on the Iranian. side of overplaying their hand too. >> Yes. >> Um and one could make the argument that. we have a we have a situation in the. world today gets back to your first. question where lots of countries are. overplaying their hands. >> trying for more than they're really uh. going to be able to grab. Um, but the.

circumstances that allowed Iran to do. what it did in response are likely to. fade over time. The rest of the world is. going to diversify away from fossil. fuels. People are going to build more. pipelines so they can get oil and gas. out of the Middle East without using the. straight of Hormuz. um we were already. seeing people re-engineer energy markets. in a variety of ways to try and and deal. with this. So Iran's leverage here is I.

in my view likely to be less 5 years. from now, 6 years from now. That doesn't. mean they don't have the leverage now. and I think they're using it. Uh but if. I were Iran, I would be careful not to. sort of drag this out too long in the. sense that at some point, you know, we. will begin to adapt. we will uh have. >> there's also only so much humiliation. the US can withstand sustain I mean at. some point every embarrassment to the.

United States is by definition like a. reduction in its power right. >> yeah but you you can sometimes make the. in other words if you're so worried. about oh I can't be humiliated I've got. to do something you better make damn. sure that that next thing you do. actually works or then your humiliation. is compounded and it gets worse and. worse and worse and worse but I'm saying. if US policy makers decide like we. actually can't lose this or we're going. to lose the dollar. >> Yeah. I don't think we're anywhere near. there though. >> But I'm just saying if people start to. think like that, you could see.

incentives to do something crazy. >> Yeah, you could. Um. I I I still cling to the hope I guess. that um that you know some of the. crazier things you occasionally hear. about you know we might you know use a. nuclear weapon or something like that. that at that point you know sensible. people will stand up and say are you. kidding over this this is not worth. crossing that particular threshold. becoming the the now the only country in.

history to use nuclear weapons and we've. done it twice against non-nuclear. powers. This is not a good look for the. United States at a moment where. America's image around the world is. tanking anyway. This seems to me would. be a huge mistake and I would expect a. lot of push back if anybody, you know, seriously. went beyond the sort of contemplating. stage. >> I hope so. Yeah. But I would think even. at the stage of contemplation someone.

would say what did you just say that's. nuts but that hasn't happened because. this has been discussed at the. >> but again I think you look at the. history of of both nuclear powers and. you know other major powers and if you. get at the number of things people have. talked about at very but without you. know without serious consideration. there's a lot of crazy that gets. gets talked about is you know let's. think this through for a second and then. some of that's undoubtedly useful if. you've thought about it, you know, okay,

let's No, that's a crazy idea. Here's. why. And then you can and can dismiss. it. So, I don't I don't want to sort of. self censor the consideration of various. options. I just want smart enough people. with good enough judgment that when they. hear something crazy to know that it's. uh know that it's crazy. >> Yeah, I've always had confidence there. would be people like that. I have less. confidence. >> I I'm with you there. Um, so it does. seem like no matter what happens, no. matter how this is resolved, there will.

be a reduction in the US presence in the. Gulf because I just think that's for a. bunch of reasons, but it seems. inevitable that there will be fewer US. forces in the Gulf, >> right? >> What effect will that I mean because. there will be a lot of politicians who. say, why are we there at all? >> Right? >> Why are we there at all? >> Well, there are variety of reasons why. we've ended up there and I think. actually historical experience, historical perspective here is quite. useful. Um, so.

we didn't care very much about the. Middle East until the end of World War. II. And at the end of World War II, we. began to take a more serious interest in. the Middle East because people began to. realize there was a lot of oil there, that there was energy resources. It was. not yet a vital interest because we. didn't need those resources at that. point. We were still producing enormous. amounts of oil and gas here in the. United States, but we began to to take. an interest. And for the rest of the. Cold War, the Middle East was a.

battleground in the Cold War where we. were competing with the Soviet Union for. influence. We had our friends, the. Saudis, the Israelis, the Jordanians, others. Uh the Soviets had Egypt, Syria, Iraq eventually as well. Um, and our. allies turned out to be better than. their allies, which uh was was useful. But very interestingly, in that whole. period, the United States didn't really. have much military uh presence there. We. had an air base or two. We had a.

flatillaa that a small flatillaa that. went in and out, but we didn't think of. it as an area where we were going to get. actively involved militarily. Yes, we. were playing basically a balance of. power game. We didn't want anybody to. control the region. We didn't have to. control it ourselves. We just wanted to. make sure the Soviet Union didn't and. nobody else was able to dominate the. region as well. Very much a balance of. power uh game. This changes, right? The. first Gulf War in 1991. We had co.

created the rapid deployment force back. in 1979 after the Iranian revolution. Created the rapid deployment force, but. we didn't park it in the Middle East. We. kept it here in the United States. We. had pre-positioned equipment. I think in. Diego Garcia, etc. But we were not a big. footprint in the Middle East. Then comes. the first Gulf War. Suddenly, we've got. several hundred,000 troops in there. throwing Iraq out of Kuwait. And we. brought most of them home, but we didn't. bring all of them home. Right? And in.

the Clinton administration, we adopted a. policy known as dual containment where. we were going to contain Iraq and Iran. simultaneously. even though Iraq and Iran were mortal. enemies at that point. Right? And to do. that we had to keep troops in Kuwait and. we had to keep troops in Saudi Arabia. This is the early to mid 1990s. And dual. containment was uh the brainchild of I. think mostly Martin Indic. And it was.

partly intended, not entirely, but. partly intended to reassure Israel and. make Israel more compliant in the Oslo. process. The theory was that, you know, Israel's insecure, always worried, always uh worried about security. So, if. we say we're going to deal with Iran and. Iraq, we'll keep track of them. You guys. should make some concessions in the Oslo. process towards the Palestinians. Didn't work, right? But that was the. logic. But the problem was by keeping. all those troops in Saudi Arabia, it.

became one of the things that Osama bin. Laden. >> Oh, famously. >> Yeah. didn't like and justified his. declaring, you know, jihad against the. United States. So, one of the reasons we. end up uh with in trouble with al-Qaeda. is the fact that we've adopted a policy. of keeping a lot of troops now in the. Middle East. That's where it starts. Then of course that eventually we get. 911 and then we get the war in Iraq, 2003 war in Iraq and now we have a very.

large presence in the Middle East and it. takes more than a decade to start. bringing that back down and we basically. have never gotten out of now either. trying to provide order in the Middle. East ourselves or more more accurately. providing a lot of disorder in the. Middle East trying to reshape it to our. liking by toppling governments of. various kinds and no president has ever. been able to fully extract themselves. from doing that. So if.

>> well we're further imshed than we have. been. >> That's right. And now if the end result. of this conflict is for the United. States to be less physically present in. the Middle East, less directly involved. in trying to manage the local politics. of the region, telling different. governments how to behave and what to. do. I think that'd be a good thing, right? that might permit the United. States to then start focusing its. attention on bigger problems. um problems in Asia and elsewhere. Last.

point, the other thing that's. characterized American policy. from the mid60s on, uh, I'd say, is. we've had special relations with some. countries in the Middle East, Israel, to. some degree, Saudi Arabia after 75, also. Egypt, and no relationship whatsoever. with one country in the Middle East, Iran. >> Yes. Right. You contrast that with. Russia, China, everybody else in the. world who has relations with everybody.

in the region. Doesn't mean they like. them necessarily. Doesn't mean they're. not uh pushing back or objecting or. doing various things, but they talk all. the time. They deal with them. They. understand that they're there. We've had. relations where we give some governments. almost unconditional support and we. don't even deal on a direct basis with. the others. And this is crazy. my my. dream. >> Why do we do that? >> We're unique among countries in doing. that. I think. >> um we're more likely than others. Um.

there's a there's proximate causes and. permissive cause. The permissive cause. is the fact that the United States has. been so secure and so wealthy and. powerful for so long, which gives us the. luxury of pretending other governments. don't exist and doesn't matter. We don't. have to talk to them, etc. um it it's not a luxury you can afford. if your security is is more precarious. So that's I think the permissive cause. and then the approximate causes uh have.

been the you know in the case of Israel. obviously the the special relationship. there is mostly driven by American. domestic politics not the only example. of that in the world but it's the most. obvious most important and to some. degree I think the connections between. Saudi royal family American elites. American oil interests things like that. um and then Egypt was partly because of. the Egypt Israeli peace treaty and sort.

of keeping Egypt on board and part of. that relationship. Most of it though I. think ultimately stems on Israel. >> So if we were to do what you hope. happens which is withdraw substantially. or completely from the region like what. are the risks of that? Well, so there. are several. The the biggest one that. people point to is u you know a. proliferation risk that to the extent. that uh the American security umbrella. has discouraged or deterred um countries.

like Saudi Arabia from pursuing nuclear. weapons. Um then if you suddenly said. we're no longer doing that, we're not in. that business uh any longer. Um, it'd be. more likely, not certain, but it'd be. more likely that some of those. countries, maybe not just Saudi Arabia, would decide, okay, well, in order to be. secure, you know, dangerous. neighborhood, Israel has nuclear. weapons. Maybe Turkey will get them. Who. knows? Iran might someday get them. I. need them, too. And so, you could. imagine.

a sort of gradual spread of nuclear. weapons in the region. Um that's even. that argument which I don't reject out. of hand uh is has to be qualified. because American activities in the. region have also given countries reasons. to pursue nuclear weapons in the past. I. mean why does Iran want to have a. nuclear program? Why has Iran wanted to. be close to the nuclear threshold but. not over it? Because it was worried. about the United States, right? It was.

worried that we were going to try to do. what we've just tried to do, right? And. so some American activities and. involvement in the region is a spur to. proliferation even though you have to be. honest disengagement uh might encourage. it. It's also um you know possible that. that will happen anyway. We've just you. know reached some kind of nuclear. arrangement with Saudi Arabia as well. which is going to it's not supposed to. lead them to get a bomb but it's not. going to make it harder.

>> No. >> As well. So, uh, there's long. speculation. >> That's that's one of the the concerns, uh, we have and I should be very clear. >> Is that a concern? I mean, if. >> I mean, would it is it impossible that. if more nations in the region had. nuclear weapons that you would have. a more peaceful region? This this is a long-standing argument um. that a number of people my dissertation. adviser Kenneth Waltz made uh this.

argument in both a famous uh paper back. in 1981. arguing that the gradual gradual spread. of nuclear weapons would actually be. stabilizing and better than going to. enormous lengths to try and prevent it. from happening. um very controversial, got lots of criticism. And then in his. very last published article a few months. before he he died, he published an. article in foreign affairs uh I think. the title was why Iran should get the. bomb. And he made exactly this argument.

that in fact if if if Iran were to get. nuclear weapons, it would be relatively. secure. it would no longer be have much. incentive to meddle around with other. countries and it would actually have. stabilizing effects. Again, very. controversial, got lot lots of. criticism. The logic behind that. position is uh a powerful logic about. the that you know using nuclear weapons. is completely irrational for Iran to use.

a nuclear weapon against Israel or. anybody else might invite its own. destruction. They're useful only for. deterring major attacks on your own soil. and therefore a nuclear Middle East. might actually be more. >> Have there been more or fewer wars per. decade between India and Pakistan before. Pakistan got the bomber after that's a a. famous illustration of exactly this. argument. There are there are also. cogent counterarguments.

on the other side that um you do have to. you know the more hands have more people. who have their fingers on the trigger. you know it only takes one right. >> and fine we might say great we've had. >> 30 years of relative not complete but. relative peace between India and. Pakistan they have fought each other a. few times but it would only take one. nuclear exchange to really alter that. that that equation. So I don't think one.

ought to be sanguin about this. possibility but one should not reject it. out of hand and one should also always. ask the the sort of opportunity cost or. counterfactual question. What do you. have to do to prevent it from happening? What are the costs of doing what you're. going to do to prevent it from. happening? I want to go back to one. other thing though, which is that I'm. not arguing for the United States to. disengage from the Middle East uh either. economically or diplomatically or. necessarily uh militarily. I like the.

idea of a balance of power in the. region. I don't want any country to try. and dominate the place, try and control. it partly because they could manipulate. energy supplies in kind of the way Iran. is trying to do now. Uh, and therefore I. think the United States should be ready. if you see something like the invasion. of Kuwait in 1991 happening, a major. potential shift in the balance of power, United States should be ready to weigh. in and try to stop that as we did in.

1991. Um, but though that's not going to. happen very often, right? and it doesn't. require the United States to be. physically present and trying to dictate. the local politics and topple regimes. and things like that. So, it's not like. the Middle East is irrelevant and I want. the United States never to have a. military role there. I just want to be. very selective in when we go and for. what purposes. >> I think you're in the center of the. mainstream on that question. But back to the original uh question.

problem, how do you get this war. resolved and when will that happen? I. mean, what's your best guess? >> Um. I this is the kind of thing because in a. sense the the critical decision rests. with one person is at this point. I. think it rests with Donald Trump. Um and. until he says, "Okay, it's over." Right? no matter how he dresses it up will be.

in a state of state of war whether. they're actually shooting at each other. or not. Uh and I can't forecast at what. point he will decide that it's just he. needs to end this and and be done with. it. Um I do think I wrote this a few uh. weeks ago that you know of all the. presidents I have observed he's probably. the one who is best able to you know. sort of declare victory and get out you. know pretend it was a victory and then. move on change the subject do something.

else somewhere. >> build a second ballroom uh you know just. get everybody talking about something. else he's he's brilliant at that and he. should take advantage of that ability. it'll be harder this time around It's a. little bit too obvious a failure, but. but that's what I would have. >> theou is an effort to do that. I think. >> I think it was and. >> one of the reasons it didn't work is. because the first line of that agreement. or framework of an agreement promised. that hostilities in Lebanon would stop.

and the Israelis totally ignored that. and doubled down. So like we're not in. this alone. >> No, that's that's true. and and you. we've seen uh occasional uh you know. signs of fissures or cracks uh with the. I think that that I would be shocked if. uh Trump had doesn't have his moments. where he's enraged at Prime Minister. Netanyahu for getting him into days. >> Yeah, you would be amazed. But but you.

haven't seen that turn into a genuine. policy rift. uh you haven't seen that turn into uh. the United States saying look you're the. junior partner here we're the great. power and this issue uh we're now fully. engaged and you're going to do what we. tell you right. >> why haven't you seen that. >> um I think uh that first of all uh Trump. uh.

is still I mean I I I think he has. advisers around him, Kushner Witkoff, others who are deeply. engaged in this who are uh pushing him. the other way. I think certainly some of. his donor base um have uh weighed in in. various ways uh not just now but. previously. So I think he's mindful of. the political consequences of of that. even though public is pushed away. Um.

the donor base on which a lot of. Republican uh politicians depend is. still heavily you know you got to back. Israel no matter what. I think that. probably uh is influencing him as well. Um the. I think that's probably you know most of. it. Um. the the rest of it though is is I think. his own uh inability to uh you know. admit even to himself that he he made a.

mistake here and that that whatever. comes out of it is going to look to most. observers like an American retreat. And. that's not that's not part of his brand. if you will. >> Yeah. It has massive consequences too by. the way, does it not? Um, I'm not sure. I mean, the, you know, Reagan didn't. face any real consequences for pulling. out of Lebanon. That was the smart, that. was a smart thing to do. Um, Nixon and.

Kissinger thought that getting out of. Vietnam and having Vietnam fall to the. communists. would have catastrophic effects on. America's position in the world. Uh, they were wrong. It actually improved. our position both in Asia and especially. in other parts of the world. So I think. we are very good at exaggerating the. negative consequences of cutting losses. You don't want to have to do it. You. don't want to have to make mistakes that. force you do these things. But in some. cases you also I mean you probably know.

this you know in your own life there. times if you make a mistake and you. admit it and you you know tell everybody. you're sorry. It was you've learned from. it. Sometimes you actually benefit. Sometimes people get credit for good. judgment in having made a mistake, being. able to recognize it and own up to it. >> It's the biggest win, >> right? And so, you know, there would be. some, I think, benefits. There'll be. carping from, you know, critics. Uh, folks who supported the war and. continued to support the war will.

undoubtedly attack him. But I think in a. in a weird way, Trump would get some. credit if he just said, "This was a. mistake. I he can blame it on whoever he. wants to blame. I was misled by my. adviserss. Fire Pete Hegth, you know, he'd make him the fall guy or whoever, right? And move on. Uh you'd be better. off for doing that. But whether he will, I don't know. My own read is that he. would have done that already if it. weren't for the Israelis. That's it's. hard to do with them for many reasons,

but um but I think he'd be happy to fire. HGTH and blame Hexath for the whole. thing. Well, >> it the option is always there. M. >> um. >> interesting. Do you think that there. will be because the public so profoundly. opposes this war according to public. opinion polling? >> How can the next administration or the. second half of this administration like. how can we have more conflicts like this. >> after 25 years the public just saying.

resoundingly we're not for this kind of. thing? >> Well, that's a great question. I mean, I've I have thought mistakenly that, you. know, this time we've really learned and. we won't do this again. And. >> the public has learned. >> Yeah. No, I think the public has learned. and and um you know, one of the there's. a telling little statistic or. observation goes way back here. Virtually every president since the end. of the Cold War has run for president on.

a platform of I'm going to do more at. home and less abroad. Right. Right. What. was Bill Clinton's mantra? >> Well, that's the Cold War. I mean, Woodro Wilson ran on that. >> Yeah, but but Cold War, you know, being. a responsible internationalist, right? You know, McGovern got hammered for. being seen as So, you wanted to be a. responsible internationalist. Uh, you. know, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, etc. That was pretty pretty, uh, constant. >> Um, Jimmy Carter was not a dove, right? He did plenty of hawkish things. But.

beginning beginning. So what's Bill. Clinton's mantra? It's the economy. stupid. He has no foreign policy. credential. He's not interested in it. He runs against a very successful. foreign policy president, George HW. Bush, and beats him, right? Get to 2000, right? What's Bush's mantra? I'm going. to give a humble foreign policy. Our. foreign policy be strong but humble. And. he criticizes the Clinton Gore. administration for too much nation.

building, right? Too much foreign policy. is social work, etc. We're too activist, >> right? The Balkans, etc. So, he runs for. office saying, "I'm going to do more at. home. I'm going to give you a strong but. humble foreign policy. That's not the. foreign policy he ended up giving us.". >> The axes of evil and remaking the world. in our image. That wasn't humility. >> No. Exactly. Barack Obama, he becomes. president because he's one of the few. Democrats who had publicly opposed the. uh Iraq war. And so he's going to do.

nation building at home. That was one of. his lines in that's not exactly what he. does either. Tries to move in that. direction, but he does Libya. He does a. lot of involvement, etc. Then we brings. us to Donald Trump, right? Opponent to. the forever wars, very critical of the. foreign policy establishment in 2016. And that's distinguishes him not only. from the Democrats, but all of the. Republicans that he's running against. who are basically interventionists,

neocons, and whatever, right? And he. wins. And then, of course, in his first. term, he doesn't do half of the things. that he says he's going to do. We're. still in Afghanistan when his term ends. He actually does a little surge just. like Obama did in his first year. So, he. doesn't change either. Then you get. Biden, of course, and Biden um is. critical of Trump, etc., But Biden was. part of the old order anyway. So all of. these presidents intuited that the. American people wanted to hear that.

there was going to be some more. attention paid to them at home, right? And less of this craziness abroad. >> Why do we use the term democracy to. describe our system? >> Well, because I think it is still. fundamentally a democracy, but it's a. democracy mediated through institutions, which is what a democracy is. And some. of those institutions are committed to. certain ways of doing business. Also, most Americans most of the time, almost. all the time, don't think of foreign. policy as very important. It's always. way down there about 10 11 in the list.

of things you worry about, right? When. you show polls, people worry about cost. of living. They worry about health care. They worry about education. and they. worry about any and foreign policy. except in rare circumstances like right. after September 11th doesn't loom that. large in the political calculations of. most Americans most of the time. But if. you're spending the overwhelming. majority of the discretionary budget, 1.5 trillion just on the Pentagon, not. including all kinds of other national. security related expenses,

>> I mean that the economy is directly. linked to your foreign policy. In fact, it's driven by your foreign policy. Well, and and you know, there's a reason. why uh there's Pentagon spending in. every congressional district in the. country, of course, right? And why. weapons manufacturing gets distributed. very broadly as well. So, yes, that. money is coming out of all of our. pockets, but it's also going to keep. people employed, and that will keep, you.

know, local congressmen in district X in. state Z voting for the budget because. there's 6,000 jobs dependent upon that. going through as well. Some of it is is. structural in the way um our system. works, but I wouldn't say it's not. democratic for that reason. Well, I'm. just saying if the big things that. government does, like I don't know, writes the tax code, sends the troops, are inconsistent with what the public.

wants over generations, it it's not a. democracy in any recognizable way. I. mean, the system you may have, well, we've got, you know, bameal chamber and. all this, but it's like so. >> no, but but that's true. I mean, public. opinion polls would have if if public. opinion were driving, right, public. policy in every way. You'd probably have. uh Medicare for all. You'd probably have. a really significant changes in gun. control, right? There's all sorts of. issues where the public is at odds with.

what the political system produces. But. I wouldn't say it's not democratic. >> But in what sense is it democratic? I I. mean I thought the the definition of. democracy was ownership of the state by. the people and the governance of the. state is mediated by the people they. elect. But ultimately it's the do the. what the state does reflects what the. people want it to do because they own. it. >> Yeah. And I and I think to a first. approximation that is still true. I. think that you know we got Donald Trump. because the American people were unhappy. with what the political system was.

>> Trump did exactly what we've been doing. No, I know. I I I understand this. I. understand this. Um, and Lord knows, you. know, there are reasons why people think. American democracy has. gone by the wayside in a variety of. different ways. I'm still, I guess, reluctant to declare the United States. is not a democracy because the decisions. made by people in government are not a. perfect reflection of what the voter.

preferences are at a particular level. on the biggest issues and and we measure. that by how much we spend on those. questions. Like that's just a one. measure, but I think it's a pretty good. one. Like what percentage of the budget. goes to. >> initiative X? If the the biggest ones. are in direct opposition with the public. wants, then I I don't really know how. we're defining the term, I guess. >> Well, I think this is a complicated. picture. So, there's also a difference. between do you want a strong defense, do. you support the troops, do you want us. to be secure versus how do you want. those resources to be used? So there's.

less support for say cutting the defense. budget than there is for not invading. other countries. Those are two different. things, right? So most Americans want a. strong defense, but they want that to be. used differently than we have been using. it. >> for defense, for example. >> Right. I mean, >> right. Um, but yeah, I mean, I I don't. know. This is my personal view. I'm not. sure of the answers to most these. questions, including the one I just.

posed to you. Is it a democracy? But I. do think we would benefit from like a. more open. and persistent discussion about like. what are these term like what do the. terms mean? Like that would be helpful. >> Yeah. No, I think I think that's right. And and the questions that are being. raised now, uh I should caveat this by. saying I've never considered myself. really a student of American politics. I. do international relations. Um but uh. but I think the questions that have. arisen now across the board about uh c.

certainly the role that money plays in. American politics now which it's all. it's not like it's never played a role. in the past. that's always been. influential and there are periods of. American history where it was, you know, waxed and wayne in its influence, but it. really is extraordinary now the amount. of money that gets poured into politics. and how it's concentrated in uh in. various places and clearly shapes. outcomes in a variety of ways and shapes. uh the way members of Congress uh and. others behave. Um that's important. I.

think we are still wrestling with the. impact of social media and the. explosion of the media environment. You. know, it's no longer the three channels. that you can listen to. It's no longer, you know, do you like Huntley and. Brinkley or Walter Conrite? You've got. as many different voices as you want to. And what effect that ultimately has on. politics. You know, I think we all kind. of intuit it that the effect has.

probably not been good, but that's even. there. It's not entirely true. It's. clear. I think it's shaping our politics. in a variety of ways that it didn't. before. Probably in some beneficial ways. and probably in some ways that are quite. pernitious. So, there's a lot going on. with American democracy and I think. democracies in other parts of the world. And one of our major challenges is. figuring out ways where we're more. likely to get um.

uh responsible and accountable uh. politicians. I would like responsible, knowledgeable and accountable. politicians and have them be rewarded. for that behavior as opposed to uh you. know grandstanders, liars, grifters, people who have managed to achieve a. following because they were good at. basically attracting attention. And we. have an awful lot of that in our. politics and in our uh and in our. punditry, if you will, or commentary.

And I I think it's deeply unhealthy. >> Well, it's obviously deeply unhealthy, but it's unhealthy in I think the more. imminent problem is it like it's. instability producing. That's what worries me. So, you wrote a. book once and you were telling me at. breakfast in which you described sort of. the groundwork that allowed the French. Revolution. >> 1789 to happen. What did France look. like the week before the mob stormed the.

Bastile? um the uh. so France France there's some I don't. want to overstate these parallels you. know historical analogies should always. be used somewhat careful. >> you don't even you just state what. France is like and then let the viewer. draw his own. >> conclusions no so so you have a highly. unequal system right all the political. powers you know reserved in the. aristocracy and the king um there is an. estates general but it's not it doesn't. have particular uh powers etc Although.

it plays a role in the story, highly all. the wealths held by the crown, all the. wealths held by the aristocracy and the. church, >> right? And moreover, the system is. rigged in such a way that those. institutions that have all the resources. really don't pay very much in taxes. You. have a very large peasantry that has. relatively little, lives hand-tomouth, etc. >> They don't have economic power. They. don't really have political power as. well. A highly unequal situation. And. because the people with the money aren't.

willing to spend any money in taxes, the. state is chronically broke. And every. time they fight a foreign war, which you. know they do, helping the American. Revolution, for example, they end up in. more trouble financially. So they're. constantly uh in financial trouble. Does. this sound begin to sound familiar? And. what among other things? Oh, final thing. of course is literacy is gradually. spreading. You have the printing press. You're getting an explosion in the media. environment. Suddenly pamphleteers can. put out various political tracks and the.

coffee houses in Paris. Lots of ideas. are being swapped around. You do have. some intellectuals who are starting to. write about democracy. Famous things. that get circulated. People begin to. talk about this maybe rights of man, stuff like this. And um so you have a. lot fermenting below the surface here. Um and then finally the fiscal crisis. becomes so significant that Louie has to. call the estates general this quasi. parliament to come in and authorize some.

new financial matters and that's the. thing that begins to generate a genuine. sort of call it grassroots movement. within the political elite or or. whatever for change. >> a debt crisis. >> Yeah. And the change then spins. completely out of control in a variety. of different ways. And there's of course. huge contingencies in all of this. You. can imagine ways this bounces. differently and in people in the right. place wrong time etc. But the end result. here is the collapse of the French.

aristocracy, the rise of Napoleon, 25 years of war. um all sorts of bad. consequences and to some degree you can. trace it to you know horrible wealth. inequality, denial of political agency, the lower classes, spread of information. in ways that are no longer mediated or. controlled, etc. >> And a debt crisis driven by pointless. foreign wars. >> Yeah. Exacerbated, I would say. >> Exacerbated. Okay. So, I'm not I'm not.

drawing any parallels at all, but I just. kind of throwing it out there. As I said. to you before, this is if I were a. really wealthy, you know, person, I. would worry about this. Um, one of the. things that, uh, you know, back in the. age of robber barons and, uh, both, not. just here, but in other countries, Great. Britain where there was enormous income. inequality, you know, end of 19th. century. I think one of the things that. saved capitalism in the in the 20th. century from bulcheism and other things.

was um the development of the modern. welfare state. The essentially income. redistribution that you wealthy people. are going to live really great lives. Good for you. Congratulations. Thank you. for all your contributions. But you're. going to have to give a bit larger share. here. You can't uh run the laboring. classes like surfs uh etc. lots of. different uh arrangements and this. happened across many many countries. especially here in the United States.

with the New Deal and I think it was. again a remarkable success uh overall. and prevented the kind of lower class. upheavalss that you saw in some other. societies as well. So if I were a. wealthy oligarch today I would have that. in mind. You know what I would do is say. against your will, we're going to. develop a new technology that you're. going to subsidize through your tax. dollars in the form of I don't know data. centers that is going to eliminate your. jobs and none of your kids are going to.

be employed and there's nothing you can. do about it. >> Um yeah, but their kids don't need to be. employed. No, but I'm just saying like. >> what that rather than respond in a. sensible way that preserves the system, what's good about the system, it does. seem like the people in charge of the. system like are making it worse almost. on purpose. And I don't understand the. thinking there. Yeah, it it I think that. we have um what what's interesting I. think about you know previous wealthy.

elites in the United States is not all. by any means uh but many of them also. had along with you know the usual drive. and ambition and you could even argue. greed um also did have a certain. public-mindedness. um. >> was called Christianity but. >> well no it wasn't just Christianity uh I. think some of them were you know, obviously devout and faithful in in. their own fashion that may have played a. role in it. But even those that weren't. were or didn't wear their religion on.

their sleeve, there was a a general. sense that they were part of a larger. society and that they owed. They they. you had to sort of give back uh in in. some respects. Um and that appears to be. largely absent in the wealthiest people. I could name right now. you don't get. the impression that they care very much. about the collectivity. Um and uh that's. not healthy. That's not a good good.

situation. >> Well, it's evil, but also dangerous. >> Yeah. >> As you just pointed out. >> Yeah. I'm I'm I'm more worried about the. danger part than the evil part. But. that's just me. >> No, I I think one leads to the next. >> Yeah. >> So, last question. Do you think I mean. and it's related to that. you wrote you know one of the most. famous books about it was in some sense. an autopsy of like the Iraq war I don't. think it was built as that but that was. my take on it and so you followed.

you know wars like the one we're in for. a long time and you just said I keep. expecting a correction and it never. comes. >> Yeah. This one if you could make a. prediction like do does this change our. politics? Is it is this kind of the last. thing like this? >> Um, so I I think it might be uh but for. reasons that are not really um about the. Iran war per se. I mean, I think that. the sea change actually began a while.

back and uh it's maybe the one positive. contribution I'd give credit to Donald. Trump for um who I believe will. eventually be remembered um by uh. Americans and by others as like the most. disastrous president we have ever had. and will be remembered by America's. adversaries as the greatest thing that. ever happened to them. Um that's just my. view. Anyway, um I I think what Trump. did in 2016 was he um he so challenged.

the prevailing consensus on American. foreign policy, bipartisan consensus. Um. and he did it in a way that was very. dismissive of the foreign policy. leadership. >> Literally back of the hand dismissive. um to the extent that as you will. probably remember right there were open. letters signed by former Republican. national security officials you know. dozens of them uh published open letters.

uh denouncing Trump's presidency. >> Oh I was there. >> Yeah. Um and. what by doing that what Trump did was he. opened up in some respects a broader. discussion. He made it possible or. easier to talk about that. Now some. others had already started to do that. had written things uh that were starting. to open that up. Um you know. organizations like the Quincy Institute. where I'm on on the board were not yet.

in existence but getting formed in the. process of being established. So you. could the cracks were beginning to form. in the edifice after 25 or so years of. failure. Um and but having a. presidential candidate and then a. president who openly proclaimed some of. these ideas or at least ideas that were. adjacent and certainly questioned the. consensus made it possible to start. having uh having a broader discussion. I. think that was that was very healthy.

Um, now just because things are bad. doesn't mean they can't get worse. And I. think some of the other things that. Trump has done did not either fulfill. the promises that he made and we're. seeing that uh come to fruition now. But. I do think that we've we are in the. process of seeing. not just a sea change in public. attitudes, which you do see um on a a. variety of different issues, but also a. change in the let's call it the. intellectual landscape. uh in.

Washington. I think it is a broader. conversation uh now splits uh within the. Democratic party on a lot of these. questions, splits within the Republican. party on a lot of these questions. Some. of the think tanks that you used to see. as. >> almost indistinguishable from each. other. AEI and Heritage on the on the. right are now kind of at odds or moving. in opposite directions. Some internal. splits within them. And on the one hand, that's you could argue that that's sort.

of worrisome uh-oh chaos. But on the. other hand, uh if we've been suffering. from an excessive consensus and an. inability to ask questions, ability to. criticize, and very importantly, a. steadfast refusal to hold anybody. accountable for mistakes. This is. probably a good thing. you think people. will be held account I mean that that's. the one thing that never happens in the.

American system. >> It's it's a fascinating question. Um. it's and it's a huge problem. Uh I mean. the. >> the people who complain get held. accountable I notice but not the people. who made the bad decisions. >> So so this I think this has been a big. problem and it's it's a it's a but it's. a tricky one. So, one of the issues I. there's a chapter in uh my book Hell of. Good Intentions on this um where I. basically make this argument that if you. look across the foreign policy elite, hardly anybody pays a price for for.

screwing up. Um and in fact the more. common pattern is you go into. government, you screw up uh and you may. go out of power for a while, you land a. safe synicure at a think tank or. whatever and then when the stars line up. properly, you go back in and make the. same mistakes. >> You join a consulting firm and get rich. >> or you well along the way you may make a. bunch of money too. And uh and when. people are really guilty of various. forms of of malfeasants and are exposed.

to that, you know, they sometimes pay a. modest price for public embarrassment um. etc. In case of crimes, maybe pay a. fine, but notice that usually the system. rallies around such people, protects. them, and they're they're fine. You can. all think of examples or similar thing, the same people keep getting reappointed. to the same jobs and keep doing the same. bad job. This is the history of American. peace negotiations in the Middle East. Um, the reason it's tricky is the.

following. That everybody makes. mistakes. Doing public policy is hard. Doing foreign policy is hard. No one's. going to get everything right all the. time. And you wouldn't want to rule. someone completely out of public service. because they made one screw- up or they. got something badly wrong when it was. not clear what the right answer was, etc. You wouldn't want to end somebody's. career at 33 because they made a. mistake. So you have to exercise a. certain amount of judgment here. And my.

criteria tend to be the following. First. of all, if somebody keeps making the. same argument over and over and over. again, and it never works. At some. point, you really should stop giving. them jobs or you should stop listening. to them. The system, you know, they. shouldn't necessarily be given a prime. spot in the New York Times. It's not a. radical demand, professor. >> No, no, at some point we ought to we. ought to see that. Um, and secondly, if. people are utterly unrepentant,

right? If they so there I have good. friends uh who uh and some people I. don't even know who say vocal supporters. of the Iraq war and some of them have. never recanted. Some of them still think. it was the right thing to do. Others. have said, you know, my head was in the. clouds. I wasn't thinking clearly. I I. believed X, Y, or Z. I was wrong. And. when you make a mistake, if you can. admit it, you can acknowledge that, yeah, I got that one completely wrong,

and here's why. Here's what I missed. Here's what I was misled by. Here's what. I should have thought harder about. I. have a lot of respect for that. And I'm. much more inclined to say, "Okay, that's. someone I'm willing to either maybe. reappoint or someone I'm willing to. listen to because they've shown a. capacity for judgment, capacity for. learning.". What I kept seeing throughout the. foreign policy uh elite was um a lot of.

people who really had trouble admitting. they'd made mistakes were very good at. defending every decision they'd ever. made and you know somehow kept finding. the same answer to to the question even. when the conditions had changed. Even. when the circumstances were different, they still had the same uh same answer. And and as you indicated, it was also. quite to me quite telling that the. people whose careers got ended were. often people who turned out to be right.

>> You know, whistleblowers. or who just took an unpopular position. and, you know, were vindicated 5 years. later or six years later, but by then, you know, things had moved on. They'd. already been been moved out. and you. know finding the right balance between. um respectful dissent, principled. dissent and the right balance between, you know, you're not going to get. everything right, but. we need accountability without a sort of.

grim trigger that penalizes people. instantaneously. Last point I'll make about this gets. back to this. I do also worry that um. that the way the now the media. environment operates and our discourse. operates um. you know people can get pillaried for. things that are essentially irrelevant. because it becomes a social media thing. as well and unless they're protected.

unless they have a lot of internal. resources to deal with that kind of. firestorm uh it can be really really. difficult and I think that's unfortunate. too. Well, it discourages telling the. truth, right? >> People are afraid. I felt it. I mean, who hasn't? >> Yeah. >> You haven't apparently because you did. it anyway. So, thank you. >> You you you never you you do it, but. that doesn't mean you're not nervous. about it. >> Yeah. Professor Walt, thank you very. much for doing this. >> Nice talking with you.