Will China be the real winner from the Iran war? | The Economist

one of the things that I'm struck by is, you know, President Ji's focus on chokeholds, which he clearly had in terms of his own focus on rare earths, and he was very determined to ensure that China had something with which. to push against the US tariff imposition a year ago. You know, the war in Iran has shown that that, you know, Iran, too, understands chokeholds and has very, very effectively. used its geographic leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Do you think that that logic will induce China.

going forward to keep thinking about chokeholds? David. they're connoisseurs of power. So, you know, they're very impressed by the military. I they're going to have to have. some serious thinking on their side about how far ahead America is on that. So they're not they're not kind of cheering about what's happening. They're watching it very carefully on the chokeholds. One of my big fears is that Donald Trump is a connoisseur. of the kind of the chokeholds of his use. You know, he's obsessed. with oil and fossil fuels, the things that made you powerful in the 1980s. The Chinese are looking for the next chokehold. So several times people said, yes, we use the control of our rare earth.

minerals sort of supply routes last year to really induce kind of panic in America. and the rest of the world. But now America is going to get us, you know, is going to do whatever it takes to break that chokehold. So we need to think of the next choke on they would list. You know, pharmaceutical precursors are the chemicals. They are looking for leverage all the time. They are connoisseurs of power. But I think one of the thing that came up again and again is, you know, I've watched them, I've listened to them tracking Trump. since the first time when I was in Beijing and then through into the second term.

They currently think of him as, as you say, chaotic. and difficult to deal with, but also tremendous opportunity. because they say, and I do believe them because I always, you know, the more cynical they are, the more truthful. I think they're being, because they are exceedingly. cynical is he is the least hawkish person in Washington. They know he is more willing. to let China buy high end American chips to invest in America. That his transactional, selfish, me first instincts are an opportunity for China. One of the things we heard was if this Iran war weakens him too much,

that's actually bad for us, because if he's really weak in Washington, then that foreign policy blob, the kind of the hawks. waiting in the wings, they get maybe more power. So they like dealing with this chaotic, selfish, transactional, not very hawkish Donald Trump. Interesting. So so the the weakness of Donald Trump would lead not to a more. traditional MAGA Republican, but but to the sort of triumph of the Hawks. Yeah. Marco Rubio gets more power. You know that's their that's their nightmare.

That's because they really do think three steps ahead. Part of this will chokeholds is once to rule power. And they are, as you say, connoisseurs of of power. And clearly much longer term strategic thinkers. to which Napoleon of being, you know, quoted so often to you. But also I think it's second long term consequences. What does all of this mean for America's position? Soft power favorability in the world relative to China's. And there's a very striking chart that I just want to show you,

which I thought is really stunning. This is a, opinion poll of the public in 42 countries. It's dramatic. And for those of you listening, the U.S favorability plunges. and China's is gradually rising. And I guess one shouldn't be surprised by this, but are you. are you struck by the scale of that shift? I really yeah. And it's, it started I guess it started around in 2024. So is that around election time? That's November 2024.

Trump yeah. So there's a big dip goes down and then it starts to recover. Actually surprisingly does sort of bit a bit of a dip in Liberation Day in April. But then you see the beginning of this year. both Venezuela first I think and then Iran. These precipitous falls from plus five average to -15. And, telling you that people are threatened. and very uncomfortable by the idea of a U.S. that is, in a revolutionary sense, tearing up,

the sort of world that it has presided over. And this is I wondered whether the view of China. is not necessarily affection, but perhaps more, at least, it's predictable. I think that's right. I spent some time just before being in China, in Singapore, and talking to people there with other people. from the rest of Asia at our summits, as well. And the clear message we got from those in Southeast Asia. and elsewhere is that China is at least a known quantity. Yes, it can be a threat. Yes, it can be a bully in the region. But there are going to be times when you want to work with them,

and it's getting more and more rational to work with them. So we've seen the Philippines, for example, agreeing now to do a joint exploration for oil and gas in the South China Sea. as they talk about normalising relations with China. I think you'll see more of that because it makes more sense now. All of this is sort of predicated on a, I think, subtext of this conversation, which is that this has been a sort of misguided, hubristic catastrophe for the U.S. and will therefore have negative long term consequences. But I do just want to, prod you a bit by asking you a question.

that Keanu Hagan asks, which is America recovered from Iraq and Afghanistan? What makes Beijing so confident this time is different? Well, I. agree to the extent that America has enormous powers. of recovery and reinvention and, you know, that's that. that is the fundamental strength of a democracy. It also has capital markets that are able to deploy resources. unlike any other in the world. And we're seeing that with AI, which could also become.

a source of enormous American power. So I do think there's a world in which this revolutionary destructive movement. sets everybody else back, if ultimately, including China, because it does it like any other country, even as big as it is, it will be affected by what's happening externally. There is a world in which, in this upheaval and chaos, America is able to thrive. I don't think that's the most likely outcome. The most likely outcome is that America suffers too,

and it sees as its alliances fall apart, it sees its power decline. But it is a world that we need to be aware of. But but let's let's assume that happens. And America is this revolutionary power smashing things up, declining. David, what strikes me in this is that I see no. movement. at all, and reinforced by this conversation from China. to do anything other than cynically look out for itself 100%. No desire to step in, in any kind of leadership role, 100%. And I think that's that's a fascinating you know,

either that's a totally optimistic view that America has an election recovers. and comes back as that kind of the America we know and love, or we go to something. much more kind of law of. the jungle of America is just this beast, beast kind of rampaging around. Either. way, that's a big problem for China, because China has been a total free rider. It's not wrong when Donald Trump says. China uses the Strait of Hormuz, and America doesn't really depend on oil. through the Strait of Hormuz, that kind of selfishness. that China pitches to others is the reason you can rely and depend on China.

One of the sort of interesting questions that I tried to kind of push them on and. I didn't get a great answer was, you know, isn't there a version of disorder? And disruption and chaos that means you have to start doing more. You have been such free riders. on that American security order and some of the shrewdest, some worldly scholars I've known for some years. They say, yes, that is a conversation we need to have. But, you know, our system moves really slowly. It's really cautious. And I think that's one of the things you hear. So often in Beijing that XI Jinping and the leadership,

they like their current plan, they don't want to change. And so for all of their talk about, you know, changes unseen in 100 years, they're actually kind of status quo. They don't really want to adapt to their own rhetoric. the thing I really want to emphasise here, though, is that in a, in a rapidly. changing world that with where the world we know is falling apart, that's a world that China should be worried about. And it's a bit of a blind spot. I think there is an awareness there that that actually to have these new productive.

forces to develop these new industries, you need stable trade. You need to be able to import vital commodities. You need predictability. You need to be able to finance things. There is that awareness. But but the system is very, very uncomfortable. despite it being created. by revolutionary change is very, very uncomfortable by rapid change. And that that kind of free riding on the existing system. and lack of focus on what kind of role China would need to play in a, you know,

more centrifugal, dysfunctional system is is probably a long. term weakness, as you say.