Who will run Gaza?
Whatever happens, we're going. to be in for a remarkable. few days, a remarkable. few days, a historic few days. But then we get to the next stages. of President Trump's 20 point peace. plan, where. I think there's quite a lot of fine. print that hasn't been either agreed. or really gone into detail. And the first of those is. will Hamas give up its weapons? Greg, I want to start with you on that. Do you think they will? Because that's surely integral. to progress on other areas. It is. It affects. every other area of this deal. that affects the extent of Israel's.
withdrawal from Gaza. It affects, I think, the prospects. for reconstruction in Gaza. I think the short answer to. whether they will give up. their weapons is no, they won't. I think they will be willing, perhaps, to make some concessions. around their weapons. I've spoken to diplomats. over the past couple of weeks. in the region. who think maybe Hamas. will be willing to concede. on heavier weapons. It might give up. its rocket launchers, for example. And that's not an enormous concession. in some ways, because its rocket arsenal. has been so badly.
depleted over the past two years. But it might relinquish those. It's not going to give up, lighter arms. It wants to keep its rifles. and things like that. And I think it has several reasons. for doing that. One is ideological. Its whole identity is based. on being an armed resistance movement. If it gives up the armed part of that, it's not clear what Hamas is anymore. So there's that ideological piece. And then I think for some of the rank. and file. members of Hamas in Gaza, there's a personal piece to this as well.
They are very unpopular right now. in Gaza. Many people are furious with Hamas, for dragging the territory. into this war over the past two years. And I think there's a concern. amongst some of the Hamas. fighters in Gaza. that there are going to be reprisals. once the war ends, once. the cease fire really sets. in, they're worried about. what might happen to them, to their own personal safety in Gaza. And so. that also gives them, on a personal level, an incentive to. to want to keep their weapons. What does this technocratic. transitional authority,
which is. supposed to be under the. the 20 point plan. of President Trump, be part of this. in Gaza designed to achieve. Patrick, what do we know about it? This is where the you could see. the plan has. been drawn up in part by businesspeople, because it looks a lot like a corporate, set up. You have an executive body, which is the, is the sort of transitional authority. formed of, of technocrats, many of them hired from the diaspora, and they will, administer Gaza,
which has something. in the order of 60,000. civil servants. who are still on the payroll, officially. on top of that, you have a board. And the board is fascinating. Maybe up to ten people, a mixture of diplomats, business figures, and, financiers, and chaired by Donald. Tony Blair. Well, Tony Blair will be there, too. And some people think this was his, original idea. And that board will, set the strategy,
approve the key appointments, of the executive body and also, we believe, report. back to the United Nations. Security Council, which is had this set up as well. as having legitimacy from the bottom up, would, hope to have legitimate legitimacy. from the top down, through international law. and the broader community. I mean, when you actually think about it, this is completely extraordinary, actually. You have, you know, you have a board. that includes Tony Blair. Has President Trump as the chair. I mean, what are these. board meetings going to be like?
It's completely, completely stunning. But actually, you. you said this is. you can tell it's. been put together by businessmen, but I think they. they would be very proud of that. I mean, I'm. a remember at the end of Trump one. Jared Kushner basically. and he wrote this in his book, being very proud of the fact. that this was a very different. kind of approach. and one that was going to be effective. I think, for this to succeed, it's going to need buy. in from Palestinians. And to get that buy in, there need to be Palestinians. involved in this. And it's not clear,
both at a high level and a low level, who is going to be involved. with this new authority at a high level? There is this ongoing. debate, between the Israelis. and the Palestinian Authority. about whether or not the PA. will be allowed to play a role in, governance in Gaza. Israel doesn't want it to. Hamas also doesn't want it to. Hamas has said it's. willing to turn over power, to independent technocrats, but not to the PA. So what should be. the sort of representative. body of Palestinians,
is being squeezed out. by both Israel and Hamas. And then I think at a low level, you have this question of Patrick. mentioned the civil service in Gaza. You actually have two civil services. You have the one that Hamas hired. after they took power, in 2007. And then you have the former employees. from the PA who Hamas, sent home. And the PA continued to pay salaries. so that they wouldn't. join the Hamas run ministry. So how do you reconcile. these two lists of employees? What happens with, the people who aren't allowed.
to have a role in this new government? I think there are so many unanswered. questions. still about how Palestinians. are going to have a role. in their own governance going forward. I was very struck. and sent, this feels to me very different. to the Oslo Accords. It's a very different approach. What did you mean by that? Well, I had three things in mind. I knew what. one was the, the in Oslo, you had five years. in which the Palestinians. sort of created their own state. that was then. unable to negotiate the final status.
This time round, that early stage is being undertaken, as we've said, a lot by by outsiders, if you know, they've been holding the ring. and creating the space. for Palestinian civil. society to bubble up. And that's the second sense. This is not top down. with Palestinian rulers coming in. This is civil society. which presently is very, very suspicious of Israel, understandably radicalised. after two years of war. But can you create a space in which, thanks to a thanks to reconstruct. and thanks to the promise. of a better life,
actually people's opinions. start to change. And then the third sense is the. is the role of the Arab states. They've been involved. in the negotiation of this in Oslo. They lent it lots of, sort of verbal support and promised. lots of money that never turned up. this time round. They're involved. They could be involved. and I think should be involved in spite. of what Greg said, it's. very difficult for them. But if they are involved in the security, aspect, that's good too, because it means they actually. present on the ground.
and they need to find the money. So those three things. make it really quite different, quite a different dynamic. Oslo just ran into the sand, became moribund. as it became. a sort of sterile negotiation. about maps. and sort of hypothetical constitutions. This, if it's to succeed, has to work. by creating a space. in which people's minds are changed. and they start in a very Jared Kushner. like way, thinking about actually, you know, what we want. We want a better life. And the route to a better, better life. is through. civil society developing.
rather than a one off deal. The probability of this. all ending. perfectly is is obviously not. not that high, but I completely agree with that. The context feels totally different. And just to add to what. that said, the regional context. is extraordinarily different. And the importance of the Abraham Accords. and Donald Trump's first term now become, I think, fully apparent. It haunts me. that we at The Economist. underplayed the original Abraham Accords. I we did not even write.
a letter about it. We had an excellent piece. by Greg in the Middle East section, but we didn't write a letter. And it is one of the things. that I've reflected on since. And I thought we totally missed. the importance of that moment. Yeah. We mean, we fell into exactly the kind of. you know, diplomatic old school. style of sort of, you know, you know, this is just a grubby commercial deal. We, we. I don't think it took us a while. to understand that. the avenues that it opened up. Do you think it is. going to change. American public opinion of Israel. and thus provide a domestic reason.
for President Trump to stick to it? I actually think that the. shifting public opinion, toward Israel within the United States. is something. that will advance this process. rather than limit it, because the hug. that President Trump is giving. Israel is sort of like the hub, the hug of a boa constrictor. You know, he can squeeze now. and they know that. And I think that's. fundamentally different. from prior administrations. What actually will. that mean on the ground in Gaza when we. I know you've been a number of times.
during this war, I think you were last there on on Friday. The sense of devastation. is extraordinary. How quickly. with a lot of aid coming in, will and can. conditions improve dramatically. for Gazans on the ground? But it's hard to exaggerate. the level of devastation in Gaza. I mean, the numbers speak of, estimated. almost 80% of buildings. which have been badly damaged. Whatever direction you go into Gaza, and you can only go into Gaza. nowadays on embeds with the IDF.
I was on one on Friday morning. But whatever direction. you go in the towns, the suburbs, the neighbourhoods. close to the border with Israel. have all been obliterated. They're totally flattened. It's a. it's a lunar scape of rubble, dust and sand. That's all that's left there. As you go further in, as we did into Gaza City, you do see areas in central Gaza City, also in the second main city of canyons, which is still standing, the town of Deer Black in central Gaza, still saying that will be the hub. for any,
governance and reconstruction. But it also has to be. said that the Gazans are very, very resilient and creative population. They've. they've seen their cities. and towns destroyed so many times, not just in the last 20 years. of of wars between Israel and Hamas. You can go back to the First World. War, when it was Britain. which flattened Gaza City. And it's been over history. It really is. one of the urban areas which has been. constantly rebuilding itself. And I don't want in any way.
to detract from the level of destruction. that I still think. that that given the building. materials, giving the equipment. And that's a big question, what will Israel allow to go in. in the next few weeks and months? But assuming they do have the materials. and the equipment, I think that they will. they'll start. They'll start much quicker. and much better than most people expect.
