What would be the point of an American strike on Iran? | The Economist

Lay out exactly how. this American buildup has happened. and what they have in the region now. Sure. So this, Ed is. is mostly an air and naval buildup, which we can see here on this map. It's not not, not substantial ground forces. And the centerpiece. is really a pair of aircraft. carrier strike groups. And a strike group, as you know, is the aircraft carrier itself. It's the air wing, and it's all the escort. ships around it. that have air defense capacity, that have weapons of their own. There is one. aircraft carrier strike group,

nearby in the Gulf of Oman. There is another one. that's been making its way. into the region. It's somewhere in the Mediterranean. We don't know exactly where it is. That's a USS Gerald Ford. That's probably also within. striking distance of Iran, given. it can be refueled. And then there are a huge. numbers of air, aircraft. So, F-35, various others. The really striking one. that I noticed in the last. 24 hours, 48 hours or so is F-22s. And as you may know,

the F-22s are America's most advanced. fighter jet. They have landed in Israel. That's very, very unusual. We don't normally see them there. They are very capable aircraft. And all of this is now spread across. a number of bases. Some countries, Saudi Arabians, the Emiratis have said. they will not allow their air. bases, their ports, to be used. as staging grounds for attacks, although inevitably. they are caught up in this. And so a lot of the force. buildup is in places. like Jordan, Bahrain, some of it in Israel. But a vast bit of it.

is simply floating. on aircraft carriers. And how does that force compare. with previous build ups. we've had over the years? Not as big as you might think. It's very big in absolute terms, you know, two aircraft carrier. strike groups, more than 100 fighter jets. There is enough here. to start a war with Iran with little. or no notice, don't get me wrong, but if you look at this chart, what you see very clearly is. this is much, much smaller than, say, the five aircraft. carrier strike groups. that were in the region. for the second Gulf War in 2003. It is even smaller than the,

campaign, the number of forces. that were there. for the strike campaign. against Iraq in 1998. And the key thing. here it is that, there are no big visible. special operations forces of the kind. we saw in the Caribbean prior. to the Maduro raid. There are no substantial. marine amphibious forces that we see. And, this is enough, a big strike campaign. It's not enough for months. and months of strikes, though. We must factor in. Of course, the Israeli. Air Force in all of this, which I think would be. pretty likely to be get involved.

if there conflict were to begin. I want to understand. what the aims of this war. could plausibly be. And I think there's a first question. here, Shashank, which is. does it matter? Why is it important to have war aims? What happens if you don't? How do you know when you stop? You know, there's a famous quote. is that David Petraeus who said, tell me how this ends. And if you don't know. why you started, you don't know how to end. If the aim is to topple the regime, that is a. I think Nick. has already been very clear, if it indeed achievable, a long, protracted,

open ended campaign, they could see you there for weeks. or months. Whereas if the aim is simply. to punish Iran. for its killing of protesters, which was, of course, the region reason originally. why Donald Trump. was pulled into this issue, his public threats to do something. that's achievable. with a single set of strikes. You don't need to wait. for the regime to do something. or give in. There's no coercive element. And so if I think as we're. sort of discussing, the aim is to do something. that gets you to a nuclear deal. that punishes Iran enough. to force them to the table to say,

we give in. We are now. willing to make the concessions. Greg's talking about like zero. uranium enrichment. That's a different middle path. that says perhaps. you have to do enough. damage, impose enough cost, but you don't have to keep doing it. until the regime is gone. You can pull back, try to. then talk to the remainder. of the regime, whether that's with. or without the Supreme leader. If you don't know what. you're trying to achieve, how do you know. which of those approaches. you take that. That's why. the war aims. at the very heart of this, isn't it? Yeah, I see, okay. But the let's go.

through the kind of things. that Trump has said. And he said lots of things, starting with protecting protesters. But let's that was years ago. and that was ancient. and nobody's more able. And Trump. I think to sort of contradict himself. or changed course midway. the latest. I think statement came. in the state of the Union address, and he spoke briefly, surprisingly. briefly, actually, given the size of the forces. But he spoke briefly. to the subject of Iran. It's here that. they were warned to. make no future attempts. to rebuild their weapons program.

and a particular. nuclear weapons, yet they continue. starting it all over. We wiped it out. and they want to start all over again. and are at this moment again. pursuing their sinister ambitions. We are in negotiations with them. They want to make a deal, but we haven't heard those. secret words. We will never have a nuclear weapon. My preference. is to solve this problem. through diplomacy. But one thing is certain.

I will never allow the world's. number one sponsor of terror, which they are by far. to have a nuclear weapon. Can't let that happen. Okay, Greg, it's. It sounds clear enough. Is it is. is that an easy thing to accomplish? You will be shocked to hear. the answer is no. It's not as easy as as Donald Trump. makes it out to be. I don't think, you know, he mentions these secret words. He wants to hear Iran. say that we will never build. a nuclear weapon. That's not actually, I think, America's objective.

in these negotiations. Iran has said those words. many, many times before. Every one from the supreme. leader on down, insists. that Iran is not seeking. to build a nuclear weapon. Those words were in the preface to, the JCPoA, the 2015 nuclear deal. So if that's all Trump wants to hear, then it's very easy. But that's not actually. all that America wants. I think there are two big questions. And trying to negotiate. any kind of a nuclear deal right now. One is, will Iran continue.

to be allowed to enrich uranium? And then the second is what happens. to its existing stockpile, of enriched uranium, some of which has been refined up. to 60%, which is very, very close. to weapons grade. On the first question, the American position, was. zero enrichment, that Iran should have no ability. to enrich uranium. Iran has always insisted. that that is a sovereign right, and it is not going to negotiate. that away. They are willing to propose, perhaps, I think, retaining.

some token enrichment capacity, they might, either go back to. what was spelled out in the JCPoA, which was enriching uranium. to about 3.5%, which is used for, for civilian purposes, or, an even smaller ability. to to refine tiny amounts. of uranium for, medical uses, which is refined up to 20%. But again, there's a gap there in the positions. And then on the question. of what to do with the existing. uranium stockpile, Iran has proposed, diluting some of it.

You blend it down. to a lower level of purity. and then shipping the other. half of it out of the country. to a friendly state. Russia might be a country, that would be a candidate. to receive in. Iran's uranium stockpile. But the American position. seems to be that they want. all of it shipped. outside the country. to the United States, which is going to be a nonstarter. for the Iranians. That's all very well, Shashank. But does bombing Iran help. you get any closer to all of that? Well, the important thing to hear. is, of course, Iran was bombed last year. Where is this uranium stockpile.

that Gregg is talking about? It's buried under the rubble. It's not entirely accessible. The fear here is Iran. could access it at a future date. And so the point here, I guess, is a recognition. that despite Donald Trump's claim. that he obliterated. the program. last year, it repeatedly repeated claim. it isn't obliterated, it's inaccessible, it's degraded, it's set back. But in the long run, it's a recognition. of what Barack Obama. was doing in his deal, which is an understanding that. for long term guarantees. against Iranian weaponization,

you need Iran to voluntarily. make concessions, voluntarily. give things up. And my gut feeling on this. is that what Trump. needs is not a perfect deal. It's something he can. claim is better than the JCPoA, which was Barack Obama's deal. And if that involves, you know, giving up uranium, all of that, that wouldn't. be that dissimilar to the JCPoA. One of the real advantages. that Trump could claim. he has secured, if he can get it, is a deal.

that has no sunset clauses, a deal. that has no expiry dates. like the JCPoA. If he came away with that, then I think he could say. with some plausibility, he has got a deal. that is, in that respect, stronger. than what Obama was able to get.