What we know about the Ukraine peace plan

Let's start with the the peace the peace. deal or the peace negotiations and I'm. losing track actually of where we are. exactly. So Ollie, let's start with you. >> First of all, a peace plan is quite a. grand statement. What we're dealing with. following the um Geneva talks is one or. possibly two possible frameworks. It's. it's a moving target as people basically. explain to me and the picture is. changing every day essentially based on. what the Russians uh are putting down. and how difficult they're being. And. that's a feature, not a bug of this.

negotiation design because on the one. hand we've got essentially Russian. demands, on the other side we've got. Ukrainian concessions and then at the. end of the process it's a Russian veto. Um but if we to take the the document. which emerged from Geneva, it's. essentially a working paper and it's a. you know what it comes down to is a. draft treaty to partition Ukraine. The. question is where um it removed some of. the the worst parts of an earlier plan. which was concocted by um the Russians.

in the the first instance but also uh. Trump's special representative uh Steve. Wickoff and it's removed some of the the. more egregious moments but the main. questions have been unresolved and. they're reserved um for leaders. Um so. you know you know Russia obviously wants. the the rest of Donbass. um but the issues of neutrality um NATO. and that partition line I mean they're. still very much in parenthesis. >> So it is and you put that very very well.

is essentially a plan to partition. Ukraine. Um uh but as Ollie said, Ed, this is better than uh the first version. of this um deal that was cooked up first. of all by Steve Witkov, Jared Kushner uh. and the Russians essentially trying to, you know, re replay the Gaza playbook, if you will. And there was an. extraordinary leak of a conversation. between Steve Witkov and Yuri Shakov uh. the Russian um representative to to kind.

of essentially advise him on how to deal. with President Trump. And this caused. shock waves. Um but President Trump. himself seemed to think this was a. perfectly normal thing to do. Let's just. listen to this clip. >> That's a standard thing, you know, because he's got to sell this to. Ukraine. He's got to sell Ukraine to. Russia. That's what he's that's what a. dealmaker does. You got to say, "Look, they want this. You got to convince them. of this." You know, that's a very. standard form of negotiation. I haven't. heard it, but I heard it was standard. negotiation.

>> Ed, what does that tell you about what. America is trying to get from this? >> Well, I think it is reasonable for. Wickoff, who wants a deal, to talk to. the Russians about how to get one. My. what my concern is I don't think he's. offering the Ukrainians the same kind of. possibilities and advice about how to. proceed and get get their way. So I. think it's asymmetrical. That's my first. fear. The other theory is like who who. who leaked this and why? Um there were. obviously in Ushakov's phone. That's the.

way it looks to me because there was. another conversation with his colleague. Kil Dmitrif that was also leaked. So. someone is in there. Is it the Americans. trying to sabotage, you know, the deep. state trying to sabotage the deal? Is it. is it the Europeans who are very. unhappy? Is is it even the Ukrainians? Is it even the Russians? Some people say. some hardliners in Russia. But that's a. kind of interesting question and it. tells you that all of this is very. improvisatory. It seems to be going very strongly in. one direction, then it goes in another. direction and it makes it very.

unpredictable. Shashank, I have to ask. you uh before we get on to the details. of where this uh this deal is now, what. is your suspicion of who leaked this. because this is a world you know well. Well, look, this call was apparently. over WhatsApp and uh you know, as we as. journalists know, WhatsApp is supposed. to be endtoend encrypted, which means. you you know, you can intercept it, but. you just get sort of garbled nonsense, which indicates someone has got one of. the end points. And I think Ed's right, you know, Usharkov is a common element.

in these leaks. So I I think it is. highly unlikely a western intelligence. service having got access to the uh. device of Putin's foreign policy aid. would be stupid enough to leak the fact. that it has got into this phone. That's. not how they tend to operate. They would. use that access any signals intelligence. agency worth its salt and acquire the. intelligence. They wouldn't burn their. access. So, this reads more to me like. perhaps, you know, he perhaps he's. played it out on speaker phone in the. wrong Moscow hotel room and it's been.

intercepted uh uh in that in that way. I. don't think a professional western. service is turning their access for the. sake of this. >> Hard to imagine what Russian would be. well served by by getting that out. there, though. >> Well, I think I think you got it right. I think someone tried to sabotage some. of these uh these processes. >> So, we have an extraordinary process. We. clearly have someone trying to sabotage. it. But let's just get to the nuts and. bolts of what we know about what the. contours of this deal look if it ever. becomes a deal might be. Oie has told us.

that it is effectively a partitioning of. Ukraine. The question is where? Chris, what about the other elements? What do. you think is still on the table in terms. of the first version cut Ukraine's. forces dramatically, said no NATO ever. Talk us through what you think is still. on the table and whether it will be. acceptable. Well, with the large proviso. that this thing is changing all the time. and we don't really know how firmly held. any of the positions or decisions are, it's definitely a lot better than it. was. Um, uh, at the moment they're not.

talking about handing over a big chunk. of territory that the Russians want but. have not yet managed to secure in the. Dombas and and that's really crucial. territory because a lot of defensive. lines are there. It seems like the cap. on the size of the Ukrainian armed. forces has been raised from 600,000 to. 800,000. And and if that's true, well, that's a number they can more easily. live with because it's not really very. much less than they have now. And then. there's reserveists and so on on top of. that. And also perhaps they've taken out. the idea that they have to write into. their constitution the Ukrainians that.

they can never join NATO. So if all of. those excisionions remain excised, that's a very big if and we can perhaps. come on to that. Um this is a lot better. for Ukraine than it was. The problem now. becomes, you know, will will the. Russians accept it? And there's still. things there that Ukrainians will have. difficulty swallowing. But um you know. it's it's a dynamic situation. >> So it started off as a what 22 point. plan 28. >> 28 point plan. A number of excisions. have been made. I. >> think it's 18 now. >> There could it could be 18. I mean this. is sort of re sort of reminiscent of.

what happened in Gaza right where there. was 19 now. No one is exactly sure but. there will it seems be some some. limitations on Ukraine's military its. ability to defend itself. Shashank, do. you think those from what you read of. what's in there at the moment, is that. something that is how how damaging that. would that be to Ukraine? And is it. something that Ukraine could accept? >> Um, it's I don't think it would be very. damaging at all actually. And I've I've.

been speaking, you know, as I was. sitting up there in Lak trying to talk. to European diplomats, some of them. saying this is deeply disturbing. Any. constraint on the sovereignty of a. European state is a terrible precedent. And I understand what they mean, but in. practice, let's be very clear, Zany. Even if the limit on Ukraine's army had. stayed at 600,000, most analysts looking at this don't. think that Ukraine would have a force or. would be able to afford a force much. bigger than 600,000 after the end of. this war. It's just unrealistic. And.

similarly, of course, uh on long-range. missiles, there are appear to be in. these, even in the first draft, by the. way, in the 28 points, no restrictions. on Ukraine's possession of long-range. missiles, whether that's uh Taurus, whether that's uh scalp, storm shadow, or future American tomahawks. Uh and so. in practice, I I think this is extremely. permissive in terms of what Ukraine can. have. The only caveat to that is of. course the original proposal rules out. any European military footprint on.

Ukrainian soil and I think that is the. bit that would have the biggest. consequences for Ukraine's post-war. defensive plans. >> That's really interesting. Ed, >> the other thing that I that really. troubled me about this plan is is the. vagueness of the US security guarantee. So it was highly significant that the US. wrote language in that seemed to imply. that it was going to participate in this. security guarantee and that was that was. progress. But if you looked at the terms. of the language, it was just. uninforceable. It was vague and.

uninforceable. And and and if you put. all of that together, you can't have. European troops. um the if the US forces. this deal on Ukraine basically with a. gun to its head and you're expecting the. power that's done that to provide the. security guarantee. That left me feeling. very queasy.