What America and Iran want from negotiations | The Economist

How determined to see regime change do you think? Trump ism. He claims he's seen it already. in a completely feeble way, it seems to me. But genuine regime change. Does Trump want that? Will he strive to get that in any way? I gave up trying to understand. his deepest intents a long time ago, but I think based on his record, regime change. has never been. at the core of Donald Trump's philosophy. Power is at the core of his philosophy, but he ran very much on a platform of saying.

regime change is an unworthy goal. His vice president, JD Vance, made that a core tenet of his political rise. And that's part of. why his base or some parts of his base have been, so surprised and disappointed by this conflict. So I think that specific goal is one of the, one of the, objectives of this war. that I think he's. most likely to walk away from, rather than the. the uranium enrichment. or the nature of that demand. or control over the state.

I think regime change. is the one that he'd be happiest. on in relative terms to seed. One of the things that's still sitting. there is almost, 400kg of highly enriched. uranium that not for roughly ten bombs. The US. regime insists that, Iran surrenders that. How likely do you think it is that the regime. will be willing to trade that. in highly enriched uranium. for, say, sanctions relief?

They will come out of this war. with extensive damage. to their infrastructure, their steel industry, their petrochemical industry. Iran is going to need investments. to deal with that, to fix that. And anyone you talk to in the region, any diplomat, who's spoken to the Iranians. or has been engaged in. talks over the past. few weeks, says what they want coming out of. this war is money. And you don't get money. unless you get sanctions relief. from the Americans. So I think the more pragmatic people in Tehran, will understand that they have to make a deal.

around their nuclear program. I'm still sceptical. They will go all the way to a zero. enrichment deal. They have made this. such a point of national pride now, for years, through multiple rounds of failed negotiations. with the Trump administration, they may still insist on some, perhaps token. enrichment capacity, but they beyond that will have to make, nuclear concessions, particularly on this. highly enriched uranium. I think they will be willing to do that. But it's this interesting moment. now where. the nuclear program has been such a focal point.

in international diplomacy for decades, going back to, the George W Bush administration. And yet, over the past six weeks, it seemed like the least of everyone's. concerns in the Middle East. I was speaking to someone earlier today. who said if I had to choose, if it was up to me, I want to deal with. Iran gives up its drones, not its uranium, because the drones are. the things that are being used to, attack oil and gas infrastructure to attack ships. in the Strait of Hormuz. I think Iran will be willing. to negotiate around the nuclear program.

The other things. I think it will be much more reluctant. to talk about missiles, drones, things like that. I agree entirely with Gregg. I think you have to separate the, enriched, highly. enriched material. that it already has. from the notion. of having some enrichment capability. up to a particular limit. within an international band. Down, down, down the line. I don't think it's willing to cede. that second principle. The first, it is ready to trade. That would be a real victory. I think that I mean, to my mind, if the if Iran were willing.

to trade away. that highly enriched uranium, I think that would be count. as a genuine result, actually, from the war. The irony is that. we were in that position before the war. That was what was on the table. Before all of this started, diplomat diplomacy could have. could have resulted in that. Perhaps it still can. War isn't able to achieve that. And there's something else. which I think kind of Iran. that feels that it has, which may be even superior to a nuclear weapon, and that is its weapon of mass disruption, its control over the Strait of Hormuz. and its ability to continue. to have this stranglehold on the global economy,

which it's going to be its primary weapon. It could end up being far more powerful. as a deterrent. than, than, than a nuclear program. So you've all raised. the possibility of using that weapon. as a way to make money. by creating a kind of toll, on the, on the, Strait of Hormuz. But it's also something that is a potential, weapon of mass disruption, a deterrent, if you like. Can it be both of those things? Will it be both of those things? Gregg, what do you think?

I'm hearing. a lot of scepticism. about this toll booth idea. in the region in wartime. Absolutely. Iran can charge ships tolls. It's doing that already. If you're worried about a physical threat. to your safety going through the strait, of course you will pay, whatever the you're on the answer asking. But in peacetime, if you want to charge those tools, you need some threats to back that up. Right? There needs to be a form of coercion. involved with that. Unless you get Donald Trump. to somehow agree to this. and put it into the ceasefire terms, which would make.

all of America's allies in the Gulf, furious. I mean, it's not impossible. Somebody was joking to me the other day. that perhaps the Iranians can do a deal. where. Trump Junior's cryptocurrency. firm gets a cut of the profits. and it's paid in cryptocurrency, and you actually imagine that happening. You laugh now, Gregg... Exactly. I tend to think this. tollbooth idea. might be something. that the Iranians negotiate with. It's a card. they can offer to make a concession around. And here it's similar. to the. the dilemma about the highly enriched uranium.

that Nic was alluding to. Why does Iran have this highly enriched uranium? Because Donald Trump withdrew. from the nuclear deal in 2018. and Joe Biden couldn't. negotiate a new one, and Iran slowly started to violate the agreement. Giving that up. Yes, it's a concession, but it brings us just back to where we were. before Trump abandoned the deal. And I think it's the same thing. No one is around charging tolls in the street. because of the war. If it offers to stop charging tolls, okay, that's a concession, but it's it's conceding. something that it's only doing. because of this conflict.

My biggest worry about or my biggest, I think, biggest block. to giving up the highly enriched uranium. is that you do that once it's gone, whereas the. relieving sanctions. is a kind of continuous process. that can be reversed, and the level of trust. between Iran. and the United States. and Israel is so low that you have. I think you have to have trust that. this sanctions relief is going to be enduring. And that's that's a hurdle to get over, isn't it? It is, except for the fact that Iran has discovered. this new leverage, which it hadn't really exercised in the past. And that is going to be something.

which it seizes as something which is ongoing. And the irony of all of this is that in part, Iran is discovering a foreign policy, I think, which dates back to the time of. the Shah, whether or not it charges tolls, could be a. could be an open question, but I think it is. it does not see its role, as in the time of the Shah, as a kind of. as a regional policeman of the, of the Gulf. And this is what it wants to secure. going forward. I just think that this whole. discussion illuminates. the how dramatically each party's.

conception of its own power. has evolved in quite a short amount of time. I mean, it used to be that Iranian power, at least from the perspective. of the United States, which I'm representing in this panel, was all about its nuclear capabilities. And now its capabilities. have been revealed. to be much broader, its abilities. to pull in different levers, to exert pressure on its enemies or allies. alike has, you know, whether it's. the drones and ballistics program, whether it's its control over the state, it now has these latent, abilities.

It hasn't fully exercised before, and it's now in the position to do so.