The final filmed interview with Sir Alex Younger, the late MI6 chief | The Economist

Sir Alex, welcome to Inside Defence. Thank you for  inviting me. Thank you for helping us make sense. of this moment. I feel the war is at this really  important juncture. President Trump is trying to. reopen the Strait of Hormuz by military means  uh through threats against Iranian power plants. and to seek to end the war through diplomatic  talks. I think what people are struggling with, what I'm struggling with is a full understanding  of who has the upper hand right now, who is in a.

stronger position as that process unfolds. Iran,  I think, um, and I I regret having had come to. this conclusion because like many MI6 officers  of my generation, um, we faced the violence and. brutality of the IRGC for most of our careers.  That's the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp. Yeah. So there is no love lost between us and I  shed no tears for Ali Kam um who was killed at.

the beginning of this war. But the reality is  that um uh the US underestimated the task and. um I think as of about two weeks ago lost the  initiative to Iran. In practice, the Iranian. regime has been more resilient than I think  anyone would have expected. Uh they took some.

good decisions actually uh as as early as last  June about dispersing their military capability. and delegating the authority for the use of those  weapons which has given them uh significant extra. resilience against this incredibly powerful um air  campaign. They have embarked on what's technically. called technically called horizontal escalation  i.e. firing rockets at anybody within range which. at the time honestly um Shashank I thought was  nuts but in fact has been a very good way of.

putting indirect price on the US sort of worked  and then um they've understood the significance. of the of the energy war and held the streets  at threat and globalized and essentially not. internationalized just globalize the conflict  in a way that gives them gives them some some. uh some weapons. So, uh, you know, they've played  a weak hand pretty well and at the same time,

my second point is that Donald Trump has said  some stuff that will have confir confirm something. they knew already, which is that they're in a  civilizational war in their terms. You know, they're they're um in a war of existence. Donald  Trump made it very clear that he wanted to see. them um, you know, up against the wall basically.  uh whereas America has embarked on a war of choice. and um in those terms I think they that's that's  um imbued them with more staying power than their.

than their US and certainly US counterparts and  they know that now and I think that really is. giving them the whip hand and then finally there's  a there's a very technical point which you'll be. as expert or or more expert on than I am which  is about stocks of drones And the reality as I. understand it that whilst this has been an almost  perfectly executed military campaign from the air,

you can't reduce the threat to zero. And  while you can't reduce the threat to zero, Iran can hold the straits at threat. Even with  just 10% of its initial drone stocks, it can. hold the straits at threat because these are not  military people that it's not a military audience. you have to satisfy. is people who own oil tankers  and captains of oil tankers and that really does. give them the whip hand. So I think the options  for the USR and Israel are pretty limited and.

and not great. You're watching my interview with  the late Sir Alex Younger from March 2026. If you. want to watch our other interviews, including  with Steve Bannon and Binyamin Netanyahu, subscribe to The Economist by clicking the link  above. Now back to the interview. You talked about. a couple of areas of leverage there. Missiles  being one, energy being another. Let's look. at the energy side for just a minute. I think we  have a chart showing the impact of Iran's leverage.

on the straight of Hormuz. And you can see that  precipitous drop in tanker traffic through Hormuz, not on the first day of war, but a little bit sort  of later in as the Iranians begin to tighten the. grip on on Hormuz. Um h how much did this figure  in thinking around the Persian Gulf region? It's. not as if this is the first time we've seen tanker  traffic attacked in the Gulf. There was the tanker. war of the 80s between Iran and Iraq. Um I've,  you know, been looking at think tank papers on.

how would you open hormuz in a war for years and  years. Um how how surprised do you think uh secure. by Iran's decision to weaponize the strait this  time when they hadn't done so in previous bouts? I think it it was a surprise in the sense  that um we saw some appalling riots in um. well they weren't appalling in a sense they were  inspirational but the violence was terrible and. the reaction was brutal and a reminder if any were  needed of the absolute lack of limit that exists.

in the minds of the uh Iranian government when  it comes to any brutality an appalling appalling. attack on their own citizenry and I think that  that was um an indication that um Iran was. um was weak. Um we we we focused on that. What  we didn't focus on and and and we focused on. the economics quite rightly and uh what we saw  was that the regime were vulnerable because they.

didn't have the capacity to feed their own people  or match any basic ambitions around the cost of. living. It was it and and that put them in a real  binding because although they al they have used. brutality in the past, they've also kind of bought  off the uprising and they didn't have that option. this time. So I and I'm amongst these people who  thought that their real vulnerability was on the. economic side and of course in those terms they  need the straits as much as anybody else. They.

the only real revenue they have but they are  getting some ships through themselves, aren't. they? That's the fascinating bit about this. It's  a selective blockade. That's the weirdness. So, of course, in fact, in our minds, I think, and I I  was included here, that they would they would draw. back from um a complete blockade of the straits  because they had as much to lose as anybody else. That logic hasn't worked. In fact, they pulled  off something quite subtle and surprising, which. has kept the straits open for themselves whilst um  essentially blocking it for anyone they define as.

an enemy, which is which is all all the Gulf. So,  they've got the best of both worlds. And I can't, you know, I don't have to think harder about how  we got here. But that that gives, you know, the. West the worst of both worlds. And I think that  is a surprise. And and and one of the symptoms of. this is we were sort of obsessing about mines, but  actually I don't think minds are the central issue. here. It's it's Iran's ability to hold the straits  of threat using drones. Yes. It's not even clear. there have been any mines laid at this point. It's  they're a threat in being, but drones and rockets. and other projectiles appear to be causing the  majority of that risk premium. That's enough. So.

that's hormuz. Let's also think about um one area  where the Americans and the Israelis perhaps have. uh done more damage to Iran and that's the nuclear  program. In a strange way, there haven't actually. been all that many strikes on nuclear assets this  in this campaign. There were last year of course. uh we've seen bombing of uh Natans and again in  the last couple of days um an enrichment site of. Iran. There's been some Israeli bombing of the  Taliban 2 complex, which is a a sort of nuclear.

weapons related complex that Israel um points  to outside of Thran, but by and large, it's been. mostly other targets. Israel says Iran's capacity  to enrich uranium has been uh eliminated. They. can't enrich uranium anymore. So, there's clearly  intelligence suggesting damage to centrifuges, damage to centrifuge components and other  parts of that supply chain. And we still have. that stockpile of highlyenriched uranium sitting  somewhere under the rubble. Most of it in Isvahan,

a little bit of it perhaps in Foraux and in  Natans as well. How do you look at all of. this in terms of the damage caused to Iran's  nuclear program? But I think more importantly. their ability to reconstitute it in the coming  years should the regime survive. Well, at the. moment I'm I'm reasonably sanguin about it. So I  mean it's it's not something to be relaxed about. um a organization like the Islamic Republic with  its impleable hatred of all things Western in.

possession of these weapons is an unthinkable and  threat. But um I think that such as the quality. of Israeli, American and Western intelligence  penetration of Iran that the chances of them. reconstituting their enrichment capability without  anybody noticing is actually pretty low. So. um it's it it remains a problem and of course you  can't destroy knowledge from the air. I'll be the. first to acknowledge that. But it but I I would  be surprised if it's if it's the close in if it's.

a close-in problem. But I emphasize I don't have  access to current intelligence. So maybe there's. something there I don't know about. And I think  one of the other questions around the nuclear. program is not just that capability, it's also  intent, Iranian intent. What is their attitude? And perhaps what is the attitude of Maj Baham as  the new supreme leader? there were suggestions he. wasn't always as um on board with the fatwear uh  offered by his father against the development of.

nuclear weapons. Now that fatwa of course as  you know as we know didn't prevent Iran from. working on a clandestine nuclear program over  the years but it did set certain limits on the. pace of that program the decision to go ahead and  weaponize a device in the final instance. So that. really brings us to the question of the regime  which is which is you know in place weakened. um but still the Islamic Republic stands as an  as a revolutionary entity the revolutionary guard.

the the the organization that planted roadside  bombs that killed many of your colleagues in. over those years that stands and is is surviving.  So to start with have they been more resilient. than you thought? Did you anticipate they would  survive this onslaught even after that brutal. suppression of protests you described? Um, how  do you understand their their their survival. and their endurance now? [clears throat] I think  that they um are in the death rows and um uh but.

I think the irony is that the biggest threat to  them is peace not war. The January uprising showed. that they have no answers. Yeah, the hatred that  engendered is endemic and will will will last for. decades. The estimates are up to 10,000 of their  own citizens machine gunned in the street by IRGC. sponsored militias. I don't expect them to survive  into the long term as a result. But of course,

ironically, this situation is an environment where  they um they get an extra lease of life because. uh it's hard for opposition to organize in in  the face of an air campaign and their license. to be even more brutal than they were before. I  think um when it comes to the nuclear stuff um. the very large majority of Iran perhaps 80% of  them are are against in fact they are they are.

they've had it with the theocratic regime [snorts]  and that that actually was sort of how the voting. went when Masoud Peskan was elected that you know  so this is data from president of Iran and it. wasn't a manipulated election you know it showed  that pretty well 80% of Iran was nothing more to. do with this sort of total resistance theocratic  ideology, but the 20% or or probably even less 10%. are the ones with the guns and that is proving  decisive. They are empowered by this situation.

to continue to brutalize the population. You've  got this interesting attrition that's taken place. at the top of the regime and new faces coming  through. Uh some of them though probably quite. well known to you, the new IRGC chief, General  Vahidi. He's a former Kuds force commander. The. goods force was of course very active in Iraq and  Afghanistan and and and you would have seen them. up close. Um you've got uh of course Ali Larajani  killed last week in an air strike but people like.

say Jali and other figures who were long you know  at the top of this regime still there. Um many of. the people you'd have been studying closely as SIS  chief I'm sure have died in the last two weeks. You know there's been huge turnover. What do you  make of the kind of ideological complexion of the. regime as it has changed in these last four weeks?  I think the net effect um which was probably going. to happen anyway is that the uh that we've seen  the end of the the the theocracy actually with.

the end of Ali his successor was never going  to be as powerful as he was. That's kind of. it. And uh in Mushtaba although he's ostensibly a  cleric he doesn't have his father's credentials. you basically see an IRGC takeover. Uh not a  dictatorship so much as a juna I would say. Um and that's how Iran is being run now. So you  know paraphrase the beards have got shorter. Tell. me a bit more about the IRGC because they're the  regime's revolutionary guard. They're the they're.

the the in a way a bit like the PLA. They're  the armed force that guards the revolution, not the state. That's the regular army which  is disempowered, not very influential. But. how religious is it? How ideological are they?  Because they also have big business interests, don't they? They also they're corrupt. They're  sort of smuggling things across borders. What. are these who are these people? Yeah. So that's  um you know they're no less ruthless than Ali, but they are more corrupt and um uh significantly  significant beneficiaries of the sanctions regime.

So, they're sort of invested in this um sort  of uh black economy that's been created by the. long-standing sanctions, which is one of the  reasons why you might think they would be more. pragmatic in these circumstances. It's important  to understand Mashtaba as just a a sort of I mean, we've never even seen him. He's he's just a  figurehead, a figurehead to to all of this. So, these guys are in charge. None of them, as you  say, have any sort of track record that might.

imply leanings toward reform, but they are, I  think, more pragmatic. That's certainly true. And then just the last thought on Iran's  domestic state of affairs, which is you. say the regime is in its death throws. Now,  you know, that process, it can be terminal, but that process could last a long time for Iran.  What follows? I mean, you're not a mind readader, but what are the prospects you would put on a  democratic transition versus some other kind of.

rather messy and unpleasant transition? Well, I I  I obviously I don't know. I don't ask ahead of MI6. to make um prognostications about revolutions  in Iran. Our track record is not unblenmished. on this on this. When I say that the regime is in  death throws, I'm emphatically not putting a time. thing on that. So I actually think in some ways  this war as I've said may sustain their capacity. to brutalize the regime. But I particularly  think after what happened in January, yeah,

the chances of them keeping the show on the road  indefinitely are low. Look, what comes next? Who. knows? All I can counel is just sort of listen to  the dialogue in particular anything that any sort. of buyers remorse around the Mushtaba appointment  when they could have put in someone like Ayatal. Humeni's son who is a much more pragmatic  person but has real religious credentials. that would have been another way to go that in  fact would have ordered a some kind of shift.

mass poses listen to him you know fundamentally a  secular reformist figure but clearly really under. the thumb of the IGC at the moment. If he starts  speaking more freely, then you have the prospect. of the 80% of Iran that is actually just sort  of had enough of this um starting to prevail, not just demographically but electorally. Maybe  that's that that would be a clue that I would. be listening to. Then of course look at the edge  just like with Russia. Um you often get the clue.

as to the instability of the regime by what's  happening on the edge, not what's happening in. the center. you know, the the e the ethnic makeup  of of Iran, it's like a kaleidoscope. All sorts of. nationalities are what's going on there and those  that will start to give you clues as well. But do. I think in five years time it look like it does  now? No, I emphatically don't. So, let's talk a. little bit about intelligence because I think part  of this war was [snorts] rooted in the belief from. Mossad and that view then channeled through to the  White House that Iran was weak on its last legs.

um and would be susceptible to one big push, but  also a view publicly articulated though I think. not supported by the facts that Iran was weeks  away from a nuclear weapon when in fact we know. that actually it had barely touched its nuclear  material since the strikes last year. All of. this raises some quite big questions around the  state of American intelligence. Uh its capacity,

its politicization, um what health is the American  intelligence community in right now? Well, well, I. I'm actually not sure about the caus or the links  implied by your question, Shashing. I mean, I. think the the key point is that Donald Trump makes  decisions on his own. He said it. He said he does. stuff because he feels it feels in his bones. That  is not the same as a rigorous inter agency policy. where where all of the intelligence services  which there are six but it is the job of his IC.

of his of his director of national intelligence  previously director of CIA to say to him and. speak truth to power and say Mr. President you're  you're wrong. If you do this the regime won't fall. and by the way you've got much more time than you  think. And instead what we have is Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence going to  the Hill on front of Congress saying refusing. to read out the portions of her annual threat  assessment that contradict the president on. Iran and um are saying it is the president that  decides what is an imminent threat. I think any. intelligence professional would be shocked by  that and would think that's really disturbing.

Yeah. So there's a culture thing there, but  I mean you know I was a head of intelligence. My job was to have the courage and I hope I lived  up to it. But it's it's harder than you think to. tell leaders what they don't want to hear. I hope  I had the courage to do that. But there is another. side of this where those leaders actually have an  appetite for uh being influenced by they have to. listen. They have to listen to what you're saying.  Yes. Yes. And so it sounds like a esoteric point, but I think it's quite an important one in this  context as to how the US intelligence community.

operate. I mean, let's just be clear, their their  um capabilities are astonishing. I've seen it. from the inside out historically. They've been a  big part of what's helped us stay on top of, for. instance, the terrorism threat in Europe, and they  should be thanked for that. But um I I I imagine. and again I don't know I'm out of it but the the  current culture will be will be demoralizing and. particularly uh the extent to which people  have lost their jobs for speaking truth to.

power. It sort of bakes in the possibility of  an intelligence failure because intelligence. failures come when we allow our intelligence  to be politicized or influenced by what we. think the decision maker wants to hear. A great  example of that, I believe, is 7th of October, an intelligence failure by any standard. This is  the Hamas attack on on Israel. Yeah. Where I think. that um the Netanyahu government basically made it  pretty clear that it regarded as inconvenient any.

idea that Hamas was anything other than ciescent.  And whilst and and so it's there's a whole lot of. stuff we could talk about about the balance  of human and technical intelligence and all. of that but in the end I think people sense that  this was not a conversation that was welcome and. that heightened uh the um uh the risks that  manifested in the end in the attack in in. the undetected attack. Let's also think about the  intelligent successes here because this campaign.

began. Whether you agree with the wisdom of this  move or not, the assassination of our hommin that. appears to reflect a pretty impressive level of  knowledge about his whereabouts, his movements. reports we've seen that um there was success  in hacking CCTV cameras and traffic cameras. into Iran, allowing his bodyguards to be tracked  in a very granular fashion. And we've seen again. and again how Israel is able to pull off  these quite astonishing feats inside Iran, stealing the nuclear archives from Tehran and  and uh finding and killing Ishmael Haneer, the.

leader of Hamas in a IRGC guest house in Thran.  um they seem to be capable of remarkable feats of. intelligence in in Iran. How h how what is it that  allows a human agency a human intelligence agency. to be doing things like that? You know, what is  it that leads to that level of success? Um being. uh being at war and focused. So, you know, um the  MAD is not a global intelligence service. It's one.

with just two or three jobs to do. So they benefit  enormously from that um essentially narrowness of. scope. Uh whereas say SIS might have global  responsibilities, China, Russia, Middle East, and they can really laser-like focus on Hamas,  Hezbollah, Iran, and a couple of others. But you. can you can make the list just exactly. But um  so they're not Yeah, we're a global intelligence. service. They're not. And then being at war  is different. Um, as we've seen in Ukraine,

it's an astonishing galvanizer of innovation.  And the trick for us uh here is to derive the. benefits of that innovation uh without obviously  um hopefully being in in the same situation. So I think the other question is beyond just Iran  related challenges, American intelligence seems. um also in a period of enormous flux in so many  other ways um including technologically and.

that's one of the issues that faces intelligence  services globally. How do they continue to do. their core work of espionage of recruiting human  sources around the world in an era in which their. um officers are being tracked biometrically with  surveillance cameras all around the world? Um what. is your sense of how existential a problem that is  for human and um how agencies are coping with it? Well um spies as I'm sure you know at least spies  like us hum operators are basically optimists.

We do a nearly impossible job. Get out of bed  every morning expecting to be able to, you know, persuade some hard bitten intelligence officer to  to change sides. You know, we we have to have an. optimistic mindset. And you're not recruiting  these top sources every week, you know. So, as I understand talking to former officers in  a tour, if you recruit a handful of people, it may be a grand success. Yeah. Exactly. So, I  would prefer to characterize our situation as a. state of existential optimism. Really? I mean how  extraordinary is it in this nexus between machine.

and and man this which we call cyber where you can  interact with anybody in the world in any way um. without regard to all of the barriers that existed  before. Um that is an amazing opportunity. How is. it, you know, how how extraordinary is it that  an age of big data and advanced analytics afford. you insights that again, you know, you would you  wouldn't get in a lifetime in the British library.

There's a whole set of advantages that acrew  to us. At the same time, it must be said as as. um you know, some really fundamental threats if  we don't take it seriously and we don't evolve. And and the most obvious of those is that our our  sort of basic business model has been disrupted by. the internet and everything is visible. We are in  a ubiquitously censored world and if you haven't. got the memo on that then you are in big trouble.  That's certainly true. So there's a premium on on.

learning and adapting which is undoubtedly there  and I think you'll see a a sort of spreading out. of of services that got the memo and services  that didn't. And I'm quite sure that my successes. and certainly I was determined you know that we  would be in the right right part of that movement. Just one more thought on that which is the sort  of who is the sort of officer who prospers in that. world because you were recruited at a time when  the world was not full of those digital senses and.

presumably it prioritized a certain set of skills  and some of those like the [snorts] ability to sit. across a table and talk to someone maybe in Dari  or Pashu and tell them why it's a good idea to. give away state secrets are kind of enduring but  others may not be. you may need a different sort. of officer. So I mean having seen the scope of  these changes, how how has the nature of a recruit. changed in that time? Well, I I think you you you  put it well. So on this the generation of of human.

relationships remains intrinsic and core uh and  that hasn't changed at all. But the environment. and circumstances and way in which you do that  and the threats to it and the opportunity are. are completely different. The biggest difference  I think in in in that that sort of came in the 30. years that I was in office was was really when  I started you could do everything yourself and.

actually that was you know quite empowering. Uh  so to the anthropology question you asked me who's. the beneficiary um it's it's certainly true that  sort of power within services and between them has. been democratized. You need more people with more  different skills to come together. You can't just. hand someone a passport in a false name and  say off you go. See you in a while. It was, you know, it was great while it lasted. But,  but it is a real team effort now in a way it. wasn't before. Um, with that detour out the way,  I want to come back to Iran because I want to talk.

about allies and how allies deal with this new  world of America, of Trump. Um, but specifically, let's begin with those most affected in the  Gulf. Um, you spent some of your career in the. Gulf. You were posted to Dubai, so you've seen  it up close. you know that part of the world. I. think they're in a really difficult place, aren't  they? Because they have lost that trust with Iran, which has bombed them in unprecedented ways that  would they would never have predicted. They in.

some ways need protection of American air defenses  and American air bases. But they also see that. America along with Israel has dragged them into  this conflict that has caused such damage to their. business model of cosmopolitanism of business  traffic of tourism uh in a haven of oasis in this. really tumultuous region. Now they could try and  cut America out and say, you know, you've caused. us these problems. Expel you from our bases. We  don't want you anymore. um perhaps in the way the.

Egyptians did to the Soviets in the 70s. They  could say, "We don't like this, but we double. down on the security blanket we know." Or they  could hedge by going to others, Brits, French, perhaps even the Russians and the Chinese. Where  are they on this this crossroads? Which which. path do you see them taking? Well, look, they  they've actually been crossed with the West and. specifically the US for quite a long time. I think  in in in the minds of the average Gulf leader, um the Western US failed a test in 2011 by not  being sufficiently um assertive in their support.

to the Arab monarchies during the Arab Spring  and that really struck a chord and these are. families that will be in place for decades and be  unlikely to forget that. And um you think that was. a mistake on part of the part of I mean my views  aren't material. point is that um that um won't. be forgotten and if and and if if if if I I I I  think if the Gulf had other options they would.

already have exercised them. So in some ways it's  a power but you do see the Saudis sort of flirting. with the Russians and the Chinese a bit don't you?  They do and you like selling um oil in Yuan and. stuff. So there's a lot of, you know, trying to  remind America they've got a choice. But actually, I think what, you know, whatever you say about the  political outcome of this war, the military lesson. is really, really clear. Um, they are in a really  difficult invidious position. I'm when it comes. to places like Dubai that I know well, though  they are an incredibly resilient Yeah. setup.

that has made sort of essentially something out  of nothing for decades. So I would not invite you. to underestimate their capacity to to get through  this. But I think you know certainly the US and. and the Gulf they they sort of need each other in  a way that probably transcends this. Uh and then. there's a sort of wider Middle East question which  is if you're left with the sort of Iranian regime. you outlined earlier which is perhaps in its death  throws but potentially quite elongated protracted.

death throws led by these hardline figures.  The IRGC more empowered than ever before with. a figurehead leader perhaps with fewer resources  to spend on their proxies and their their missile. forces. They'll have in a period of rebuilding  for some time, but they still four weeks into. this campaign are able to fire scores of ballistic  missiles every day, including over vast distances. like the 4,000 km to Diego Garcia in the Indian  Ocean despite being constantly hunted by American.

and Israeli planes. That's all quite impressive.  And so they cast a shadow over that region. So. one side of this is how does the Gulf States  deal with America? And as you said, you know, there's they don't have all that many options.  The other side is how do they deal with Iran? You know, living under its shadow. Do they the  Omani route is clear, you know, you play dead, you play nice, you appease the Iranians. Um, a  lot of the other Gulf States seem quite angry at. Oman for its approach in this war. I don't think  you should um underestimate the damage that would.

have been done to Iran. They've been subjected  to this uh astonishingly um frankly successful. wellargeted military campaign which reflects the  evolution of targeting in a way that will have. done enormous damage to all of their capacity  to project threat and violence. My my point was. simply that the last 10% cannot be got at from the  air a residual component with which they can keep.

firing its seanes or Gulf States. So the best I  think and given that Trump is sort of signaling. with including today that he basically wants  out. If you were to ask me where's this going, I'd say the most likely end state we're looking  at is something like Iraq before the second before. the 2003 Yes. invasion where so between Gulf one  and Gulf two. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. sort of down but. not out and you know really down but but still  with a capacity to project asymmetric threat and a. willingness to do it that keeps on drawing people  back in and and and is a persistent problem. It.

seems to me that's probably what it will feel  like and because they've got this sort of golden. opportunity in the straits. This is not something  anybody is going to be able to ignore. that that's. going to be a big problem for and what we forget  of course thinking of your analogy which is very. interesting is that you know in the first Gulf  War you've got this failed uprising by the Kurds. and by the Shia it's it's suppressed it's put  down even though America's encouraging it which. is another rather unfortunate you know chapter in  American history but then it's not as if it's all.

calm till 2003 till the invasion the UK the US  and France for a time in in operation you know. desert fox and others are bombing Iraq in order  to try to force to comply with UN resolutions. over its weapons program and also enact a no-fly  zone over Iraqi territory. So, it's this open. wound. It's not it's not a passive threat that's  dealt with that suddenly pops up again in 2003. And if that's right, I mean, what what what occurs  to me then is that for America, a country that.

has been trying to devote its security efforts to  the Pacific and this enormous problem of Chinese. military power could find itself, you know, not  having dealt with the issue once and for all, but. having created a wound that just fers for years,  pulling its resources back into the region. Well, it t it takes two to end a war, I think, is what  we're going to discover. And um and by the way, we haven't even talked about Israel yet. But of  course, they have a different set of I think this.

is the point where we see a certain divergence  between the agendas of the two countries. So. just lifting off from this cleanly, declaring  victory doesn't look to me like an option. It it. is something that Trump can do, but in practical  terms, I think it's very the problem remains in. exactly the terms you've described it. Let's say  there is then an attempt at a deal or a deal. Um, one question that interests me is given your  answer to my first question that Iran has. the upper hand here, you could infer from that  that the terms of a settlement will reflect that.

balance of power as they often do and therefore  that what might be on the table is less attractive. than what was being discussed in Oman at those  talks just before the war began. And so on Iran's. nuclear program, on its missile program, on its  relationship to proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah, on Hormuz and the Iranian rights over Hormuz,  even on American basing in the region, you could. argue Trump could be facing with a prospect of a  pretty unpalatable deal that's a lot worse than. he had access to early on. Well, look, the the  Shia regime, Shiaism, Shiism comes from a it's a.

it's an ethic of resistance. It's it's an underdog  thing and they there's a huge um premium on doing. the pragmatic thing right so I think they are  capable of being pretty pragmatic the drinking. the cup of poison put it in the end of the Iran  Iraq war that's all there but but equally can. you imagine any Iranian government of this stripe  signing up to anything less than guarantees that. they won't be attacked again and sanctions relief  right those are without those two things they.

don't really have a state you But we know that  they desperately need sanctions relief because. of what happened in January. And how can they sign  anything that doesn't stop them being bombed and. and attacked and to concede those two things is  yeah it's it's it's a pretty big concession on the. on the US part. We don't know what US war aims are  because they've never really been articulated. But. that you know that that's quite a lot to swallow.  Well, I I guess the other element of of that is.

um uh Trump's threats to escalate to bomb Iranian  power plants. He says, starting with the biggest, which you know could constitute a war crime  depending on on how it's done. Um and the. prospect that he sees is Hog Island, which is this  very important island from which Iran exports 90%. of its oil. in the situation that he destroys  power plants, destroys Iranian gas fields, takes over Hog, is it possible that he could  wrench the terms back in his favor? Yeah. So, I think there's a there's a possibility that  he just declares victory. I think there's Harog.

Island there, by the way. There it is. We can  see declares victory and goes or um and you know, there were signs of that in the announcement this  morning. Before that, I think I would have said. that a more likely scenario is the one you just  described, which is escalating to deescalate. So really ramping up the pressure uh through  the the threat of um a hog island or um a raid, you know, to take hold of the northern coast of  the straight of Hormuz or raid on the nuclear.

program, whatever it might be um uh to um to  try and um ideally split the Iranian regime or. at least you know bring it to terms. I I think  you know those are the two options that he has. he has got. I think they're both in play at the  moment. But at the end of it certainly the second. scenario there is a conversation of some kind.  However weird that might sound I just can't see. um how you get complete military victory from  from the air. I just can't see it. So let's then.

think about other allies. Having talked about the  Gulf, let's perhaps look to Europe for a moment. This war has, I think, accentuated those fault  lines between Europe and the United States. Trump. has called NATO allies cowards. He has accused  them of failing to help him reopen the Strait. of Hormuz. Just today as we're talking in an  act that would be extraordinary for any other. president in any other time. He has shared  a satirical sketch from Saturday Night Live.

mocking Sakir Stalmma the British prime minister  openly which which would be completely you know. beyond the norms of ordinary diplomatic conduct in  any normal presidency. Um which raises all these. questions you know back to the four particularly  following the Greenland crisis. Um is is America. lost as an ally to Europe? I think um we've we've  been huge beneficiaries of an incredibly bene um. generous security guarantee for the United States  over decades. But my strong view is that we've.

actually been infantilized by it. We we have been  prepared to outsource the most fundamental duty. of government, which is security to to to another  nation now. They're they're close allies of ours, but they don't have identical objectives. So, in  some ways, this is a bit timely. I I don't think. we should hasten um the or encourage people in  America who want to draw down or reduce their. commitment to the success most successful alliance  in in history which is NATO. But at the same time,

I think this is the moment where we actually  kind of amend our relationship with hard power. and understand that without that we're just going  to be um prey to other people's ambitions really. And so that that is overdue. So in some ways this  is a good opportunity. You know we and we haven't. talked about Ukraine yet but of course this is  the other big galvanizer. This is the time where. Britain and Europe needs to regain its capacity  to develop and exercise hard power. And here's.

the rub. I actually think we'll have a better  relationship with America once we do that. And. so in terms of our dependency, we don't want to  hasten that rupture as you put it. But you want. to prepare for that world you're entering. And I  think getting that transition right is very hard, particularly in areas like intelligence where  you have 80 years of deep cooperation. Some of. it profoundly institutionalized with formal  structures and cooperation like in signals.

intelligence with the five eyes. In perhaps the  human intelligence world, less institutionalized. in the same way. But nonetheless, it's not clear  how easy it is and how how affordable it is to. hedge against this and to build alternatives.  How do you go about doing that? Well, I I I as. regards the com the relationship America to me  it was it was pretty clear. I mean, of course, we've got decades of um working together with  us this strong personal relationships. But in. the end, it was about being useful. And I don't  think I was under any illusion about what that.

relationship would look would would be like if  we were not useful. So it doesn't kind of alter. the mission from a UK intelligence perspective.  Be good and be useful and and that that that's. objectively what we want to achieve in any case  in terms of sort of building out building out. alternatives. I mean I think that that in a sense  it follows from what I've just said. We will want. to retain the capacity to be as effective as  we possibly can be in defense of our of our.

nation's interest. But being useful seems also  a problem in this context where this is not. the first time we've disagreed with the United  States over a major policy question. But there. is a tension between being useful in the sense of  opening up our air bases in the UK for use by the. United States and staying out of a foreign policy  decision that we think is foolish and may end up. um um uh uh emboldening Iran. And it seems to  me that on issue after issue that tension may.

crop up more as America moves in a different  direction politically. So how how do you be. useful without being pulled into these follyies?  Because I'm talking about a we could talk about. that. I'm very happy to talk about that. But  I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about. the intelligence relationship which is explicitly  defined as being depoliticized. Okay. So of course. both nations and in the five eyes generally  we we still are ultimately guardians of our. own national interest. But there's a but there's  a premium and a trust thing about not allowing.

your intelligence to be politicized. Yes. Now  clearly you've got a highly political president in. the United States and the risks of that actually  happening are going up. But I still believe that. our our job is to apply cost to that by by America  having something to lose by us being really good. and really useful and making a really significant  contribution. that gives us bargaining power where. we say no the deal here is that we're exchanging  intelligence in a way that is not political and.

um can we and and and make the whole idea of horse  trading more problematic. Just a final thought for. us to conclude on which is putting the Iran war in  broader global context and you mentioned Ukraine. This obviously has spillover for Ukraine in  the shortage of air defense interceptors, the loosening of sanctions on Russia in purchases  of Russian oil. Ukrainian drone operators are. being sent to the Gulf. Russian intelligence  appears to be flowing to Iran to aid its.

targeting. This affects China in that it's sapping  American military power for the next several years. and drawing down its munitions. Iran faces its own  energy problems as a result of Hormuz. There is. a feeling among many people that there is um not  necessarily a third world war but this is a really. internationalized conflict in which great powers  are in their problems are converging in some way. that feels quite troubling. How do you see this  sort of this in global terms? So I I don't think.

this war will spread beyond the region. I I don't  think it's well worth although it has gone from. Cyprus to Sri Lanka in some ways. Hopefully no  further west or east of that. Yeah. But what I but. but what I do think and it's a corollery of the  sort of hyperconnected world in which we live is. that the second and third or order consequences of  the world will be international and global and and. and the list I can't better the list you've just  come up with Shashank I I would say you know I. really regret the fillup that Russia will receive  from this in terms of the budget improvement and.

um and the fact that there'll be fewer um  of these precious interceptors available. and the fact that NATO is yet again um arguing  amongst itself, they'll love this stuff. Um. equally, I I'm bound to point out because  one of my bug bears is the success with which. Putin posits this idea that he's winning that  last month Russia actually went backwards. So, can we please keep the faith on this? If we  want to defend Europe, we need you Ukraine.

to succeed. Well, Sir Alex, thank you so much  for a fascinating conversation. Thank you. And. thank you for watching. Send me your thoughts  to insider economist.com. I'll see you soon.