Kaja Kallas: can the European Union survive in an era of strongmen?

Hi representative Kaja Kallas. Welcome. to Inside Geopolitics and thank you for. being our very first guest. Thank you. for having me. You had an extraordinary. conversation with the Chinese foreign. policy chief Wang Yi about how China. sees the war in Ukraine and it was. reported that he said to you that he. they don't that China has an interest in. seeing Russia not lose. What what what. was his message to you? His message was. that it's not in their interest that. this war stops because then America's.

intentions will turn to China and and. it's not in their interest. It is. interesting. you know why he said that. later on I spoke to some think tankers. from Japan whose assessment was that. actually the war in Ukraine is not very. popular in China. So they need to also. explain this to the people why they are. the key enablers of this war. So so to make this softer and say see.

this is in our interest and that's why. >> But at a minimum that's saying that I. mean if if if he's sincere he's happy to. see cities bombed and civilians die. for China's self-interest. So I think. that's a picture of this very very kind. of ruthless great power that is rising. and his influence. So to go back to. something you said at the beginning. about how Europe has tremendous economic. leverage and also has the power of being. predictable the kind of the rule setter. and the rule kind of keeper.

That doesn't work as well as you might. imagine with China right? I mean you. could make a case that you have. tremendous leverage over China. You're a. very very important market for China and. yet when they're in a dispute with the. Americans and suddenly choking off the. supply of incredibly important minerals. like rare earths. Europe has basically been collateral. damage without any kind of power at all. How do you end up with so little. leverage given your economic importance? >> Yes and this is exactly the point of the. geopolitical powerful Europe that is.

only there if we are united. I mean if. we talk with the member states two big. worries that we have with China. One is. their economic coercive practices. regarding our economies our industries. export controls you name it and the. other is their. support or them being the key enabler of. Russia's war. in Ukraine that's causing a lot of harm. to to our economies as well. So so these. are the key issues. Now the question is.

what do we do about this and there the. views are very divergent when it comes. to different member states because some. are more dependent on China than the. others. Now again I think the response. or the answer to this is to actually. build partnerships around the world. I. think what the superpowers very often. they very often overestimate their own. power and they underestimate them. needing anybody else. So I think the key.

here is to build with the Indo-Pacific. partners the Latin American partners. also from Africa to have a diversified. supply chains. >> Well that's a very European answer if I. may say it. I mean you know it's always. about sort of building out some wider. partnerships. But there is a kind of. another view that China is a country. that understands power and strength and. who can impose pain. Now Europe has the. ability to impose quite a lot of pain. through things like you you created an. instrument to hit back at any country.

that is deemed to be using economic. coercion on Europe. It exists. If we are. united it's never been used. Do you think that it could be should be. used on China when they're. hurting the European economy? Well as. I'm representing the 27 member states. and that is the problem that we have. that you know. it is true what you say. We have the. power we have the tools. if we. are united in using the tools and that.

is the that is the problem. That's why we're trying to really. consolidate and see. what what is our approach or what can we. do together. But there why I'm. mentioning the partnerships is that you. only have the power if you have also a. leverage of you know turning away. someone like I'm not dependent on you. and if you look. of China's position right now I mean. how many critical raw materials come.

from China how many I mean electric. batteries. the percentage is very high or the ships. or or electric vehicles or you name it. Then. you know a lot of countries are actually. worried about their economic power which. means that there are also a lot of. countries who have the critical raw. materials and that's why you know it. doesn't happen overnight. It should have. been maybe done before. but it's clearly you can only use those. tools when you know that the other party.

can also inflict pain on you when you're. sure that you have a backup option. Is. it possible though that you also need. kind of brute hard power military power. that that Donald Trump's you know Donald. Trump is also often playing an economic. leverage game. He has you know he's very. fond of the idea that tariffs are. essentially a kind of super weapon that. can bring another country to its knees. just with the threat of 100% tariffs or. 150%. tariffs. Is Europe being pushed to one. side by great powers that are willing to. bundle hard power and coercion and.

economic power? Is that is that the. fundamental problem? >> I think the fundamental problem is that. in this rough world where you have on. one side countries that are able to take. decisions by one person executive orders. versus countries where you only don't. have 27 members but you have 27. democracies that also have a domestic. you know issues. So we have debates it. takes a longer time.

>> do you think we'll go back to a world in. which there's a premium for being. predictable because I know that's. Europe's kind of thing and and how could. it be any other way? You have to have. rules and laws when you're trying to. bind together 27 very different. countries. But Donald Trump Xi Jinping. Vladimir Putin these are all strongman. leaders whose as you say it's not just. that they have kind of the ability to. take a decision alone but their very. unpredictability. gives them power. >> I think China and and Russia are very. predictable. I think you know Putin made.

sure what his goals are in 2007 and he. has been very open about this. China as. well I mean when President Xi visited. Russia. and and he said to Putin that the. changes not foreseen in 100 years are. led by us together. Yes we we shape them together. So they. have been very open and very. predictable. The question is whether we. believe them because we don't think like. this. I remember when this war started I.

was actually astonished how many. you know leaders before that did not. believe that it's possible because we. think via the democratic lens I mean but. they don't and they are very predictable. in this sense. But I think in this in. this time. the question how these things evolve is. also on us. [Music].