How strong is the Russian army?

Few outsiders understand Russia's. military and its mindset better than my. guest John Foreman who served as. Britain's defense atache in both Kiev. and Moscow. He has seen the Kremlin's. world up close. He spent years of. serving the Russian army. He was tailed. by FSB spies and he was in the room as. Britain's defense chiefs warned Russian. generals not to invade and watched as. that warning was ignored. John Foreman, welcome to Inside Defense. Thank you. Shashank for the invitation. >> John, it's great to have you here. Um,

you spent 40 years in the Royal Navy. doing lots of Navy things. Yeah. >> But latally in your career from 2019 to. 2022, you were Britain's defense attache. in Moscow. You were our military's man. in Moscow in the the lion's den. >> Yeah. >> And you were in the room as we can see. here just to take you back a few years. as Britain's defense minister. There's. Ben Wallace and Sir Tony Ratkin, the. chief of defense staff. >> were meeting their Russian counterparts. this Sergey Shyu and and Valerie. Garasimov and asked them face to face.

whether they would invade. I think. you're there in the back corner, aren't. you, John? You watched as they brazenly. lied to your face. >> What was going through your head as we. can see you there. And what was the. atmosphere in that room like? >> Well, we'd had two weeks to arrange it, you know, and um it was such in the. run-up to the the invasion, the. intelligence we've been, you know, more. and more evidence was building that. Russia was going to invade. So this is. really much the lastish attempt to deter. them from doing so. The key point was.

that we knew that Shyu and Gresimov met. Putin. So rather than going through. layers and layers of um other. intermediaries, we'd speak to the. Russians directly. Yeah. >> What was the mood like? Um it started. quite stuffy. You know, Shy Good was a. man like a vain man like to read his. statement. But the point was to refute. their sort of talking points and really. get onto the substance of it and really. say look if you don't invade which were. a bad thing for Europe and for Ukraine. and for Russia then there are things we. can do bilaterally and multilaterally to.

stabilize our relationship. You know. we've gone through. >> there's a carrot on the table. >> Well I think there was a carrot about. the demands issued to us in in the end. of 2021 on European security which ones. were you know negotiable and which ones. weren't. Um but actually so it was both. both our interest not to have you know. conflict both bilateral relationship. also multilaterally but I don't think. they're listening you know my role here. at the end I was doing what was the mood. like obly I speak Russian listening to. how they spoke um and then I had a. friend down here was taking the notes.

and after we compared notes and somebody. said they're either Champions League. liars or you know they're lying to our. faces or they're or they're saying it's. all be great don't worry about it John. Um I think the proof of the puddings was. Ben sent more weapons, defensive weapons. to Ukraine. So I think we saw through. their lies. >> Yes. >> And. >> and you're confident they were lying. It's not that they were in the dark as. well from Putin. >> No, I think um Shan and Gresimov. definitely knew. And I think a couple of. others did, but it's interesting. afterwards I was outside uh being. thanked by the Russian generals for. having brought this big delegation and.

sorted out. It's all fantastic and how. we're going to have peace in our time. and you know we can have a new. relationship. Um and I looked to their eyes and I. don't think they knew. >> what I knew. Um and um so there was. quite optimism on both sides actually. I. think some people the foreign office. also grabbed at the straws and said this. is a great sign that Russia's not going. to attack and I think also in some parts. of this machine because you know the way. the nature of decision-m is taken by. Putin you know ultimately it was his. decision they' probably agreed in.

principle of the planning had been done. >> but the final go had not yet been given. and I think that was probably taken. around about Valentine's Day that yeah. 14th and then a week later they invaded. so we were before that um this final. decision based and all the facts. So, so. the preparation was carrying on. >> You know, you had been observing the. Russian army on exercises, reading their. military journals, talking to their. academics. That's what was your job was. >> Absolutely. >> What did you think of as their strengths.

and weaknesses? And when they eventually. failed to adapt to being punched in the. mouth, was it because they had a bad. plan or was it because there was a. fundamental rot in their army to do with. culture or proficiency or something? You. sort of got with hindsight. Have you. taken a view on this? >> Well, I I I think it's a omni shambles. to be honest. The Russian I mean did. they underestimate the Ukrainians? Yes. Did they overestimate themselves? Yes. Were they blinded by as I wrote in the. economist a hubris? >> Yeah. >> Chauvinism, racism. Yes.

>> The Ukrainians are lesser are lesser. people. >> Yeah. They are they are malaras. They're. little Russians quote unquote. Know we. are the great Russian people. They are. the small Russian people. You know we. are the heirs of Zhukov. they are just a. bunch of you quote unquote country. bumpkins um who are corrupt and. inefficient and can't run their own. country. >> I think there was a role of um you know. sort quote new generation warfare you. know this of thing I the indirect um. espionage sabotage destabilization. operations.

>> you don't need large uh infantry. formations because by attacking the key. nodes of Ukrainian power by undermining. them through subversion covert action. they'll crumble for decades. Yes. >> So Ukraine's a house of cards in. >> Yeah. And basically we'll put lock on. the door. >> Yeah. >> We've already done all this work and. then the whole country is going to. collapse. The the um leadership will. flee. We'll surround the army of. Donbass, force them into um surrender, bring on a puppet leader, sort of Lucena. type figure, eradicate the uh Ukrainian.

intellectuals and those people that. would get in the way and then move on. And I think that was the plan. But I. think you know there so there was. problems in the in the concept of the. plan. There were uh problems in the. intelligence preparation uh especially. the intelligence services kick um. passing information up that Putin wanted. to hear. >> Yeah. Not sending bad news up the chain. >> Yeah. Like you know all our troops have. got COVID and they're not prepared. They. haven't done any rehearsals. Boss, we. haven't got enough troops or the Ukraine. is going to fight and that wasn't heard. because it's the way it's done.

>> But I thought also in the execution um. the fact they had four parallel thrusts. into Ukraine at the same time. No. overall commander, no logistics, no. rehearsals as I said. So when my. colleagues were driving around the. border in the winter of 2022, they just. sat there getting drunk um getting COVID. and doing nothing. So suddenly they like. sprung up and said, "Lads, you got to. evade tomorrow." So well there's no. plans, nothing. The plans are out of the. maps are out of date. So I mean I think. it's just catastrophic um failure of the.

Russian state. I think it's a symbol of. how much Russia's been institutions like. the army, armed forces, ministry of. defense have been eaten away by. corruption, incompetence. >> Let's imagine there was a ceasefire. today and the Russian army starts. >> rebuilding. It starts thinking what kind. of army do we want in 2030. >> Now, one option is the sort of army it. wanted before 2022. That is lean, modernized, small units that are, you. know, focused on more, you know, lethal. firepower. Another option is a Soviet.

style mass army that is built around. just vast numbers of people. Do you. think the Russians have a view of this? What kind of force is NATO going to be. looking at in 2030 2035? >> The problem with the Russian army in. 2022, it wasn't the sort of lean. professional readiness army that the. allies have NATO or the Soviet style. large large force. So they were sort of. that's why they had things like the. battalion tile groups and all that. >> So I think that's a direction in line. with that sort of sense of conservatism. The problem the Russians have had is.

that they whilst they've been engaged in. the war, they can't think about a war. But I still think it would be a a. defensive force. Uh I still think that. they will um you know look to the past. for the future. But I'd also say that I. think some of the forecasting in the. west is mistaken is because they don't. think about intent. You know what is the. Russian army for? >> Yeah. And you know I can read we can all. read multiple reports by multiple NATO. generals and said well you know if X. tanks are built a year then that takes Y.

to build and this recent the army. they'll be ready to attack by then. because of course why would they want to. do that so I also think that whilst they. are building their conventional army. which they'll have to do because we're. now on the third army effectively a bit. of a rabble the army's gone and Putin. said his directions are travel that will. throw uh emphas empises back onto. nuclear weapons. Russia is already at. inferiority in economy militarily, financially to Europe. I think that. gap's going to grow. I think Russia is.

in decline. I think already speaking to. uh Tony Ratakin pointed out. >> the former chief of defense. >> staff. Yeah. The numbers in terms of. European spending if we will get to two. and a half, three, three and a half%. It's going to be like a trillion extra. dollars in defense over the next 5 to 10. years, which is a considerable amount of. money. At the same time, you have the. Russian economy creaking along having to. rebuild its army. >> The NATO army is fundamentally. untouched, notwithstanding, you know,

what's happened to Ukraine. So again, why would Russia want to attack NATO. when having a suffered at the hands of. Ukraine so grievously and b then have to. face a more even more superior enemy and. notwithstanding the whole debate whether. Americans can be with us or not? I think. even European NATO could be handle the. Russian army let alone with the. Americans there. I think the future. Russian army look very much like the. previous versions of the Russian army. um yeah an army which you know quite. good on paper.

>> um but again is there to keep us from. them I think it's a symbol of how much. Russia's been institutions like the army. armed forces ministry of defense have. been eaten away by corruption. incompetence.