Finland’s president: are Europe and America’s interests still aligned?| The Economist

It seems to me you've moved because not that long ago you were sort of saying, let's not lose hope. The Americans might actually strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. I have to say, yesterday, talking to people here, people were using phrases like irreparable damage has been done. So where is your kind of morale right now about, well, fixable. You know, I'm pro-European, pro-American and therefore by default, a pro trans-Atlantic. I think it is one of the strongest alliances that we've seen, in international relations throughout the history of mankind.

And I think we shouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater. But to argue now that the transatlantic partnership. is stronger than ever would be a fallacy. It's not. But all I'm saying is that we need to work on areas. where we have common interests such as defence, NATO, minerals, technology, or in the Finnish case, icebreakers. And then we need to cordially disagree on things such as the European Union, international institutions, the liberal world order, and climate change.

And we need to understand that America, with the current administration. has changed its tack, you know, its value basis, quite right wing. Its interest. base is quite financial, and its power base. is not relying on alliances in the same way that they used to. So I always talk, you know, as a Finn, I say deal with the world as it is, not as you would wish it to be. Of course, I wished the transatlantic partnership was stronger than what it is right now.

But let's just maintain let's just make sure that it's not going to crumple. I remember being struck yesterday, we had, the undersecretary of defence, I guess, now say, well, why don't we bridge Kobe talking about, you know, maybe Europeans are panicking because they realise. that America has different sort of arguments about values, but interest is what really counts. But when you go through your list. just now have kind of climate change, their support for far right, in many cases. pro-Russian parties that they would like to see take power here in Europe. Their view of alliance is are you confident that even on interests,

are you absolutely confident that that that binds us at the moment? I think in some cases it does. It's some it doesn't. And I think, of course, the values issue is a little bit complicated. So when I look at American foreign policy doctrine right now, it's obviously. framed in the National Security Strategy, which was published in November 2025. And for me, it has two pillars. One is MAGA. So Make America Great Again. That's the ideology that sort of thinks of Europe.

as a big Democratic party, if you will. You know, it thinks of Europe as too liberal to a certain extent, killing. Itself with immigration. It's very harsh. Harsh are saying which of course, which is interesting in the sense that I. think that immigration into the US is still higher than what it is to Europe. But that's beside the point. It's also the one that attacks London, you know, very strongly because it's a multicultural melting pot, etc.. So that's one strand. And then the other strand, is the policy side of things, and that's America first.

And in that there's a pecking order, you know, number one is the Western Hemisphere. Number two is in the Pacific. Number three is Europe. Number four is the Middle East. And number five is Africa. And this is the reality where we live in now. Then we come to the basic question of interest. Is it in the interest of the United States that Finland, bordering. Russia 1340km, has one of the largest armies in Europe? Yes it is. Is it in the interest of the United States that Sweden. and Norway have strong Arctic defence forces? Yes it is.

Is it in the interest. of the United States that Russia doesn't create spheres of interest in Europe? Yes, it is. So I do think that it's probably a little bit more on the interest side. than the value side at the moment. But you left off one Nordic country, Denmark, where America sees an interest. Well, at least you know, five minutes ago in taking a bit of that territory. Yeah. And that's why it was important to get an off ramp in Davos on that, because I think we had three scenarios the good, the bad and the ugly. The good was to get the off ramp and focus on Arctic security. The bad would have been to increase tariffs and go into a trade war.

And the ugly one, of course, continued military threat coming from the US. And now the good news here is that we're working on Arctic security. And I keep on reminding everyone that the Arctic is not only Greenland. The core of the Arctic, and the defence of the alliance. is actually in Finland, Sweden and Norway. And I think the alliance should feel lucky. that we have one of the strongest Arctic forces in the world. you said something interesting on stage in Davos. A lot of people noticed where you said, you know, Europe can defend itself, you know, almost on its own. But then you also admitted that, you know, one of the very big expensive assets.

Finland has is I think it's 62, American fighter jets, F-18 fighter jets. And you sort of said in passing. But of course, if the Americans didn't let us use them, that would be problem. But they would never do that. Is Finland actually still in some important ways, you know, subject to an American veto on what you can use? No, when I say that Europe can defend itself, this is not only. strategic communication, but it's reality because I don't like language. that talks about European weakness or incapacity to defend themselves.

Our whole defence composure is based on defending ourselves without anyone else. There's a reason why we have trained through obligatory military service. 1 million men and women, for Arctic conditions. There's a reason why we have 62 f-18s. Why we just bought 64 F-35s. There's a reason why we have a long range missiles, air, land at sea. And there's a reason why we have the biggest artillery in Europe. And that reason, it's not Stockholm. So what I'm saying is, you know, we've got this.

Don't worry about it. And I think it's just it's it's such a hypothetical question. I mean, I. didn't meet the CEO of Lockheed to say, can you please keep the f-18s going? Of course they will be going. But it's not just a hypothetical, right? I mean, I I've been in European capitals not very far from yours, Helsinki, where people are talking about, you know, watching the Americans forbid. the Ukrainians from. using some of their long range missiles or watching Elon Musk turn, turning off the Starlink private jets in Russia. And so people are realising that for now, we still have.

I mean, it's not a literal kill switch, but I mean, Finland's defence. Are you still in some ways dependent on American goodwill? If a future American president says, don't fight, the Russians come to a peace. deal with them. They may have just invaded the Baltics. But you need to talk, not fight. Can they do that to, you. Know, and it's not going to happen. And remember that it's also tit for tat. There's a reason why the bilateral defence, cooperation between the United States and Finland is deeper than that.

There's a reason why we have 25,000 soldiers training in Northern Norway. And Finland, next week, 5000 of which are American. There's a reason why America wanted to buy 11 icebreakers, which they can, use for their, naval forces. There's a reason why we did the Defence Cooperation agreement. And the reason is that Finland has one of the most powerful militaries. bordering Russia, close to, the major nuclear weapons that Russia has. So, you know, it's interest driven.

The Americans, of course, there's values, but their interests as well. And it's in the interests of the United States, to have close defence cooperation with the Nordics.