I Know Why War Time Trump Is Out of His Depth | The Daily Beast Podcast

Well, they're trying to provide him with information. they think the president should have in front of. And then often he just didn't care about that. or wasn't taking it on board or couldn't process it. But it was a different experience than I've seen. with any other American president. I think it's a problem. I think it's clear in the second term he feels more at ease. making these decisions, but it doesn't mean he considers in. any more detail or at any greater length or scope. what exactly the implications are of what he's doing.

I'm trying to close this is the Daily Beast podcast. Can you imagine what it must be like being in the room. trying to brief Donald Trump on matters of national intelligence, of whether or not we should bomb Iran, of where even Iran is? I literally can't and I can't imagine. being a senior military official trying to explain the complexity. of pulling together troops in the Gulf. and also trying to explain how important it is to talk.

to our allies and message our allies about what we're doing. But of course, one man who has tried and lived to tell the tale. and tells the tale incredibly bravely and frankly is John Bolton. And whatever you think of John Bolton's. policies, his ability to articulate what it's like to be in the room. with Donald Trump when Donald Trump is doing anything.

but listening to what is being said, is, I think, really illuminating. It's alarming. It's unnerving, and it's really unmissable. I found his insights into the complexity of the power dynamics in the room. When you have President Trump. and you have the Joint Chiefs of Staff, really fascinating. And well, anyway, you can see for yourself. I loved talking to him.

Ambassador Bolton, thank you so much for joining us again. Last time you were on the Daily Beast podcast. You told us a little bit about what it was like actually briefing Donald Trump. when you were his national security adviser. Can you remind us of that? Because clearly, it's an incredibly important role, which has now fallen to Marco Rubio, the secretary of state. But but from Trump won. What was your experience of briefing him?

Well, Trump didn't take briefings all that seriously, whether intelligence briefings or other kinds of briefings. He would frequently talk more than the intelligence. briefers, which makes it hard to consume intelligence. Lyndon Johnson once said, I found that I don't learn very much when I'm talking, which is a remarkable thing for somebody like Lyndon Johnson to say. But obviously Trump Trump had never heard that, Trump. Trump believes that, international relations are embodied.

in the personal relationships he has with foreign leaders. So, for example, he believes he's good friends with Vladimir Putin. and therefore, that the U.S. and Russia have good state to state relations. I mean, personal relations are important in all aspects of human life, but but they're not the dominant factor in foreign affairs. It's, state interests and values that dominate. And Vladimir Putin doesn't think he's Donald Trump's friend. He thinks he's the leader of Russia and he knows what he wants.

So so watching Trump make these decisions, can be very difficult. He doesn't have a philosophy. He doesn't have a national security grand strategy. He doesn't even do policy the way we normally understand it. And I think you see those characteristics already just in the first 4 or 5 days, playing out in this, action against Iran. So, so it's incredibly helpful to sort of hear that. Can you describe what it's like being in the room with the president.

when you have very senior military leaders? What's the sort of juxtaposition of power like? Because on the one hand, obviously the president. is the most powerful man in the room. But then on the other, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have extreme. military knowledge that has to be downloaded in some way. What is that sort of chemistry like? Well, I found that, President Trump was. was often very uncomfortable, chairing a National Security.

Council meeting in the Situation Room when the president chairs that. That's that's what an NSC meeting is. When the national security Advisor chairs it, it's called. a meeting of the principals committee, but it's when the president is chairing it. that that's potentially a real decision making meeting. And the situation rooms are kind of cramped conference rooms, sometimes filled with people sitting behind the principals. who sit at the actual table that the president doesn't know.

And he felt much more comfortable doing things in the Oval Office, sitting behind the resolute desk with a few senior advisors in those chairs. you've seen in a semicircle in front of the desk, because it was more his office than the Situation Room. He's the only president I've seen who felt uncomfortable in the Situation Room. And what was what do you think the discomfort was about? What do you think it was? Because he'd, you know, claimed bone spurs when he would have got.

called up to to Vietnam. What is that discomfort about? I think it was because there were a lot of people in the room. who know a lot more about what we were talking about than he did. Look, every president has his own decision making style. It's our job to adapt to him. He doesn't have to do it the way others have done it. The question is, whatever path he chooses, is he getting the information. that he needs? And, often I was worried that Trump wasn't getting it, wasn't taking it on. board. In in my experience with him, he, he had, two chairman of the Joint.

Chiefs of Staff, Joe Dunford, a four star marine general, and then Mark Milley, former army chief of staff and a four star Army general. I can tell you that every senior military official that I ever saw. Trump with, including Dan Kaine, who was then in command of U.S. operations in Syria, that we met at the al-Asad Air Force. base in Iraq the day after Christmas in 2018. And who obviously impressed Trump then. But every military officer that I saw Trump with, behaved.

was the greatest, deference, politeness, professionalism. It was it's a it's quite a performance. you don't see in the political leaders who form our cabinets. And they spoke with restraint. They didn't think they were making the decision. They were there to advise the president. That's the job of the chairman of the Joint. Chiefs to be the president's principal military advisor. And I felt that in most cases,

he respected the individuals who were talking to him. But again, felt uncomfortable about making decisions. when when we did, make decisions, often following what I call the absolute Brant. Scowcroft model of how national security decision making process should work, Trump would make a decision. and in one case in particular, made a decision to strike Iran. after they shot one of our drones down in international airspace over the Gulf.

And they reversed himself the next day. And I told this story in my book, and I remember Joe Dunford, who was chairman, said, I just wish the president would own his decisions. And that was a very powerful signal, I think, of how, the military felt that, when things went great. Boy, that was, that was fine, but but when things weren't going great. or he felt uncertain, it was somebody else's problem. And it's. He's awkward in the room with them.

I take your point that they're deferential. and they're polite, and obviously they're doing their jobs. Is it awkward for them to. I mean, are they trying to sort of figure out his learning, his learning, style so that they can sort of shoehorn. the bits of information that they feel he needs? Well, they're trying to provide him with information they think, president. should have in front of and, and often he just didn't care about that, or wasn't taking it on board or couldn't process it.

You know, I'm not a shrink. I don't want to get into what was going through Trump's head, but but it was a different experience than I've seen. with any other American president. Both the decisions that I participated in at lower levels. in the government as I worked my way, through the chairs or. just reading about, and I think it's, I think it's a problem. I think it's clear in the second term, he feels more at ease. making these decisions, but it doesn't mean he considers.

in any more detail or at any greater, length or scope. what exactly the implications are of what he's doing. And, while I'm a strong supporter of the decisions. he has made with respect to Iran, I'm very worried. he hasn't thought through the implications or laid the groundwork that a, a. hopefully a normal decision making process would have, would have, led him to do. so in the example you just gave us of him making a decision, and then reversing himself the following day, was there an indication.

why he'd reversed himself, reversing himself that evening. after elements of the mission had been lodged? Because a lawyer from the white House counsel's office ran in. and told him that the casualty figures could be whatever they were, 100. plus that were based on training manuals, that the Iraq that the Iranian army had used. No indication that those level of casualties, those numbers of people would have actually been involved. It was a terrible breach of the protocol of decision.

making for one person on his own to go and say that after the Seoul. National Security Council, chaired by the president, had considered, these questions, including the president asking very specific questions. about casualties, and that breakdown of the process, I think, has become become much more acute in the second term, where one person, for the first time since Henry Kissinger, who's both the National Security Advisor and the secretary of State.

and where the National Security Council staff has been cut to levels as one person. described, that the levels that we had when color television was embedded. So so the idea that we're not, getting the kind of, decision making process that we need is very disturbing. The process does not guarantee the right decision, but the absence of a process. magnifies the risk that you're going to get a bad decision. Ambassador Bolton, what was the most effective way.

of, of getting Donald Trump's attention? I mean, did he respond to charts? Did he respond to clips. from television news shows? I mean, did you ever walk away from a briefing with him thinking that went well? Well, from time to time, I think, one thing we learned was. you could have briefings, that he would listen to and take in if they only had one point. So, for example, in preparation for his second meeting.

with, Kim Jong un in North Korea, I described this in my book as well. We wanted to, reassure him that he could walk away from that meeting. without a deal on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and it would. it would not be to his disadvantage or the country's. And he did understand that point, and he did walk away without a deal, which was the right outcome. But but, what what he would focus on or what.

he would take to be important was, was always a challenge to understand. So given what you know of him, do you think that he has the, curiosity and the attention to detail. to stay with what might turn out to be a lengthy engagement with Iran? Well, I think that's a big open question. Now, he has been saying this could go for 4 or 5 weeks or maybe even longer. So as of the time he makes that statement, he, does appear to understand.

that, it's not a matter of days, but but he could change his mind on that, at the, in an instant and reverse himself declared total victory and stop. We just. We just don't know. I do think that, Prime Minister Netanyahu is one of the people. who was most successful in his for. in the first term and, speaking with the president and I think, only Shinzo Abe of Japan, was better than, than, Netanyahu in the first term.

Although Boris Johnson came close during the time I was there, at least. I think in the second term, Netanyahu is the most successful of any foreign leader. And, if anybody has thought this through in. excruciating detail, it is Netanyahu. So is that a good thing for the US or not a good thing? So one of our allies has thought it through more carefully than we have. Does that mean that we're beholden to them? No. Well, at least there are some people in the United States.

who have thought it through as thoroughly as Netanyahu has. And they're coming to the right conclusion, whether we, have the patience and the persistence to stick to it. at this point remains unclear. I do think it's, significant that, the Trump has acknowledged. it's not like the 12 day war where we bombed for exactly one day. Did a remarkable job with our bunker busters against the nuclear program. Did not obliterated, as Trump later said, but did cause it, along with what?

The Israelis have already done significant damage. So, the distance between one day and 4 or 5 weeks for Trump is very considerable. And I think that if he can stick with that, that alone, is a step forward. But but, you know, three weeks ago we were talking about Greenland. Two weeks ago we were talking about Minneapolis. Before that, there was Venezuela. Do you have any confidence he will be able to stick with it? I mean, this is a man who's able to change the narrative, you know, faster than most people can change their outfits.

Yeah, well, he has a short attention span, so it's always at risk. And, as long as things are going successfully, he'll stick with it. If we run into real difficulty. And I hope we don't. And, we shouldn't at this point. But if we do, because anything is possible, that that would be the testing time to see whether he was able to stick it out. I just I mean, it's you might as well flip a coin is decide what he's going to do. All right. That's rather an alarming depiction, ambassador.

So as. you mentioned, they've taken your old role. National security adviser wrapped it up with Secretary of state. What is the disadvantage of giving both. those distinctly different jobs. to one person, however capable that person turns out to be? What is the sort of internal conflict that. Well, if you go back to the National Security. Act of 1947, which created the Defense Department, merge the Army.

and ward of the War and Navy departments, created an air force, created the CIA, the the creation of the National Security Council was a recognition. that the US had entered. into a much more complex world than we had lived in before World War Two, when the cabinet departments were largely autonomous and, and, there was no coordination mechanism for the president, to, to make these critical decisions. But Congress. and, President Truman recognized that we were in a very different world.

So the whole NSC structure is designed to help the president. make complex decisions in a complex and threatening environment. If you ignore that process, you're back to 1939. And, and that's very dangerous. There has only been one time before when, the National Security advisor. and the secretary of state were the same person, and that was when Henry Kissinger held it, during, during the depths of Watergate and then into the Ford administration.

And with all due respect, DeMarco, he's not Henry Kissinger, neither does anybody else, for that matter. Nor nor are we in the depths of Watergate now. And Gerald Ford came to realize that, as as incredible a person as Kissinger was, it was insufficient for him as president, to have one person with those two jobs. Now, he nominated, Brant Scowcroft to be, the national Security Advisor who had been Kissinger's deputy. But Brant had his own personality, and and he did the job,

and he then and what he served for George H.W. Bush later created the template on which. every subsequent national security advisor has based the job. How the NSC process should work, what the National Security Advisor. does, versus what the Secretary of state or the secretary of defense do. And that has been obliterated. And, I don't think it serves the president well. To lose that process doesn't serve the country well. Trump doesn't seem to understand that he he thought I could do the job.

He told me this expressly was, you know, 10 or 12 people when I had a staff of that 350, I think the staff of any official can always be reduced. But but the issue is, how do you make sure the president has the. right information, that he has the, options that, he can consider? And then how do you make sure. afterward that the president's decisions are being carried out? And I think by essentially ignoring the NSC, by gutting it,

you're you're just eliminating all of those procedural, aspects that are intended to help the president, not not to shift. decision making power away from the president, intended to help the president. Those are not functioning now. So that's an incredibly, helpful potted history. Thank you. And I take your point that this is an apparatus set up to support the. president's decision making, not to not to make him feel less important.

I mean, clearly the same thing has gone on in the diplomatic, corps, too. And you have Donald Trump's son in law, Jared Kushner, and his old real estate. and golfing buddy in Steve Whitcomb being sent out. to lead negotiations with Iran. The negotiations obviously came to an end. What what I mean, what do you think when you see those two.

setting off to do is they say a deal with Iran? I mean, can you sort of describe what you think. the impacts on American security is when you have two people who may. well have a completely different approach, but also don't have any kind of history. in terms of understanding the complexity of what they're doing. Well, you might as well have sent. the Bobbsey twins to negotiate with Iran. Or negotiate with Russia over Ukraine.

Their principal characteristic was they were loyal to Trump. And the main thing you need and in, national security decision. making is judgment. Judgment. You don't need knowledge. Really? Totally. But it helps occasionally. And they went without knowledge or judgment. They went without knowledge or judgment. That's really kind of, Well, that's unnerving, coming from you. So what do you think Vladimir Putin is thinking.

as he watching all this unfold? Well, I think, Russia is about to lose an important surrogate in the Middle East. if the Iranian regime falls, when the Assad regime in. Syria, was overthrown, they lost another ally there. They may lose their naval and air bases, at Tartus. and in a lot of key province, same with the Chinese in terms of Iran. has been an important supplier of oil, contrary to our sanctions.

And, and, and something China has leaned on its own energy poor country. So this will be an enormous setback to, to to Russia and China. And it reflects, in Russia's case, their bandwidth is overwhelmed by the war in Ukraine. They couldn't do anything about Syria. Essentially, they couldn't do anything about, the capture of Maduro in Venezuela, although regime change is not complete. in Venezuela, notwithstanding, whatever Trump, thanks to the. the travesties, are still in charge in Caracas and hoping to hang on.

But but the the trend the trend in the Middle East. if this regime falls is decidedly, against, the interest of the Chinese and Russians. and they don't appear at this point to be able to do anything about it. And we've seen no evidence after the attack. began over the weekend that they've tried. So, in other words, this may be a good thing. for weakening their their position. Yes. Although I don't I don't think that figured into Trump's decision.

I think if anything, because he's going to see his good friend Jinping. at the end of March, beginning of April, it would have operated as a constraint. So I don't, I don't think, the Russia or Chinese. role here played, a significant part of the decision. Okay. So, so one of the things that the Republicans. traditionally have been very good. at is messaging and everybody staying on on message. We appear to have had several contradictory messages about why we are,

why America decided to bomb Iran when it did, and the most recent of which. was Donald Trump saying that we were about to have a nuclear war with Iran. Everything seems to have been ratcheted up as they tried to explain. how important is it for the military and for the Joint Chiefs. to have the civilian government. explaining why they are doing this? Well, I think the military knows what they think their orders are.

I don't I don't think they pay that much attention. I think it's more the, political effect of mixed messaging, both for the. American public that need to be sold on why this is in our national interest, which I think the case is overwhelming, that it is, but it's not being made, how to deal with Congress, which is, another political problem. Same kind, different audience, different circumstances. But basically, seeking to make the case that Congress. should support the president. The same is true in the diplomatic area where we done next to no consultations.

We want our allies to stand with us. And I will say, I'm certainly grateful to Canada, Australia, New Zealand. Are you see the pattern there? But we could be waiting for something from London. But but from the Europeans just, crickets. So I think, we would be in a stronger position if Trump had done. this political homework and if they could keep their messaging, together. I think they will have strong Republican support with just a few exceptions. Apart from within the administration, where there's a strong dissent.

coming from the MAGA elements. that are isolationist, beginning with the vice president himself. So that's a problem Trump alone is capable of dealing with. I don't know what he will do, but it's a significant weakness. Internal to his own political base. So Secretary of Defense slash war. Pete Hegseth has said that next week he'll be attending a fundraiser in Iowa. And, you know, he won't be in effect,

in the chair overseeing what's going on right now. Is that fairly unusual for a defense secretary? Yeah, I think, certainly. it's the job of the commander in chief to be on the bridge during a war. And I think that's, the job of the secretary of defense. to be there with him, to be able to assist and advise, you know, there are times when you conduct business. as usual to deceive your adversaries that that's perfectly normal. But to say.

we're we're going to treat this as if it's a normal time is a big mistake. And I think sends a very, counterproductive signal. inside the Defense Department. The president announced, that we were going to be firing. on Iran on Saturday when he just left a fundraiser at Mar a Lago. There appears to be a temporary situation room set up there, which, you know, appears to be done with velvet curtains. And people have referred to perhaps, comically online as his blanket fort.

How secure can you make. those sort of arrangements when you're doing something like this? I think they were secure. I think it's a question of judgment. If going to mar a Lago was helpful in in keeping the secret wrap. around the beginning of the attack, then I don't mind that. But I think after he announced that he should have come directly back. to Washington and I think, I may be old fashioned here, but I grew up, at a time when president sat behind their desk in the Oval Office.

and spoke to the nation, at moments of crisis. And you knew when the president was making a speech from the Oval Office. that it was something serious, that it was something he wanted. His fellow countrymen to hear. And, Trump hasn't done that. Neither did Biden do it very much. Neither did Obama. I think it's a mistake to lose that. That is a signal that, this is serious and the country should take it seriously. People can agree or disagree, but I want to see a president.

that goes beyond tweets, and post on social media. He should address the country. He should do it this week, especially when American lives are at stake. That's really the most frequent time presidents speak to the nation. I remember Kennedy at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, everybody everybody remembers one or another of those speeches. They didn't necessarily persuade people, but that's the job of the president to do. It's not being done. Do you ever regret going to work for him? No, because I think somebody had to do the job.

And, I regret I wasn't more persuasive. I wish I had persuaded him to do what he's done. Back when I was there. All right. Ambassador Bolton, thank you so much for your frank opinions. and your incredible clarity and the way you declare them. Many, many thanks, Bob. Great to be with you. Thank you. I love. talking to Ambassador Bolton because it's so unusual to find someone. who will be that frank and who's actually been in the room with Donald Trump.

And I also liked his frankness, but he didn't regret going to work out. And I also like his frankness that he doesn't regret going to work. for him, even though, of course, he's now facing his own indictment. in a sort of political retribution from Donald Trump, where he's facing. 18 different charges for, disseminating classified information. Anyway, that case is ongoing, and we weren't able to ask him about it. because for legal reasons, he can't talk about it.

But I do find his analysis of how Trump learns. and what it's like being in the room incredibly valuable. And as I said at the beginning, incredibly alarming. This is the man in charge of American lives in the Gulf. Anyway, if you have been, thank you very much for watching. Please leave us your comments. Don't forget to sign up for a beast tier level of membership. And I also wanted to promote myself with my new Substack.

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