Why Is the U.S. Building the Saudi Nuclear Program While Destroying Iran’s?

From the New York Times, I'm Rachel. Abrams and this is The Daily. >> [music]. >> On Wednesday, the United [music] States. signed a historic deal that allows Saudi. Arabia to develop a nuclear program even. as the Trump administration escalates a. war against Iran [music]. that the White House says is about. destroying its nuclear capabilities. Today, David [music] Sanger explains. what Saudi Arabia and the US are each.

getting out of the deal. And why it's [music] prompted worries. about nuclear proliferation across a. region that is already engulfed in an. escalating [music]. war. It's Thursday, July 23rd. So, David, when I saw this news about. this Saudi nuclear deal, I will confess.

I was surprised. I had a bunch of. questions, but I assume that you, long-time Washington correspondent, nuclear expert, were probably not quite. as surprised as I was. >> Not surprised because this has been. brewing for a long time. More than 10 years, actually. But, it has taken many different forms. For a while, the Biden administration. wanted to make this part of a much. broader deal with Saudi Arabia about. recognizing Israel. The Trump administration has dealt with. it more as a business deal.

But, we knew it was coming. The question is, what were the terms? >> So, let's actually talk about that next. What do we know so far about what is. included in this deal? >> Well, the core of it is that Saudi. Arabia gets to build at least two. nuclear reactors, probably more. That this will last for three decades. And that the business will largely go to. American companies, which is to say. Westinghouse, which even though it has. significant Canadian ownership these.

days, is still a big jobs provider in. the US. So, what the United States gets. out of it is an extension of the. president's determination. to export American goods and to make. sure that American allies. are tied to American energy systems. >> Mhm. >> But, there's a catch, as there always is. with things nuclear. And that has to do. with the question of who makes Saudi. Arabia's fuel.

and what kind of inspections the Saudis. agree to. >> And just to be clear, David, it sounds. like from what you're describing that. this is a civilian energy program, right? >> It's entirely a civilian energy program, which means that its intent is to help. Saudi Arabia build nuclear power plants, the way many other advanced economies. have, including many countries that. don't have nuclear weapons. Think about. Japan or Germany or South Korea.

But, the critical problem comes in the. supply of nuclear fuel. If you are making your own nuclear fuel. and enriching uranium up to say 3%, well, that's fine. That's the level at. which you can use that uranium as a. source for your nuclear electricity. generation. But, if you keep enriching. up to 90%, suddenly you have the makings of an.

atomic bomb. >> Mhm. >> And so, the whole effort from the 1950s. forward, from Eisenhower's Atoms for. Peace program to spread nuclear. technology around the world and make. cheap nuclear energy available to all, has been to find a way to let countries. produce nuclear energy. without getting the stuff they need to. divert to a nuclear weapons program. >> Just so I'm clear, David, this deal is.

about providing Saudi Arabia with fuel, right? Not letting them enrich their own. fuel, which would avoid the threat that. you just explained. >> Well, Rachel, that's where this deal. gets very vague. It allows the Saudis to. purchase the nuclear reactors, which. will take years to build. But, it doesn't resolve the question of. whether they are making their own fuel. or whether they are buying it from. someone else, including the United. States. Instead, it refers that to a committee.

to go study the question of whether or. not it even makes economic sense for. Saudi Arabia to make its own fuel. >> It sort of kicks that can down the road, it sounds like, on this important. question. >> It does. >> Okay, I want to back up just for a. second, though, David, because you had. said just a couple minutes ago that this. deal had been in the works for a really. long time. So, I want to talk about the. origin of all of this. Like, when and. why did these talks begin in the first. place? >> Well, Saudi Arabia wanted a deal for the.

same reason all of its Arab neighbors. want deals. They all want nuclear power. They're thinking about a future in which. their economies are driven as much by. data centers as petroleum. They want to. build modern societies. They're conscious to some degree of the. environmental effects. And so, you've seen many countries in. the region turn to nuclear energy.

One of Saudi Arabia's most prosperous. neighbors, >> [music]. >> the United Arab Emirates, decided back 20 years ago they wanted. nuclear power plants, and they struck a deal with the United. States in 2009. And today they have four nuclear power. plants [music] that are up and running. But to do that, they had to go reach a. deal with the US that every country. that's using nuclear technology of. American origin has to go strike.

And that is what's called a 123. agreement. Sounds strange. It comes out. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. What it means essentially is if you were. going to buy US technology, you have to. agree to some US restrictions. When the UAE negotiated its deal in. 2009, it was considered probably the. gold standard of these kinds of. arrangements because the UAE agreed that.

it would not produce its own nuclear. fuel and that it would allow. international inspectors for the most. intrusive kind of inspections. And so the thought was, okay, we've set. this standard. Let's apply this to other. countries. And when the Saudis began discussing. this with some of President Trump's. closest allies during the first term, it was clear that they were more. reluctant than the UAE to give up their.

right to produce nuclear fuel. and to allow those intrusive. inspections. >> So if those talks started in the first. Trump administration, what has happened. since then? Why did this deal only come. about now? >> Well, the Biden administration picked it. up and President Biden wanted to make a. nuclear deal part of a larger political. arrangement with Saudi Arabia. that would include Saudi diplomatic. recognition of Israel. And so the.

nuclear deal was a sweetener for that. and they were all linked together. The Saudis also were demanding that. Israel allow a Palestinian state to. exist. So, there were these negotiations. that were all wrapped into one big ball, and they were getting very close to. completion. when the terror attacks of October 7th, 2023 happened. And that blew up the. entire thing. >> Right. And I think a lot of people will. remember that when Israel started.

retaliating for that October 7th attack. by bombing Gaza, the idea that Saudi. Arabia would normalize diplomatic. relations with Israel, that was a total. non-starter at that moment. >> That's absolutely right, Rachel. And. beyond that, we now have some evidence. that Hamas timed their attack on Israel. in part to blow up the deal with the. Saudis. >> Right. >> So, when President Trump came in, he recognized he was going to have to.

decouple the nuclear deal. from the diplomatic arrangement because. the Saudis aren't going to recognize. Israel diplomatically. for years if they can ever pull that. off. And Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS in. the region, the Saudi leader, made clear. to President Trump last fall that. diplomatic recognition of Israel was. pretty low on his priority list. But, the nuclear deal was high on his.

priority list. And because it has the. promise of bringing billions of dollars. of revenue to the United States, it's. high on President Trump's list, as well. >> Right. Basically, the United States is. thinking, Israel normalization not as. high on the list as all the money we. could get from this deal, hence why. we might cut a deal with Saudi Arabia. that has these kind of favorable looser. restrictions. >> That's right. And the question was, how. loose would those restrictions be? Now, to be fair to President Trump,

when the Biden administration was. negotiating before October 7th, they were moving towards some pretty. loose restrictions themselves. >> Mhm. >> So, it's not clear to me that the terms. would have been any tougher under. President Biden. >> Right, [snorts] but the Biden. administration was going to get. something very different and very. significant in return, which was a. Palestinian state and diplomatic. relations with Israel being established. by Saudi Arabia.

>> That's right. For President Biden, the. idea of getting such a huge diplomatic. breakthrough was worth taking a bit more. nuclear risk. For President Trump, the idea of getting a big business deal. is worth taking a little more nuclear. risk. >> I want to talk a little bit more about. the timing of all of this, David, because obviously, this deal is coming. in the middle of the United States' war. with Iran, right? And we know that there.

has been tension between Saudi Arabia. and the United States over the war, to. the point where I think at one point. Saudi Arabia closed its airspace to the. United States for the military for a. period of time. So, can you just talk a. little bit about whether the war has. anything to do with why we're seeing. this happen now? >> Well, certainly, as we've discussed, this was long brewing. So, uh there was some thinking, in fact, that the deal would be signed back in. February. But then the war broke out with Iran,

and the Saudis were angry at Washington. for several reasons. I remember having. dinner with a very senior Saudi official. just hours before President Trump. ordered the first bombs dropped on. Tehran in February. And that official did not have much. notice, if any, that the war was about. to break out. Then the Iranians took everybody by. surprise by actually expanding the war.

to the Gulf allies and particularly. hitting American bases. And again, there was a lot of tension. about whether the United States was. putting enough effort into protecting. Saudi airspace from these incoming. missiles and drones. >> Right. >> So, there have been a lot of points. where the war in Iran has surfaced a lot. of tensions between MBS and President. Trump even in the midst of a pretty. solid alliance.

>> So, David, should we see this deal as a. way of smoothing things over with Saudi. Arabia? Like, you mentioned all these. tensions and it seems like Saudi Arabia. is getting a lot of what they want here, a nuclear program and relatively loose. restrictions on the fuel. >> Certainly, Rachel, you could say that. this is a way of helping solidify what's. been a rocky alliance in recent times. between the US and Saudi Arabia. It. establishes for 30 years a relationship. that'll be very profitable for the.

United States, presumably, and will get. Saudi Arabia into the nuclear power game. with some of the world's best equipment. >> [music]. >> But, the big question that's out there. right now is could Saudi Arabia exploit. that technology for other purposes at. some point in the future? And that's what has so many in the. region concerned.

>> [music]. [music]. >> We'll be right back. So, David, if this deal is, theoretically at least, a plan for Saudi. Arabia to develop nuclear power for. civilian purposes, as you explained, walk us through the concerns that that. has raised.

>> Well, the first concern people are. worried about has to do with Saudi. Arabia itself. >> Mhm. >> It's made pretty clear that if Iran ever. gets a nuclear weapon at some point in. the future, it's going to build one, too. But right now, it doesn't have the fuel. to go do that. If at the end of the day, the Saudis get what's called the nuclear. fuel cycle, that they are allowed to go. produce and enrich their own uranium, the concern is that the same engineers.

who are enriching to 3% to go feed Saudi. Arabia's new nuclear reactors, could. on their night job, go over to some secret laboratory and. enrich up to 90% and be able to go build. a bomb. >> In the secret bunker in the hills. somewhere. >> That's right. And we've seen it happen. before. North Korea said it was just producing. nuclear fuel for its reactors before it. built the bomb.

Iran has always maintained that its. nuclear program is completely civilian. in nature. We don't believe them. And so, in the Saudi case, if in fact, they ultimately end up being. able to produce their own nuclear fuel, the world is going to want to know that. that's not being diverted to a bomb. project. >> as you explained, that is how a civilian. nuclear program becomes a military. nuclear program. >> That's right. But there are other.

concerns. So, remember that United Arab. Emirates deal that I mentioned to you? >> Right. Yep. >> It's got a little codicil in it that. says if any country in the region gets a. better deal than we got, we have the opportunity to go back and. have consultations with the United. States about whether we should get that. deal as well. >> Oh, so they they go back and be like, we. want what Saudi wants. >> Absolutely. It's like the most favored. nation treaty for nuclear power, right? So, they may well demand that they get.

similar rights. And imagine other. countries that we want to go sign. nuclear deals with. in the future. They're going to say, "Well, you did this for the Saudis, so of course you'll do this for us.". >> Right. And so, what that could mean if. I'm just following the logic through. here is that the number of countries in. this region or nearby that could. potentially have nuclear weapons goes. from Israel to Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and then presumably whoever else. wants them and is willing to pay for it.

>> Egypt would love to have nuclear power. Many other countries would. But the question is do you make them. sign on to the kind of standards that. the Bush and Obama administrations. insisted on for the UAE, or do they get the same deal that the. Saudis just got? >> Whoever's actually worried about this. new Saudi Arabia deal, David, can those. people actually do anything to stop this. agreement? >> Well, these agreements have to go in.

front of Congress. Not just the Senate, but both houses. And Congress has 90 days to vote a. resolution of disapproval. of the agreement. Now, it's conceivable. that such a disapproval vote might pass, particularly if there's a new Congress. that's voting on it. We'll have to see. after the elections. But even then, the. president could veto. the resolution and override the veto,

you'd need 2/3. And it's not clear that those votes. would be there. So, if you had to ask me. to guess today, I would guess that President Trump is. going to get this through. >> If I were Iran right now, I can imagine. thinking to myself, "Why would we ever agree to very strict. monitoring and enrichment rules if. everybody else in the region effectively. does not have to abide by them?" Like, in other words, I presume that this deal. with Saudi Arabia makes the negotiation.

that the United States is trying to have. with Iran right now on this very issue. that much harder. >> I think you're exactly right, Rachel. And the other argument that the Iranians. may make is that this deal shows. how discriminatory. the nuclear rules of the road are. And the fact of the matter is, we have. different rules for our friends and for. our adversaries. And while it doesn't look that way on.

paper, no one in the United States complains to. Israel. about the fact that it never signed the. nuclear nonproliferation treaty and is. widely known to have a arsenal of 100. weapons. >> Right. >> Pakistan and India didn't sign, right? But we complain much more about North. Korea, a clear adversary. Well, you're. seeing a little bit of that here. >> Mhm. >> But in the nuclear world, there have. always been these built-in. contradictions. You know, the rules are different for. the five original nuclear weapon states,

right? The United States, Russia, China, Britain, France. When the first nuclear treaties were. written, it was understood that they. were going to get to hold on to their. weapons. And the idea was to keep other. countries from getting them. That's a fundamental unfairness. And it's why the nuclear. nonproliferation treaty requires all. countries, even nuclear weapon states, to begin moving down towards zero. Not.

that we really do that. And in this. case, you're just seeing very different. treatment for a close ally like Saudi. Arabia. and an adversary like Iran. And that comes down to a fundamental. question of trust. >> But okay, if we're talking about trust, we have got to talk about the fact that. Saudi Arabia is not a long-time ally of. the United States in some very key ways. They obviously harbored the 9/11. terrorists. There was the killing of the Washington. Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi. They might have been rehabilitated in.

the eyes of the Trump administration. under MBS, but it seems fair to question. how far the trust will actually get us. in this particular relationship given. that this history of being friendly does. not go back super far. >> It's an excellent point because nuclear. programs last for decades. And your close alliances may not. Think back to Iran. Who gave Iran their first test nuclear.

reactor? The United States did. Back in the days. of the Shah. And then the Shah was overthrown and. suddenly this nuclear program is in the. hands of revolutionaries who shout death. to America. And that's the risk, of course, that you. run at any time that you ship out. nuclear technology. Now, the US has. decided over the years that that risk is. pretty small. when you're dealing with Japan or.

Germany or Singapore or any number of. other fairly stable allies. But in the case of Saudi Arabia, there's. no question that there's a roll of the. dice happening here about what Saudi. society will look like 30 years from. now. >> That is so interesting, David, because. I'm sure that there are a lot of people. who did not know or perhaps forgot that. the United States had built Iran's. nuclear infrastructure under the Shah. I. wonder how much you think the Trump. administration is thinking about that as.

sort of a cautionary tale, right? As. they're finalizing this deal with Saudi. Arabia. >> Well, I certainly hope they are. And. they argue that while. they have loosened some restrictions, there are other restrictions built in. here, and that the United States will be. so enmeshed in the Saudi nuclear program. that if anything was going awry, they. would know about it. And they also make the point, think. about the Saudi alternatives. Yeah, it'd be great if they bought from. the United States, but if they can't.

strike their deal with the US, they're. going to do it with China or with. Russia. And neither of them are going to require. any significant non-proliferation. agreements. >> The thinking, if I understand you. correctly, is that it's better to have a. say here, from the United States. perspective, because otherwise Saudi. Arabia could just go to somebody else, and that somebody else might not. [clears throat] be friendly to the US, so it might as well be us. >> This is the classic debate about how you. wrap countries into your network, not.

just of defense suppliers and so forth, but into all of their networks. Whether you wrap them into building. nuclear equipment with you, so you can. keep an eye on them, or building telecommunications networks, because you'd rather they be in the. American tech stack than in the Chinese. tech stack. It's the question that's. come up over artificial intelligence, that if we don't open up our best.

products to other countries, particularly allies, they'll go. elsewhere, to the Chinese. And so one way of thinking about this. nuclear deal is that we have taken a big. step back from 15 years ago when we. struck that gold standard arrangement. with the UAE. Another way to think about it is we're. in an era when power has to do with your. networks, and keeping Saudi Arabia. >> [music]. >> in the electric grid,

and building nuclear power with the US. is a better alternative than letting. them do it with someone else. >> [music]. >> David Sanger, thank you so much. >> Thank you, Rachel. >> [music]. >> We'll be right back. Here's what else you need to know today.

In a tit-for-tat [music] on Wednesday, President Trump said that if Tehran. continues to strike ships in the Strait. of Hormuz, the US will destroy bridges. and power plants in retaliation. Iranian leaders then dug in against. President Trump's threats, with the. foreign minister warning that his. country would fight, {quote} an eye for. an eye. >> [music]. >> Hours after that declaration, an Iranian. ally in Yemen claimed to have attacked. two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea. >> [music]. >> And.

an investment firm run by Donald Trump. Jr. [music] posted returns of 200%. according to a person familiar with the. matter. The firm made investments in AI and. defense technology [music]. that have tripled in just months, fueled. in large part by policies enacted during. the second Trump administration. The revelation comes amid growing. concerns over how the president and his. family are profiting [music] from. business ventures that directly. intersect with the priorities of the. federal government. >> [music].

>> Today's episode was produced by Rochelle. Banja, Austa Charaterbady, and Eric. Krupke. It was edited by MJ Davis Lynn. and Paige Cowett [music]. and contains music by Alicia Batey Tube. and Mary Lozano. Our theme music is by. Wonderly and this episode was engineered. by Chris [music] Wood. >> [music]. >> That's it for The Daily. I'm Rachel. Abrams. See you tomorrow.

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