Were the Covid Lockdowns Worth It?

From the New York Times, I'm Michael. Babaro. This is the. [Music]. daily. 5 years ago, at the urging of. federal officials, much of the United. States locked down to stop the spread of. CO. A decision that over time polarized. the country and changed the relationship. between many Americans and their.

government. Now, two prominent political. scientists are making the case that. there's no clear evidence that those. lockdowns saved lives and that it's time. for a national reckoning about the. decisionmaking that led to those. lockdowns in the first place. Today, my conversation with Steven Mso. and Francis Lee about their new book in. CO's wake and what they say will be.

required for a better outcome when the. next pandemic. [Music]. strikes. It's Thursday, March 20th. [Music]. Just to start, can I call you by your.

first names? Should I call you by your. professional t? Is it okay to call you. Steve and Francis? Yes, absolutely, please. Of course, now that I've called. you by those names, you're I've. pressured you into the informality. Not. at all. We're actually not a show that. often speaks to academics if you listen. to the daily and that's nothing against. academics. We usually talk to our. colleagues, but you have produced a body. of work here that feels important and it. feels unique. You're both tenur.

professors at Princeton University. Steve, you spent a lot of your career. researching democracy. Francis, your. work is focused on policym. big deals in your fields and and so to. start I want to talk about why you. undertook this project of examining the. US response to CO in a really rigorous. way. So maybe I'll just say a couple of. words about that to start with. I. actually had started to work on a larger.

project on several topics on which I. thought progressives were not paying. enough attention to arguments coming. from the other side and that included. immigration, abortion and then CO as. well. And as soon as I got deeply into. it, uh it was clear that the COVID. policy issues themselves, the COVID. crisis itself was large enough and. moreover that people were not engaging. in critical reflection and the sort of. reckoning we've tried to do. So this is.

meant to be in part a book about policy. choices, policy deliberation and in many. ways policy mistakes perhaps that were. made during co but there's also a larger. kind of institutional question in the. background and principled question in. the background which is a how did the. institutions function which are supposed. to be helping us to catch mistakes and. correct our mistakes to seek the truth. on difficult matters. how did they. function under co and I mean of course. journalism science and the academy more.

broadly and so the biggest theme that. runs through the book I think is that. these as we call them truth-seeking. institutions did not function as well as. they should have during co that there. was a premature policy consensus there. was an unwillingness to re-examine. assumptions and there was an intolerance. of criticism and divergent points of. view that emerged fairly quickly in the. pandemic and that uh hurt us that hurt. our policy responses that hurt our. ability to course correct over the.

course of the pandemic as we learned. more and had greater reason to course. correct. I mean this was as was. frequently said at the time a a whole of. government whole of society response and. it was undertaken without the normal. deliberation that accompanies. decisionmaking of that degree of. consequence and you know I I mean I. remember when the pandemic began that I. had some doubts as to whether these. measures were going to succeed. I mean.

it was just a normal kind of skepticism. about whether government policy would. work which is you know sort of bedrock. to political science. I mean that is one. of our main topics of inquiry whether. government policy works or whether it. has unanticipated consequences and I was. so struck at the lack of skepticism over. the course of the pandemic about these. measures. I mean it was obvious that a. large share of the workforce lack of. skepticism from from some Yes. Right. uh. in the quarters you know that I travel.

in among academics or uh mainstream. media that's where there seemed to be. little questioning it was almost seen as. sort of wrong or immoral to raise. questions about whether this was. feasible for most of the population and. Stephen what was your experience of this. pandemic like and how did that in any. way contribute to your desire to. excavate the entire thing well my. experience was not unusual. I was in New. Jersey, a blue state, and I went along.

with the messaging. I was busy with. doing other things. Of course, we kept. teaching online and doing our research. online, but I didn't really investigate. skeptically during the height of CO. itself in 2020 2021. I started working. on this book in. 2022 and frankly have been kind of. shocked on almost a daily basis in. researching the book at the things I'm. coming across and discussing with. Francis. So for me it's been a kind of. voyage of discovery and I've been very.

surprised at what you know we've. uncovered in your reconstruction of it. I found myself thinking, "Wow, I thought. I knew the pandemic really well because. I lived through it, but I didn't know it. as well as I thought I did." And I think. the biggest way many people experienced. the pandemic was through the mandates, right, the restrictions. One of the. things that surprised me in your. research, in your book, was that heading. into the pandemic, you found that there.

was not a consensus that these. restrictions, these mandates around. things like school closures, lockdowns, stay-at-home orders, quarantining, masking, that they were the right way to. try to fight a respiratory viral. pandemic. that instead there was some. real uncertainty about whether that made. sense or that it could work at a large. scale as public policy and actually that. there were a lot of doubts that it ever.

could. Well, there were a number of. precoid pandemic planning documents. anticipating a respiratory pandemic such. as CO turned out to be. One of them was. published just in the fall of 2019. shortly before the COVID pandemic broke. out. That was by the World Health. Organization. It surveyed the range of. non-farmaceutical interventions, social. distancing measures, school closures. Let's just zero in on that word because. we're going to use it a lot, I think. Non-farmaceutical interventions. Yes. Just just define that. Yeah. So, it's. everything other than vaccines and.

drugs. Uh the whole suite of measures. from handwashing, maskearing, personal. hygiene, staying apart, closing schools, restricting businesses, restricting. public gatherings, not letting people go. to church, and so on. the big things we. associate with the government's response. to the pandemic. Absolutely. Things that. are often lumped under the word lockdown. and so those measures had been. contemplated before uh they were. investigated. That was the major subject. of these pre-COVID pandemic plans. Obviously getting a vaccine as soon as.

possible and administering it was. something on which there was a. consensus. But the controversial part of. the policy was the non-farmaceutical. measures. And and what made them. controversial and just how controversial. were they? Well, they were quite. controversial because one of the things. that the plans emphasize is that they. would be costly. That keeping children. out of school would lead to learning. losses and other detriments to health. and well-being, including mental. well-being, from children being. isolated. Business closures likewise.

could have consequences in terms of. human well-being for those who own. businesses who depend on that businesses. for a livelihood. uh economic uh loss. can lead also to psychological loss and. family conflicts and so on. Isolating. human beings who are social creatures. will have a whole series of knock-on. effects that the uh preandemic planning. documents discuss. And these matters had. been studied and they found that there. was a lack of good evidence an absence. of certainty around the effectiveness of. these measures of effect effectiveness.

in terms of actually stopping containing. the spread of the virus. Yes. Especially. reducing morbidity and mortality that is. to say serious illness and death. I'd. just like to add on this 2019 World. Health Organization study. The the study. was to examine intervention by. intervention which of them have evidence. of effectiveness against a respiratory. pandemic and all of the measures were. rated as having very poor evidence. So.

in other words, we don't know if these. measures work. Four of them they. recommended not to use under any. circumstances. Those four measures were. quarantine of exposed persons, border. closure, entry and exit screening, and. contact tracing. So, there were no. asurances that these measures would. work, but we were assured that they. would have costs, right? And prompted by. you two and what you wrote, I went in.

and looked at this study. What it says. is that while there is, like you just. said, low evidence that it was plausible. that these kinds of. interventions could help mitigate the. spread of of the virus. What do what do. you make of that word plausible? Well, uh they had been suggested that's the. reason why they are being studied. And. of course, we know at some level that. viruses transmit from person to person. So one can infer that separating people. from one another, putting barriers.

between them ought to make a difference. that or or that there's a there's a. logic there. But the question is whether. that could be scaled up to society or. whether it would be sustainable over the. course of a pandemic. There was no body. of evidence around that. And so when it. became the mantra of the pandemic that. we should follow the science, there just. wasn't a body of scientific work that. undergurted the response that directed. us to conclude that these measures were.

likely to be effective. You're citing. this WH study, but how widespread, how. dominant would you say this skepticism. of these kinds of interventions as. effective, as worth the cost, as as. practical and scalable? How widely would. you say that view was held before the. pandemic? Well, yeah. The World Health. Organization was one study, but there. was another one in 2019 by John's. Hopkins which came to similarly. skeptical conclusions about these. various non-farmaceutical interventions, school closures, maskearing, and so on.

and so forth. Earlier the 2011, the UK. government did a prepandemic planning. document and similarly argued that uh in. times of modern transportation around. the world, these non-farmaceutical. interventions could not be counted on to. uh significantly slow the spread of a. virus. And so I would say that that was. the dominant view. There were of course. mathematical modelers who um were. prominent in the George W. Bush. administration. they were more.

optimistic not based on huge amounts of. data but based on scientific modeling. projections they believed that these. measures could work. So given this. skepticism in the world of public health. toward these non-farmaceutical. interventions or Steve as you said. basically at large the lockdown. approach before the pandemic how and why. did the US shift gears and end up. recommending pretty much all the things.

that you're saying everybody previously. thought wasn't such a good idea. Well, one factor was the fact that China. locked down and the World Health. Organization sent a team to China and um. they issued a report after just spending. a week there and it was a wholesome. endorsement of the Chinese approach. They said that China has shown the world. the way to suppress a virus. Never been. done before, but it's been done by China. and they endorsed the strategy without. qualification for around the world. Can.

I pause because China's response as I. recall was pretty heavily criticized at. the very beginning as as harsh. So how. does China's response to co that. lockdown approach that was so total at. least according to these. recommendations? How did it become so. persuasive especially given that's a. very unique system of government totally. authoritarian with a big surveillance. apparatus and a much more compliant. citizenry than most of the world? Well,

you're expressing some skepticism about. the extent to which we should regard the. Chinese approach as a model given the. features of its system and their. inconsistency with Western civil. liberties, freedom of descent, and so. on. And that's a perfectly good. question. None of that is evident in the. World Health Organization report. They. don't emphasize those sorts of things at. all. They pay no attention to the fact. that Chinese had authoritarian powers to. require people to be bolted into their. apartments in in some cases, literally. Right. Yeah. And then Italy had the.

first national lockdown in the world. A. democracy, we should say, not a. democracy. Right. So they showed it was. possible. I mean, Italy showed that a. western population was willing to go. along with a national lockdown. And that. I think had a demonstration effect. Another factor was the report that came. out of Imperial College London, the. optimistic modeling projections about. non-farmaceutical interventions. That's. Neil M. Ferguson. uh his uh report. projected something like two million. deaths in the United States by August.

2020. Right. Kind of a the report heard. around the world. The report heard. around the world. One of the most. influential it looks like reports that. was ever issued. And it was that that. Anthony Fouchy and Deborah Burks carried. into Donald Trump's office leading to a. news conference on March 16th that. recommended school closures and other. measures. So, I'm glad to see that. you're practicing social distancing. That looks very nice. That's very good. Uh I want to thank everybody for being. here.

today. And this afternoon, we're. announcing new guidelines for every. American to follow over the next 15 days. as we combat the virus. Each and every. one of us has a critical role to play. My administration is recommending that. all Americans, including the young and. healthy, work to engage in schooling. from home when possible, avoid gathering. in groups of more than 10 people, avoid. discretionary travel, and avoid eating.

and drinking at bars, restaurants, and. public food courts. [Music]. this what we're mentioning now the. guidelines when you look at them. carefully I believe if the people in the. United States take them seriously. because they were based on some rather. serious consideration back and forth. some may look at them and say they're. going to be really inconvenient for. people some will look and say well maybe. we've gone a little bit too far they.

were well thought. out so take a Look at the guidelines, read them carefully, and we hope that. the people of the United States will. take them very seriously because they. will fail if people don't adhere to. them. Thank you. Good. afternoon. This morning, I signed an. executive order directing nearly all of. our 9 million residents to quite simply.

stay at home. that we direct a statewide. order for people to stay at home. The. breaking news, stay at home. That is the. order tonight from four state governors. as the corona virus pandemic spreads. I. fully recognize that in some cases I am. choosing between saving people's lives. and saving people's livelihoods. In. California, the notoriously busy. highways are nearly empty. The hustle. and bustle of New York is at a. standstill. More than half of the. country's students have been sent home.

businesses across the country forced to. shut their doors. About a quarter of all. restaurants to close as a result of this. pandemic. The Corona virus now has one. in four Americans living in lockdown. We. are looking at a new. war that no one has seen before. Francis, do you think that the reality. is that in the face of what felt. terrifyingly like an existential threat.

to so much of our. population, US government officials, as. aware as they must have been of all this. skepticism you two have found that they. just didn't trust Americans enough to. kind of really level with them from the. start and say something like, "Look, these interventions, they are our best. guess about what's going to slow this. down and save as many lives as possible. and get us through this pandemic in the.

best shape that we possibly can and to. say essentially this is a large-scale. experiment and we have to be honest it's. going to involve all these trade-offs. economic social academic psychological. it may hurt a lot of people in the name. of saving an unknown number of people. but we think it's going to be worth it. so join us I mean that is admittedly a. hard message to ask people to join you. I think under the pressure of the crisis. with the public demanding action with.

the uh sense of catastrophe unfolding I. think they indulged in a great deal of. wishful thinking and so when advocates. of non-farmaceutical interventions. recommended these measures and were. optimistic about it they heard what they. wanted to hear. I mean there was a a. sense that with the two weeks to slow. the spread that you know we get control. of this thing you know that the it'll go. up there'll be a peak and then it'll. come down we'll defeat it this will be. done in a few months. So there was.

optimism that this could be over with in. short order but there just wasn't a lot. of long-term thinking of any sort around. this and a great deal of hope that uh. long-term these measures wouldn't be in. place. I mean I think there was a. general social fixation on the number of. deaths, the spread of cases. We. developed a kind of tunnel vision. The. one indicy that public health officials. were focusing on was sickness and death. from COVID and the these other matters. were not highlighted by political. leaders or by public health officials.

Is there any case to be made that with a. new and deadly virus that everyone was. learning about in real time that if. government leaders thought that any of. these measures had any chance of working. or even just buying time until a vaccine. was available that as a result it was. worth a try. I mean I guess to distill. my question is a deep singular focus on. saving lives okay.

I don't see how it is if there are. significant costs involved including in. the currency of life these policy. choices always involve a variety of. values and we have to not simply focus. on the one indicy of saving lives I. think if in so far as why not just just. explain that because I think there. there'll be some people listening who. say that's the only indicy that matters. in a pandemic. You know, look, early on, I think that the the initial lockdown.

orders and those conditions of. uncertainty and so on may have made some. sense, but we learned things over the. summer that should have helped inform. the strategy and that should have at. least been more vigorously debated. Mhm. The success of the public health. measures always depended upon public. buyin, public willingness to comply, a. public willingness to trust and to go. along. And there wasn't enough public. deliberation about these matters. Too. much power was accorded to narrow. experts in public health and.

epidemiology in particular. There should. have been a wider conversation simply. involving many more people with broader. expertise. But it also should have. involved ordinary people in the public. who after all were the being the ones. asked to make sacrifices in their own. lives to adopt policies which always. involve trade-offs across values risks. how much we willing to give up to not. visit an elderly relative in the. hospital to not have a funeral to not be. allowed to attend church on Sunday these. sorts of public questions don't have.

scientific answers they're value. judgments about which ordinary people. have a certain expertise about their own. lives and what matters to them and they. should have been involved as well in the. deliberation about these measures. I. would also add on this point that it's. not just that there were costs is that. the costs were inequitably. distributed so that some would suffer to. protect the lives of others. I mean the. pandemic restrictions did not protect. essential workers from exposure to COVID.

and so they were being asked to bear the. societal burden of disease. So I think. we have to confront the nature of these. restrictions that it's not a matter of. saving everyone's life it was saving. some. I mean that was all they could. have achieved is to save some. question. as to whether they saved any. Um, in. that as we look back, you know, the. places that imposed tougher restrictions. did not do. [Music].

better. We'll be right back. [Music]. The corona virus pandemic has left a. trail of destruction in the US and. around the world. I've never seen so. much death. So many of the patients are. dying despite our best efforts. I am. fighting two wars. I'm fighting a war.

against corona virus and I'm fighting a. war against stupidity. People are not. listening to what we're saying. Protesters say the shutdown has lasted. too long and inflicted too much pain, especially on small businesses. The cure. can never be worse than the disease. There are 30 million people that are out. of work in this country. We have to go. back to work. Open our country. Open us. up. We need to work. Open up. We are. ordering you. Open the shutdown now.

Open up. Now 36 states are seeing increases in. new weekly infections this morning. The. US just suffered the deadliest day of. the summer so far. We want to reopen the. schools. Everybody wants it. The moms. want it. The dads want it. The kids want. it. It's time to do it. Tonight, with. the virus raging and hospitals on the. brink, the president putting pressure on. schools today, threatening to cut off. funding for districts that don't reopen.

in person. Many teachers across the. country are pushing back on plans to. bring students back into the classroom. This CO 19 world we've been living in. has lasted a full six months. The. official CO 19 death toll in the US has. now surpassed 200,000, the most of any. nation. It's a little shocking to see so. many people not wearing protective. masks, not staying 6 feet apart. It's a. ho. It's a ho. How can we coexist with.

anti-science people? What can we do to. survive the ignorant? I just think we. need to hunker down and get through this. fall and winter because it's not going. to be easy. It's a ho. It's a ho. It's a. [Music]. Let's talk about what happens as the. pandemic progresses and the impacts and.

the cost of these shutdowns, these. quarantines, these stay-at-home orders. that the government told us we needed, they begin to grow. You two posite that. even as those costs are rising, the. country's public health officials show. very little tolerance for an open debate. about whether this approach should. change. And for you, this is. encapsulated by what happens to three. well-known scientists who decide to. write what becomes known as the Great.

Bington Declaration, which arrives in. the fall of 2020. So about 7 months into. the pandemic. Can you lay out what that. declaration was and how the conversation. in response to it unfolded? Well, they. were three scientists from Stanford. University, Harvard University, and. Oxford, well-known, well-established. scientists with excellent publication. records. They were concerned about the. costs of the closures. Uh they were. concerned about the disproportionate.

burdens being borne by essential workers. and school children. and they attempted. to start a conversation. They were. arguing that um rather than keeping the. whole of society closed, rather than. keeping schools closed for children at. very little risk from COVID, we should. be focusing protection on the vulnerable. parts of the population. And by October. 4th, when that document was published, we had good evidence to suggest to know. that there was highly uneven. vulnerability across the population, age.

being the principal factor, right? Death. rates among the elderly were orders of. magnitude larger than the general. population, much much higher. And what. they suggested was focusing protection. on the vulnerable. And and how did they. suggest doing that? The the Great. Bington Declaration is a strategic plan. I mean it's one page long and it just. lays out a different approach and then. invites people to think carefully about. how you might be implemented how one. might engage in the effort of protecting.

the vulnerable like more COVID testing. of people who interact with the elderly. uh more help, you know, organized. societywide help of of you know, getting. groceries and taking them to the. elderly, like you know, looking for ways. to uh reduce the risk of those who were. at most risk of severe outcomes. That. was what they hoped to initiate with the. Great Barington Declaration was then a. discussion that might develop more fully. paths to implementing this strategic.

plan. But instead, they were denounced. um they were presented as if they wanted. people to die. You know, their motives. were profoundly questioned and that. happened also at the highest levels of. uh the US scientific establishment. Just. explain that. Well, it's um when the. declaration came out a few days later, the great band of people were charged. with adopting a herd immunity strategy. to let the virus rip through the. population and that it would cost.

hundreds of thousands of lives. We have. now the email by Francis Collins, the. head of the National Institutes of. Health, in effect Dr. Anthony Fauci's. boss. Uh he said uh in his email to Dr. Fouchy and others, the document from the. three fringe epidemiologists is getting. a lot of attention. Even a co- signature. from a Nobel Prize winner, people were. signing this declaration online. And he. said there needs to be a quick and. devastating takedown. For those of you who don't know, the.

Great Barington Declaration is a awful, awful idea. It's the fantasy of petulent. children who just want this pandemic to. be over. And it is appalling really that. experts would even suggest something. like this as a real plan. Critics, including the director general of the. World Health Organization, call this. plan a dangerous approach and not an. option. You're essentially asking people. to go to concentration camps. I mean, that's overstatement. I'm sorry, but.

separating the families, it's, you know, it's it's just not workable. NIH. director Francis Collins said this, but. what I worry about with this is it's. being presented as if it's a major. alternative view that's held by large. numbers of experts in the scientific. community. That is not true. This is a. fringe component of epidemiology. This. is not mainstream science. It is. dangerous. If you let infections rip as. it were and say let everybody get. infected that's going to be able to be.

getting infected and then we'll have. herd immunity. Quite frankly that is. nonsense. [Music]. Francis, was there something to the. backlash kind of unprincipled? Because I. recall that there was a response from. the scientific and public health. community that basically amounted to. this alternative vision, the great. parenting declaration. It's just not. practical. You know, how do you separate.

vulnerable people from the rest of. society? Think about your. immunompromised grandmother. She lives. on the third floor of a. multi-generational household. How is she. supposed to be protected when everybody. else is suddenly liberated from their. stay-at-home orders and bringing that. virus home to then infect her who is. very very vulnerable? Well, the question presupposes that the. measures that we were taking were. working. They were not protecting the.

essential workers. And if we're not. going to be able to contain the virus, if it's going to continue to spread. through society, if it's going to become. endemic, then aiming at protecting those. at most risk makes more sense. It's a. matter of whe you know what you see as. the future trajectory here. Mhm. So the. question of what the approach should be. to co of course ends up in the hands of. states and governors and as all our. listeners will remember states take very. divergent approaches. So talk to us.

about what you find in your research. about that breakdown across the 50. states especially on the metric of. saving lives. So, at the outset, states. across the board um implemented. stay-at-home orders. 43 states put them. in place. Of the seven states that did. not, all but one had broad business. closures. So, there was great unity of. response across the country. And these.

measures were hugely popular. Like. something like 87% of Americans. supported the measures at the time of. their implementation. Where we began to see policy divergence. is in the reopening process. Democraticleaning states maintained. these stay-at-home orders two and a half. times longer than Republicanleaning. states. Democraticleaning states were. slower to reopen schools, dramatically. slower to reopen schools.

they maintained more stringent. restrictions in terms of of uh you know. business closures and which businesses. could reopen and when and on what. timeline and whether you'd have to have. outdoor dining or whether restaurants. would be closed again in the winter of. 2020. So there were substantial policy. differences between red states and blue. states over the course of the pandemic. And at the time that the vaccine roll. out began, there was no difference. between red states and blue states in.

their cumulative COVID mortality over. the course of the crisis. No difference. No difference. The difference begins to. emerge in the postvaccine period. And. that's where you begin to see blue. states fairing better than red states. So that by the end of the time series we. examine in our book which stops in. January 23, Republican states had 30%. more COVID mortality than Democratic. states. Can I ask you to linger on this. period before the vaccines? Because from.

what you're saying, Francis, before the. vaccines were introduced, states that. had more and longer restrictive measures. had the same more or less number of. deaths as states that had less and. shorter restrictive measures. That's. correct. This is what we can see as we. look back. We can see that there was a. great deal of variation in how states. responded, but that variation doesn't. correlate with variation in COVID.

outcomes as measured by mortality from. the disease as reported to the CDC. And. we control for factors like um the age. structure of the state population, the. percent with obesity, the percent who. live in urban areas, uh and uh you know. other demographic factors likely to. affect a state's vulnerability to the. virus. Is there any evidence, Steve, that that these restrictions slowed the. spread of CO across the states? Well,

there's some evidence that the. non-farmaceutical interventions of. various sorts, the lockdown measures, school closures, etc. reduce somewhat the spread of the virus. But even the optimistic reports that. emphasize that and call that success do. not show evidence of significantly. reduced death. So uh the virus evidently. spread efficiently enough so that even. if uh the spread of infection could be. reduced say 15% that did not yield.

significant benefits in terms of death. and disease. Francis how is it possible? I just want to make sure we can wrap our. heads around how it might be the case. that longer, deeper. restrictions didn't end up meaningfully. changing outcomes. I'm just imagining. someone hearing that and thinking, I. stayed home. I didn't get sick. And so. why in your estimation, by your. analysis, didn't this save more lives?

Well, individuals of sufficient means to. stay home can protect themselves. individually, but what works for. individuals may not work for society as. a whole. Yes. Uh you know uh the. lockdowns had lots of holes in them. The. social distancing measures were very. porous. A third of workers had to keep. working as essential workers to keep the. rest of us wellfed, the electricity on. So it really was not possible uh to lock. down the entire economy uh or or the.

workforce. That's right. Uh, another. explanation is of course that it matters. greatly who is being infected. It was. only highly lethal in certain. populations. And so if you were not. protecting those in nursing homes, but. you were keeping the teenagers and the. college students locked down, you're not. going to achieve anything in terms of. reducing COVID um, mortality. We also didn't know when the. virus reached the United States. There's evidence from antibodies in.

blood banks that the virus was already. here in December of 2019. So, it had. already been spreading for months before. the first lockdowns occurred. And um. data from cell phone mobility shows that. uh lockdowns begin to break down after. just a few weeks. So, they're not. sustainable for human beings either. Human beings could not comply over the. long haul. Mhm. You know, there's. evidence that these measures made a. difference for transmission, but there's. not evidence that these measures were.

effective at reducing COVID mortality. And so, that's just where we are. We. need to do more study to understand what. happened during the pandemic. And so, I. think we need to confront our failures. and our successes and and learn from it. And ultimately, it's really the vaccine. that starts to make the difference when. it comes to death rates. Our data are. consistent with that interpretation in. that we begin to see a divergence uh. after the vaccine roll out between. states with high vaccine uptake and.

states with low vaccine uptake in their. um COVID mortality. At the aggregate. level, uh states that had higher vaccine. uptake do have better COVID outcomes in. the period after vaccines were. available. And so if we go back to where. we started this conversation about. tradeoffs before the pandemic, you. thoroughly described this scientific. view that these kinds of interventions. we've been talking about the whole time, the lockdown approach was difficult to.

implement and would come with heavy. costs and uncertain benefits. And yet. the United States and dozens of other. countries plowed ahead with the shutdown. and lockdown approaches anyway, focusing. on their theoretical life-saving. benefits. 5 years later, what your. findings show is that the stateby-state. data within the US hasn't definitively. established those life-saving benefits. But what we do know is a lot about the.

costs. So talk about what you found when. it comes to those costs. I mean they're extraordinarily wide. ranging. I mean this was a whole of. society intervention and so the whole of. society was affected. I mean uh we can. start by thinking about the cost to. education. You we saw unprecedented. drops in student learning as gauged by. you know longstanding indicators of. student progress. Chronic absenteeism. from school roughly doubled nationwide.

still elevated. the gaps that emerged in. uh learning outcomes between the better. off and the less well-off students um. they widened and they haven't begun to. close uh since the pandemic ended and. since schools reopened. Those gaps are. still wider than they were. Those who. are academically lagging before the. pandemic were much worse off after the. pandemic. I mean we can we can go. through the long there's a long list of.

uh I was cost I was just going to add. one which is the uh tremendous. expenditures uh on covid relief. Now, some of that was going to be necessary, but uh Francis has pointed out that the. uh initial uh expenditures were. equivalent to the New Deal uh and the uh. uh uh so the the 2020 COVID response was. equivalent as a share of GDP to the new. both the New Deal and the 2009 stimulus.

package combined. Right? Trillions. trillions of dollars in the United. States. And then in 2021, we had another. new deal all over again. It's roughly. equivalent uh uh in terms of the demand. on the US Treasury to war mobilization. in. 1943. About 10% of the total cost went. to health care. Most of it is going to. sustaining businesses and individuals. through the closures. That's the lion. share of co aid. So, if we're putting this all together.

and summarizing what you found here. about the lack of evidence of a. life-saving benefit and the real clear. evidence of extraordinary cost from what. you're saying, Francis, we're not able. to say at this point that these. extraordinary historic interventions. that they were. ultimately worth it. I mean, that's. where that's where things stand. I I.

think there's one that's one of the. reasons why there's a great deal of. hesitance to look back at what was done. and to take stock of it. I'm curious. about something. In the end, you're. clearly saying that there needs to be a. different kind of conversation about the. measures that were taken. But are you. saying that we shouldn't have done the. things we did during CO? because those. are two very distinct ways of thinking. about this. I mean that that's a larger question. than I think we are capable of settling.

What we can point to is the shortcomings. in deliberation in considering the costs. and in the equivocal and skeptical. nature of the evidence when these. measures were. undertaken and the doubts about what. difference they made based on the data. that we have now. That's why we think a. larger conversation is necessary. It's. not for us to say. I mean this the scale. of the decisions we are talking about. are societywide. They are global. You.

know as I have reflected on the or the. work that Steve and I were doing as you. know as we were writing. I'm. just it's just I'm struck by the tragedy. if these measures didn't work like what. the costs were, what else we could have. done had we been able to make those. kinds of public investments in something. that was effective uh for other needs. that we have as a. society. It is excruciating to think.

about. Um but I I think we owe it to. ourselves to do so. I mean, the risk of. any kind of reckoning like this is that. it results in people having even less. faith in the government and taking bits. and pieces of what you find and. weaponizing them. Do you worry that. conspiracy theories will be fueled by. what you're asking people to do here? Well, I think conspiracy theories are. fueled by not asking these questions. I. mean this is obviously this there are.

many conspiracy theories around co uh. you know the pandemic you know. governments took these actions in order. to assert more control over us. I mean. that kind of discourse which exists if. government acknowledged these questions. and tried to hash them out. Yes, some. faith might be lost but also some faith. would be gained. Right? It's very hard. to say for sure what will succeed in. raising trust in the institutions in our. society that in the business of pursuing. the truth, science, science journalism,

the academy, and so on. But we should. try to behave in a more trustworthy. fashion and hope that greater trust. follows from that. We need a franker. conversation about uh what happened uh. and um how we can do better the next. time around. So a final question and. you're starting to hint at it here. Since we can't go back and redo our. response to CO to the degree we can try. to get it right next time if there's a. next time what is your prescription for.

that knowing what you now know and. knowing how polarized this country. remains over what happened? I guess I. would say that we need to consider the. costs as well as the hoped for benefits. of policies that are adopted especially. these kinds of non-farmaceutical. interventions, social distancing. measures and so on. uh and u we need to. have wider and more tolerant. deliberation about these matters and not. repose as much authority in narrow. experts who have tunnel vision very.

often who admitted after co to having. tunnel vision. Francis Collins admitted. quite frankly in uh July 2023 that. public health officials, including. himself, focused way too narrowly on a. narrow set of public health. [Music]. outcomes. as a guy living inside the. beltway, feeling the sense of crisis, trying to decide what to do in some. situation room in the White House with.

people who had data that was incomplete. We weren't really thinking about what. that would mean uh to Wilk and his. family uh in. Minnesota, thousand miles away from. where the virus was hitting so hard. We. weren't really considering the. consequences in communities that were. not New York City or or or some other. big city. If you're a public health. person and you're trying to make a. decision, you have this very narrow view. of what the right decision is and that.

is something that will save a life. Doesn't matter what else happens. So you. attach infinite value uh to stopping the. disease and saving a life. You attach a. zero value to whether this actually. totally disrupts people's lives, ruins. the economy, and has many kids kept out. of school in a way that they never quite. collateral damage. So there, yeah, collateral damage. This is a public. health mindset, and I think a lot of us. involved in trying to make those.

recommendations had that mindset. And. that was really unfortunate. That's. another mistake we made. [Music]. That's a really really fascinating thing. to say aloud. I mean that quote is. excruciating. Uh you know and it goes. right back to what you know you were. asking us to confront a few minutes ago. I you know how how can you tell us that. all this bought us nothing that it was.

feutal? Um I mean it it's extremely painful. Um, and I think that's one of the reasons. why there's a hesitation even to look. back at all. Right? And in light of that. quotation, how can we not how can we not. look back? It's an invitation to have a. reckoning, right? How could we not have. the reckoning given what Francis Collins. has said? Well, Steve and Francis, thank you both.

very much for your time. We really. appreciate it. We appreciate the. conversation. Thank you. [Music]. We'll be right.

back. Here's what else you need to know. today. On Wednesday, the Federal Reserve. predicted that inflation would rise this. year to. 2.7% from. 2.5%. And suggested that President. Trump's tariffs on imported goods likely. accounted for much of that increase. Still, the Fed said that it would. neither raise nor cut the interest rate, its most powerful tool for influencing.

inflation, as it waits to see how. Trump's policies affect the. economy. And Ukrainian President Wimir. Zalinski has agreed to accept Russia's. offer of a mutual pause in attacks on. energy targets as a step toward a. broader ceasefire. The agreement came during a call between. Zalinski and President Trump. Their. first conversation since a dramatic Oval.

Office confrontation last. [Music]. month. Today's episode was produced by. AA Chhaturved and Caitlyn O'Keefe. It. was edited by Lissa Anderson and Lisa. Chow. Fact checked by Susan Lee. contains original music by Dan Powell, Marian Lozano, and Pat McCusker, and was. engineered by Chris Wood. Our theme.

music is by Jim Brunberg, and Ben Lansf. of. Wonderly. Special thanks to David. Leionhard, Paula Schuman, Nick Pitman, Celia Duggar, Michael Mason, Paige. Cowat, and Jim Yardley. [Music]. [Music]. That's it for the daily. I'm Michael.

Babaro. See you tomorrow. [Music].