Why isn't China doing more for Iran? - Asia Specific podcast, BBC World Service

The conflict in the Middle East might seem far from East Asia, but for China, it's posing a dilemma. China's diplomatically close to Iran, it's Tehran's biggest customer for oil, and Beijing has strongly criticised the US for its actions. The United States military began major combat operations in Iran. So what is China doing now that Iran's government is under attack? And why isn't Beijing doing more?

I'm Mariko Oi in Singapore and this is Asia Specific from the BBC World Service. Twice a week, we bring you Asia Pacific stories. unpacked by those who know them best. Well, today I have two guests watching. this Middle East crisis unfold from different sides of the globe. The BBC's China correspondent, Laura Bicker is in Beijing. I also have William Figueroa, a China-Iran specialist. at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. Welcome both. Hello, Mariko. And hello, William. Hi. Nice to meet you all.

Nice to be here. Yeah. So let's start with you, Laura. This conflict, obviously, there's a lot of interest around the world, but in China, what's been the reaction of people as well as the government? So I think one of the things I think we should point out right from the start. is Iran is a so-called ally of China. But I think there was this expectation, perhaps in some circles in the West. that, you know, Beijing gets on its white horse,

comes to the rescue of Iran at some point. That is not how China sees alliances. That is not how it sees its partnerships anywhere in the world. So when it came to the response, it was seen in some circles as muted. Let's tell you what Wang Yi, the foreign minister, had to say. He spoke to his Iranian, his Russian, his French and Oman counterparts. Now, his statement strongly condemns Washington. He described it as pushing the Middle East to the brink of a dangerous abyss.

Said it was unacceptable for the US and Israel to launch attacks against Iran, while negotiations were still ongoing, and still less to blatantly assassinate a leader of a sovereign country. and instigate regime change, which China says violated international law. and fundamental norms of international relations. So I think there's two things interesting here. One, China is really positioning itself. as someone to perhaps promote international norms,

promote international law. And it's interesting to note who Wang Yi has spoken to. Russian, of course, but also the French and Oman counterparts. Now, that signals perhaps, that China is also positioning itself. as perhaps a kind of mediator role in the Middle East and in this conflict. But we'll have to wait and see. As for netizens, as for Chinese people, there have been a lot of discussion online as you would expect,

much of it censored, but much of it coming up with the same kind. of Chinese Communist Party line describing America as warmongers, but also kind of worried about the Chinese population. in the Middle East and how they're dealing with it. I think they've evacuated 3000 Chinese people from Iran at this time. So, Bill, Laura described China and Iran's relationship as so-called allies. I mean, do you agree with that assessment? And what's been your reaction to Beijing's response to this conflict?

Yeah, I mean, the "so-called" is doing a lot of heavy lifting there. And I would even go as far as to say that, you know, I really don't see the relationship as allies. If there is an alliance, it would be more better understood. as an alliance of convenience, perhaps a convergence of interests. First of all, China doesn't see any of its relationships. with countries in the Middle East or in the global South. that it doesn't have an explicit.

alliance with as a military alliance. So these are predominantly trade, economic relationships. They have geostrategic, geopolitical dimensions. But they are not intended to imply. nor do I think that anyone in the region really took seriously. the idea that China was, as you were saying, going to come riding in on white horse and protect them from. a situation in which the United States might take an aggressive action.

What I do think people might have had some expectation for is. that, uh, or rather, what I should say is. that the people that do have that expectation are people in the West, the Western media that observes this, and has a tendency to exaggerate the relationship between China and Iran. And this happens on both sides. Both China and the United States have multiple reasons. why they want to portray this as a strong alliance that is. anti-Western and anti-American in its orientation.

But the reality is that just doesn't hold water. There's a lot of reasons that I can get into, but the long and the short of it is China's economic relation with Iran, its political relationship with Iran, and its military connections with Iran are all a order of magnitude weaker. than its relationships with any of the surrounding countries, all of Iran's or the majority of Iran's neighbours. And most of the other countries in the Middle East. I want to get to the two countries' trade relations and so on.

But it's interesting, Bill, you talked. about how some people were saying that this attack was all about China. You obviously disagree with it, but obviously Presidents Trump and Xi, they'll be meeting later this month. So is it possible that China played some kind of a role like Mr. Trump may be thinking, you know, even slightly about China, using this. as a leverage ahead of that bilateral meeting? I want both of your opinions, but let's start with you, Laura.

I don't think that this move by Washington is a move. on China, as some have perhaps said. Could it, however, affect this much anticipated visit by Donald Trump. to Beijing, which we're expecting at the end of this month? Yes, it could, because if you're looking at whether. or not America's bogged down over the next three to four weeks, how on earth are they expected to concentrate. on doing deals with China, getting things solved? Because when it comes to the two leaders meeting,

let's remember everything is sorted out. You usually have all of these meetings ahead of time. to then sort out the big one when Donald Trump arrives, and presumably he gets this state visit here in the capital. Now, we are hearing that some of those meetings are still going ahead, despite what's happening in the Middle East. But how much attention can the State Department pay to what is a huge deal. with China when it's bogged down in the Middle East.

Now, does China want to get this meeting out of the way? Yes. It wants its dealings with Washington to remain stable. despite whatever's going on or continuing to go on. in the Middle East in the next month. And that is so uncertain. We're really not sure how all that's going to play out. But when it comes to its relationship with Washington, it wants this trade deal. It wants that sorted because it wants to move on. with its own economic challenges, so that when it comes to Beijing's priorities,

that is a priority for the moment. It could well be. There has been speculation. that this visit will, you know, perhaps either be delayed in some way. We'll need to wait and see. So far, it seems. that some meetings at least are going on between the US and China. You know, we as a team are preparing. for that big meeting at the end of this month and going ahead as normal. But again, things are so uncertain in the Middle East. from China's perspective. However, when it comes to the United States, if the US gets bogged down in the Middle East as it did with Iraq,

then that is, you know, China might go, that that's quite beneficial. in the past when that happened to the United States. China saw its competition with Washington, yes, increase. But it can just get on with things. It can go right. Okay. Let's move forward. Let's move forward with everything we need to do. While our main competitor is using its money, using its time, using its resources in a region that China's not bogged down in.

So I think that's you know, first of all, I fully agree with everything Laura said. And I also would add to it that, you know, the idea that China is part. of the calculus, of course, is true. Right? I mean, they're looking at the whole world, and China is part of the world, and it's a big part of the US. How it sees its sort of strategic rivalry. What I dispute is the idea that these particular countries were chosen.

primarily because of their impact on China and not because of the US. Long term, you know, geo-strategic goals and priorities. You look at Venezuela. I mean, the relationship to Cuba is obvious. And so is the direct benefits. that the United States gets monetarily out of that sort of a deal. Iran also a long term US priority. When you add up all of the percentage points for the oil, even if you add a couple of extra for good measure, because we always say, well, we don't really know how much Iranian oil is going to to China.

You know, you're still leaving the country. with over 80% of its oil supplies. Far more dangerous, I think, than directly attacking Iran or Venezuela. To cut off China's oil is the possibility of a larger war. in the Middle East, which is the main way that I think that. while this might not be about China, it's still certainly could affect China. But the idea that the United States would attempt. to throw global oil markets into disarray,

which would also impact negatively the United States, I should also add, simply to gain some sort of leverage. in a trade negotiation with China, I think is, it doesn't make sense to me also, because using it. as a leverage implies that they can turn it on and turn it off at will. And I think it's very clear that, um, you know, nothing is going to turn off this war at will. in the next three weeks before this conference comes up. Before we get to some of those details that you just mentioned,

Bill, could you just paint the picture of what Iran-China relationship is? I mean, you know, you guys have been talking about they're not allies, maybe, you know, pragmatic partners. How would you describe it? Yeah, there's a really good report that was written a number. of years ago, and it still holds true, that describes Iran and China's relationship as last among equals. And I think that's a great way to think about it, because China has good relations with every country in the Middle East.

and has a larger strategy to, um, to build up its economic and diplomatic footprint there. But amongst the countries that it has relations with, Iran. is one of the weaker relationships. I think when it comes to Iran, I think one of the things. when we're talking about how many commentators in the West see it, I think if you lift it up, a headline in a tabloid, what many commentators have done is lump a number of countries together.

as what they call the axis of upheaval, or the axis of evil. And those are China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. And that is what many Western commentators seem to kind of put in. one great big clump, which is why some have kind of looked at the relationship. between Iran and China and go, oh they must be really close friends. And as you've just heard, that is not entirely the truth now. They implemented diplomatic ties, I think back in 1971, and I think the last visit by President XI was 2016. So we're looking ten years ago. Now look at how much travel President Xi does.

when he's only visited Iran once in the last ten years. That should tell you just how close a so-called transactional. relationship alliance, or whatever we're going to call it is. China values this relationship with Iran for primarily three reasons. First, oil and gas. And remember, China is security hungry. It needs that energy security. And then of course, there's Iran's relationship with the US,

its adversarial relationship with the United States. And I think China values its relationship with Iran because of that. They they both think the same. Laura, I was just reading about how China provides technical support to Iran. Do we know, how much do we know about this? What kind of things are we talking about that China provides. In terms of technical support? Again, much of it seems to be exaggerated. And we're kind of in the dark.

about what exactly China is supporting them with. And of course, there's a number of arms deals. China has supported Iran with a number of kind of arms exports. But when it comes to the kind of support that it gets from Iran, what it's looking at primarily is getting a oil and gas from Iran. And in return, it was supposed to put in that £400 billion worth of investment. I think there was even talk of this railway line. that was going to go all the way to Yiwu in China.

But in terms of all of those, it's what has been promised. and what has been delivered are two different things. Bill, do you agree with the assessment. of Laura in terms of technical support? Because one could argue that if they were providing some technical support, that their efforts may have failed given this latest attack. Yeah, there is definitely some amount of technical support. I look at it almost as sort of like helping Iran to rearm. The Chinese probably saw it very much as, you know, um,

allowing them the equipment necessary to defend themselves. Because of how they viewed. Iran's position in the last war as being the nation that was attacked, which is, I mean, which is an accurate assessment. The reality is, as you said, yes, whatever, I wouldn't say failed because, um, it's more, more to say that the amount of support that China was providing Iran, as Laura and as most experts have been arguing, is actually quite limited.

And it wasn't enough to substantially change the dynamic. Also worth mentioning, always, when this discussion comes up. that China is a minor player in the arms deals in the Middle East, and that the main player remains the United States. Yeah. I mean, when it comes to what Beijing has allegedly sold Iran, its air defense systems, anti-ship missiles, a ballistic missile components, uh, you know, in some kind of what's called dual use items to help Iran's missiles,

and missile propulsion, some guidance system, that kind of thing. So I think that is what Beijing has sold them. And I think there is this narrative that, Mariko, you just asked the question, does it say that Beijing systems have failed? I think the same was said perhaps of Venezuela and others. I think, again, we've got to look at this position. where there is this ramping up of China is selling all of this and,

perhaps their systems are not good enough to repel any US attack. I think you've got to look at it in the overall structure. of what Iran may have, and what Iran may be using. And I think when it comes, I'm not sure. it's accurate to say at this stage that China is, you know, providing Iran with enough military support. Or has it provided enough military support to repel any major superpower.

Bill only a few years ago, it almost looked like China was making, I guess, diplomatic inroads in the Middle East. In 2023, Beijing brokered that resumption of diplomatic ties. between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Beijing. has been increasing investments in the Gulf state as well, haven't they? Yes, absolutely. And this is another great example of how the relationship between Saudi Arabia. and China is much stronger than the relationship between Iran and China.

The Iran-Saudi deal is a great example of how China can have. a stronger diplomatic, footprint in the region. and have some more influence, but it also shows the limitations of that influence. because the Iran-Saudi deal or the Iran-Saudi normalization agreement, as you might call it, was brokered by China, but only after 90% of the work had been done by both sides. And there was kind of just a last, uh, sort of a last sort.

of hurdle to get over, in terms of not having a place. that they agreed upon to meet to hammer out the final details. And second of all, that initiative came from. both the Iranian and the Saudi side. They are much more focused on Saudi Arabia. And I can give you a good example of that. So around this time, a couple of years ago, during Xi Jinping's first major Middle East visit, he visited Saudi Arabia. and he got what they call the purple carpet treatment.

And you may have remembered seeing a lot of images of that around the time. They really gave him a royal welcome. And while he was there, they signed, you know, up to $10 billion or more in hydrocarbon energy agreements. This caused a massive backlash in Iran. because there had been already building this discourse of why. have they not given us the investment we've been asking for, as I mentioned. And now all of a sudden, they've gone to. their neighboring country and they've given them everything they wanted.

They rolled out the purple carpet. and they were sort of asking, you know, this doesn't this really show. how poorly the Iranian government has managed its relationship with China? Laura, do you think this US actions in Iran, but also Venezuela, could it change? Could it affect Beijing's thinking when it comes to Taiwan? So I was asked this question. I think I mean, I lost count of how many times I was asked this question. during the Venezuela issue. Look, when it comes to Taiwan, China sees the whole issue of Taiwan.

as an internal issue. It has its own timeline. It has, it will have its own reasons, and it will have its own calculations to make. Whether or not the United States is embroiled in a crisis and. or a protracted war in the Middle East, it may have some bearing on those calculations, but it will not change them. And so when it comes to Taiwan, China sees it primarily.

as its own internal issue and will not judge or change its calculations. based on what is happening elsewhere, according to the analysts I've spoken to. Now, it may well affect perhaps anything that they're discussing. when they can see what's happening in the Middle East. and depending on what's happening over the next few weeks. Also, it is crucial to mention, because, you know, when it comes to this oil from the Middle East, it is crucial to China's overall energy security.

Even though we keep kind of playing down, yes, it's only 12 or 13%, but if the conflict were to drag on, China will have to ensure that it has the capacity to cushion the shock. of a continued protracted problem in either, getting oil right from the region or getting oil from Iran. One thing we often forget is that the international. oil system is effectively a cartel, meaning that they manage production. in a very specific way to keep prices in a specific range, which means that.

at any given moment, 100% of the oil production in the world. is not being, um, is not being outputted. What typically happens in these moments of crises. is not that all the oil from one country dries up, and. there's suddenly 12% less oil available to China and the global market. What typically happens is other countries ramp up production. to fill those gaps to meet market needs. One only has to look at what happened a couple of years ago.

when China stopped buying Iranian oil almost entirely for a brief period, because Russian oil was discounted so heavily that it was able to compete. with the heavily discounted Iranian oil prices. Okay. One final question to both of you. As Laura mentioned, this conflict could drag on. What would you think Beijing would be doing next, Laura? I think Beijing will be making calculations. about what this will mean to them. This is all about its own interests,

and I think it will be looking at what how this might leave the Middle East. I'm not sure they will worry too much about who is actually running Iran. I think it will be very concerned about the wider implications. What does this mean for the Middle East as a whole? And I think when it comes to its relationship. with the United States, it also be a kind of concern. Will this then affect the visit coming up. and perhaps getting that issue resolved and getting the trade war.

with the United States, which it desperately wants, resolved out of the way and sorted? So I think in terms of what China wants from this, it wants stability. China is all about keeping stability. I think we'll see the same typical flurry of condemnations, of offers. to mediate that won't be taken up. And primarily the main action they'll take is the evacuation of Chinese citizens. That's probably the only substantial action that they will take.

I think their main concern is the one that they have. no real ability to impact, which is the possibility. that the US actions and the US-Israeli actions will spiral. into a wider regional conflict that will impact shipping, uh, their shipping lanes and their, their investments in the region. And there's not really much that they can do about that, unfortunately. We'll continue to monitor how this conflict drags on.

Thank you so much for sharing your insights, Laura and Bill. Thank you both. Thanks a lot. Very happy to be here. You've been watching Asia Specific from the BBC World Service. with me, Mariko Oi, in Singapore. If you have any questions or thoughts on what we've covered in this episode. or any other story from the region, please leave us a comment below. You can also get in touch with us on email: AsiaSpecific@bbc.co.uk. and click like and subscribe so you never miss an episode. See you next time!