The message Iran war sends to Asia's nuclear powers - Asia Specific podcast, BBC World Service

The US and Israel attack on Iran caused upheaval. in the Middle East and on global markets. But long term, how will it change the way. other countries think about their defense? One of Washington's main justifications for attacking Iran. was to ruin the country's nuclear facilities and prevent it. from ever obtaining nuclear weapons. For decades, it had been the policy of the United States. never to allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Since they seized control of that proud nation 47 years ago,

the regime and its murderous proxies have spread nothing. but terrorism and death and hate. So what message does the war send to nuclear powers in Asia, especially North Korea, which only a few years ago was the target. of intense pressure from Washington over its nuclear programme? And what about China, a country. reportedly building up its arsenal of warheads? I'm Mariko in Singapore and this is Asia Specific.

from the BBC World Service. Twice a week we bring you Asia Pacific stories. unpacked by those who know them best. And today I have Dr Zhao Tong from the Nuclear policy programme. at Carnegie, which is a Washington based think tank. I also have from Seoul, Dasl Yoon, who's a reporter with the Wall Street Journal. Welcome both. Thank you. It's great to be here. Thank you for having me. Firstly, this attack on Iran, do you think it plays.

into the calculations of Chinese or North Korean leaders when it comes. to their nuclear weapons programmes? Let's start with China, Zhao Tong. Well, I think it will reinforce Chinese leaders belief. in the broad coercive value of nuclear weapons. Based on my own research, I think the recent Chinese nuclear build up. is actually quite driven by Mr. XI Jinping's belief that.

with a larger nuclear arsenal, China could compel the United States. to show more respect to Chinese core interests. And now, when Beijing sees Washington again trying to topple regimes. in more than one country, it may have greater concern about regime security and. therefore expect its nuclear weapons to play a continued strong role.

in deterring perceived aggressive hostility from the United States. Yeah. I want to get to the details of. those Chinese nuclear weapons programme a bit later, but what about North Korea, Dasl? How does it play into the calculations of the North Korean regime, do you think? I think for North Korea, we have to realise. that they've long viewed their nuclear programme. as an insurance for regime survival.

And even before the attacks on Iran, North Korea has pointed to their nuclear programme. as it turns against what they would call us hostile policy. And so Kim Jong Un has consistently been expanding his weapons programme. since he took power, and recently stated. that even engaging in talks with the US would hinge. on America accepting North Korea as a nuclear state. And so that said, I think there are lessons. that North Korea will be taking away from the attacks on Iran,

including the capabilities that the US military has. or how fast they may burn through their weapons stockpile, and who steps up for Iran. But for the most part, I think the attacks. reinforce North Korea's nuclear resolve. and reaffirm the Kim regime's belief that nuclear weapons are necessary. for them to avoid any kind of a regime change.

Before we talk in details about the Chinese. and the North Korean nuclear weapons programmes, Zhao Tong, can you just tell us. how many nuclear weapons currently exist in the world? Where are they? How ready are they to be actively deployed? So basically, at the height of the Cold War, the two nuclear superpowers, US and Soviet Union, they each developed tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.

But they started reducing the size of the arsenal, especially after the end of the Cold War. And there have been. bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaties between the two superpowers. So based on the most credible data. in the international research community. it looks like the United States has an arsenal of about. just a few less than 4000 nuclear weapons.

So it's somewhere between 3000 and 4000. The Russian side has a little bit more nuclear capability. They currently have about little more than 4000 nuclear weapons, but they have some advantage in tactical nuclear capabilities. The other nuclear weapon states, their nuclear arsenals are significantly smaller. The UK has somewhere between 200 and 300,

and the French nuclear arsenal might be slightly larger, but not too much. The Chinese nuclear arsenal is experiencing. very significant change in recent years. The Chinese government has never said anything about its nuclear arsenal size. But according to American government assessments, for decades, China maintained a small arsenal of about 200 nuclear weapons.

But since 2019, that number has steadily grown, and today the US government assesses China has about 600 nuclear weapons. and might building it up further to 1000 by the end of this decade. Other nuclear weapon states, their arsenals. like those in India and Pakistan, somewhat smaller even. You used the word tactical there. We keep hearing this phrase, tactical weapons.

Can you just tell us what they are? There is no agreed definition, but usually people regard those nuclear weapons. that are primarily used for regional or theater strikes, which means they are of shorter range. compared with intercontinental range nuclear weapons. They may have smaller yield nuclear warheads. and therefore they could create a less collateral damage,

making them more usable on the battlefield. And also they're usually very accurate. So they can be used to target specific military sites. without necessarily harming civilians in the broader region. Let's focus on Asian nuclear powers and start with China. Zhao Tong, you were talking about how China has reportedly been expanding.

the number of its nuclear warheads. So what exactly do we know about them? Where are they deployed and what are their ranges? The international research community actually has to depend a lot. on the US government's intelligence capability. to understand the status of China's nuclear expansion. But independent researchers have also been using open source information,

including commercial satellite imagery, and they have also been able to track the expansion. of China's nuclear infrastructure facilities, where China conducts nuclear weapon research experiments. and even the manufacturing of nuclear warheads. And it's very clear that the nuclear production infrastructure. has been expanding very significantly over the past years.

And what about North Korea does or how. and when did their nuclear weapons programme begin? And where are they at now that we know of. North Korea began pursuing nuclear weapons back in the 1950s, initially with Soviet assistance. So it began under their founder, Kim Il Sung. And initially they relied on nuclear scientists. trained by the Soviet Union.

But then within a few decades, they were doing it themselves. And by the 1990s, the US was aware. that North Korea had a nuclear weapons program. The founder of North Korea died. His son took over a continuing nuclear development. So North Korea officially admitted to having a nuclear programme in 2002. And then in 2003, they withdrew from the UN nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, which they had joined back in 1985.

So then we fast forward to the third generation leader we have now. who has labeled his nuclear programme permanent and irreversible. They are estimated to have around 50 nuclear warheads as of now, plus enough fissile material to produce about 40 more. It's growing every year. I mean, I think around five years ago, the estimate was around 30 to 40 nuclear warheads.

Several years ago, there were lots. of efforts to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula, weren't they? Are those efforts still ongoing or, you know, you just quoted Kim Jong Un calling it permanent. So do the rest of the world have to just accept the fact. that North Korea may now be a nuclear armed state? There are still efforts to engage North Korea. I mean, President Trump has repeatedly said he is willing.

to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The white House has said that they are open to meeting, open to engaging with North Korea without preconditions. We've heard this line multiple times. Here in South Korea, we have a left leaning administration that is constantly reaching out. and constantly trying to engage with North Korea, despite the fact that Pyongyang has repeatedly said no. And so there are efforts, but formally between the US.

and North Korea, formal talks last happened in 2019, and after those talks fell through, you know, Kim Jong Un has really focused on growing his weapons programme. and stating that the nuclear programme is permanent. And so the efforts to engage them in dialogue so far hasn't been successful. What about China, though? How does China view North Korea's nuclear ambitions. and has that view changed recently, Dasl?

I think they are definitely less inclined to talk publicly. about denuclearising North Korea. I mean, back in 2017, 2018, during President Trump's first presidency, for example, China was, China and also Russia, they were imposing sanctions on North Korea. at the UN Security Council because of the weapons tests. Also they were openly and publicly talking.

about this shared goal of denuclearising North Korea. Recently, we have not seen very much of that. We have not heard China talk so much about denuclearisation. as a goal, you know, potentially, China maybe has less sway now in terms of what they can do. with North Korea's nuclear programme, having seen that, you know, it's been sustained this far and has grown this much.

I just want to add that Beijing is obviously also observing. how other countries are reacting to the North Korean nuclear issue. And here the important data point for Beijing is the fact. that Russia about two years ago, officially said it considers. the North Korean nuclear issue a closed issue. In May 2024, there was a China, Japan, South Korea trilateral summit.

And in the readout of the summit meeting, there was a reference. to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. But after that, North Korea lodged strong protest. and increasingly put pressure on China. So after that, China only once officially used. the term denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

I think that's a further confirmation that China basically made. a formal decision to not ever raise the issue formally. I think because Beijing is increasingly preoccupied. with strategic competition with the United States. So it starts to believe that, to preserve. China's geoeconomic influence over Korean Peninsula issues. is more important than pushing North Korea on denuclearisation.

More broadly, what about efforts to limit the number. of nuclear weapons in the world? In 2024, a Japanese group of atomic bomb survivors won the Nobel Peace Prize. for their efforts to get rid of nuclear weapons from the world. And I've been covering Hiroshima and Nagasaki issues for many years, but it almost feels like the world is going the other way. There is always concern that when countries. like North Korea continue to expand their weapons programmes,

that neighboring countries will feel threatened. and that it could trigger an arms race, right? It could trigger Japan or South Korea to suddenly want to develop. their own nuclear weapons. So that has been a concern in this region. And it has been a conversation that has been ongoing. in South Korea for quite a bit of time now. with actually majority support from South Korean citizens.

in terms of developing their own nuclear weapons. I'm not saying it's going to happen. There are many, many complicated issues that would stop South Korea. from going forward with something like that. But I think the fact that prominent. politicians are talking about, the fact that the US nuclear umbrella, for example, is not enough of a security guarantee. and that in order to truly counter a nuclear state like North Korea,

that they have to also develop their own nuclear weapons. I think that is another challenge that we are dealing with where. because countries that have nuclear weapons like. Dr Zhao Tong mentioned, are continuing to expand them exponentially. That is bringing ideas for other countries thinking, what more can we do to deter this threat?

You talked about how people in South Korea feel. about North Korea as a nuclear threat. But also you have China as its neighbour as well. Do people really feel threatened, scared by the nuclear threat, do you think? I think if we're talking about the daily lives of the people here, it is not some imminent threat that people are feeling that they are. I mean, South Korea is a country surrounded by nuclear powers, right? There's Russia, there's China, and then they have their neighbour,

North Korea, claiming now to be officially a nuclear state. But there is a general concern that South Korea may not be. in a position to be able to deter all the threats. If things were to start to, you know, blow up around the region, right? One thing that South Korea has gotten approval for recently from the US is, they've gotten permission to start building nuclear powered submarines.

And South Korea has framed it. to the US as a way of easing the American security burden in the region. But essentially, I think this is and will be one of the ways. that South Korea will more closely monitor China and also North Korea. And the regional situation, once they are able to join this group. of military powers that have nuclear powered submarines.

And Zhao Tong, you were earlier talking about Ukraine. And I keep thinking about how, I think it was in 1994, a newly independent Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. And since Russia's invasion, some have been saying that maybe that was a mistake. Do you think all these recent conflicts, including the most recent one on Iran, these conflicts could encourage more countries to try.

and obtain nuclear weapons? Indeed. I think the risk is very real. It's not only, there are, you know, the international security environment is getting worse. We have seen, you know, invasions, major conflict in Europe. that hasn't happened for decades. At the same time, the traditional. nuclear umbrella mechanism is being eroded.

The US now pursues America first. It is less willing to sacrifice treasure and blood. on behalf of allies and friendly countries in faraway regions. So, non-nuclear weapon states, that traditionally rely on US nuke umbrella, may think more seriously today. whether they should pursue their indigenous hedging options, including to build the basis for nuclear weapon capability going forward.

And we have seen more countries in both Asia and Europe. are openly discussing the potential need for their own nuclear option. And on the other side, we are seeing the existing consensus. among the major powers to jointly contain nuclear proliferation. to prevent more countries from developing nuclear weapons. That consensus is also breaking down.

That's a very worrying trend, isn't it? Thank you so much for joining me, Zhao Tong and Dasl. Thank you for having me. Thank you for having us. You've been watching Asia Specific from the BBC World Service. with me, Mariko Oi in Singapore. If you have any questions or thoughts on what we've covered in this episode. or any other stories from the region, please leave us a comment below. You can also get in touch with us on email asiaspecific@bbc.co.uk.

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