China’s invasion timetable for Taiwan - Asia Specific podcast, BBC World Service

I know this is like the $1 billion question, but are we going to see a Taiwan invasion in our lifetime? You know, I think that likelihood seems to be higher and higher. There is so much domestic pressure about this. that how could they just let it linger for another 20, 25 years? A dramatic show of force to send an increasingly sharp message.

China has ended 2025. with one of its biggest ever displays of military might around Taiwan, as a warning against what it calls the separatist forces on the island. It might feel like Groundhog Day. Chinese drills practicing a blockade of the self-ruled island. are becoming more and more routine. But this latest one follows a deal for the United States to sell. a record value of arms to help the Taiwanese defend themselves.

In 2027, China's People's Liberation Army turns 100. So how many more years is the Chinese leader Xi Jinping willing to wait? And why aren't people in Taiwan all that worried about the possible invasion? I'm Mariko in Singapore and this is Asia Pacific from the BBC World Service. Twice a week we bring you Asia Pacific stories unpacked by those who know them best.

And today I have William Yang from a think tank Crisis Group in Taipei, and also Bill Birtles from our Asia Specific podcast team. A former Taiwan and China correspondent. Welcome both. Thanks, Mariko. I'm very excited to have William on the podcast. because he's like the go-to man when anybody rolls into Taipei, there was this big exodus of China-based journalists around the pandemic period. It was getting harder for them to stay in China, and they a lot of them set up shop, including me in Taipei.

And William Yang was basically the first person you'd, you'd seek out. to get the lowdown on not just how the sort of media works in Taiwan, but also where to get the best Rechao. Where. To eat food. So quite exciting to have him on the podcast. Indeed. So nice to have you, William. I guess we want to start with these military drills. They have been taking place quite frequently, especially since 2022. So can you firstly tell us what's different this time?

Yeah. Thank you so much for having me on the podcast. You know, I think what is really different this time is, perhaps the, I think number one external environment. There is a lot more uncertainty coming out of the, United States when it comes to. the Trump administration's policy toward Taiwan and China. And at the same time, you know, I think because of that, there is.

a greater level of skepticism and also anxiety within Taiwan. about how exactly is this government going to handle relationship. with China and Taiwan? And I think at the same time, because of the recent rise of tension between Japan and China. due to the new Japanese Prime Minister Takeuchi's comments. about Taiwan contingency. There is also, I think, a lot more focus on.

how Japan might actually react to the whole exercise this time around. But I think other than that, you know, we are also seeing. the Chinese military being more confident and more bold when it comes. to declaring the goals that they want to achieve through this exercise. Yeah, we did a whole episode, didn't we, Bill? On Sanae Takaichi's comments. She was answering, I guess, a question in Parliament, where she said. that Japan's Self-Defense force could step in if China attacked Taiwan.

I understand that this time. This is the first time these drills have been publicly associated. with deterrence of outside military intervention. So is that what you're referring to? This is a clear message to Washington and Tokyo, not just to Taipei. Yeah, exactly. You know, I think that being so explicitly described. and also laid out in the readout is definitely something unusual. compared to similar exercises in the past.

I'm wondering also about the role of president Lai in Taiwan, because China had those military drills during his inauguration in 2024, and they've also released a series of cartoons depicting him as a parasite. So, Bill, it seems quite clear that Beijing doesn't like this guy. Yeah, for about a decade. now, the Chinese government has made it very clear that it doesn't want. to deal with the governing Democratic Progressive Party, the DPP in Taiwan.

First of all, it was President Tsai Ing-wen. She was basically shut out. from high level contact with the Chinese government, which was a departure from what was happening in the years preceding her. You had the, the KMT was in power, the other main political party at the time in Taiwan. And they had a much more, I guess you'd say, conciliatory approach to China. Much more. Let's talk, let's negotiate.

Let's hold the line in terms of Taiwan's sovereignty. But let's try and have a workable relationship with Beijing, which was resulting in the opening of more trade and direct flights. between the island and China and all this sort of stuff. And then once Tsai Ing-wen in the DPP got in, there was a real hardening. of the attitude from China's government. Things like restrictions on Chinese tourists being able to go to Taiwan.

And then she was re-elected at the very beginning of 2020. And then William Lai, the current president, was her successor. So you've had this political party in power. in Taiwan now for about a decade or so, where the Chinese government has basically said, first of all, we're not going to deal with you unless you completely change your stance. in a way that's favorable to what we want. And then it's really escalated, it seems, with William Lai, where they are really using dehumanizing language and cartoons.

about this leader depicting him as a parasite or a worm. The messaging was clear that they are going to really put pressure on him, his party, and the side of Taiwan that doesn't advocate. for the island becoming its own independent sovereign nation, but takes the stance that we basically already are. So we don't need to do anything to try and appease China.

and its demand that we go under its control. And yeah, once again, in some of the images or propaganda that the Chinese military has released, there once again has been a reference to green bugs, which harks back to those earlier cartoons about the Taiwanese president. Yeah, I've noticed Beijing's cartoons or the Chinese cartoons. of Takaichi since that row as well. But it does seem like Beijing's language is escalating. The Chinese military describing this latest military exercise.

as a shield of justice. So here's some of the language. from a spokesperson from the Eastern Command of the PLA. It's a stern warning against Taiwan separatist forces. and external interference, and a legitimate. and necessary action to safeguard China's sovereignty and national unity. Yeah, because 2027 is the year that some overseas experts consider. as the year that maybe China would be ready to invade Taiwan.

I mean, one would think that Xi Jinping wants to see. this happen while he's in power. So you know what kind of deadline? You know, what kind of time frame are you thinking, William? You know, I think, 2027. is obviously now being viewed, embraced both by the US government. and also the Taiwanese government. as a time or a time stamp that they really have to be serious about.

But at the same time, I think, with the large scale purge. that has been taking place within the PLA. and the very frequent change of the leadership, you know, across the board with the different services that. we have actually witnessed, there are also a lot of doubts about actually. how effective the PLA actually is in terms of being a fighting force. to actually carry out a very complicated task of attacking Taiwan.

and achieving reunification through a potential landing boots on the ground, kind of like operation. And I guess also. the Taiwanese government has been boosting its military spending, showing that it is willing it is trying to defend itself as well. Bill, I want to, you know, get to how prepared Taiwanese are. because Taiwan holds its military drills as well, don't they? And you've covered both the Taiwanese but also the Chinese military drills.

How how are they different? Well, it's a bit of a vibe thing. Mariko. We as foreign media didn't get invited along to PLA drills too often, but there was this massive naval flotilla off Qingdao in, It was quite a few years back, just before Covid. And so we're on a Chinese warship, aircraft carrier, going by all that sort of stuff. And the Chinese sailors were very professional. But, at one point, I sort of said,

oh, I just got up to go to the bathroom. It was just across the room. And straight away, the, person who's there to kind of accompany you stands up. Say, can I help you? And just to kind of check, you know, where you're going, and they run a tight ship, basically, uh, when ever I did drills with the Taiwanese forces. and the Han Kuang annual drills as one example. But we went out on the naval ships. William will know about this from his time as a journalist.

It's very common for the Taiwanese, media to be given quite a lot. of access to the exercises that the Taiwan military puts on, and there always is a theatrical element to it, because they're sort of show putting on a bit of a show. But it did strike me that, at times it felt a little bit. not so professional compared at least to the PLA. Things like we're on board a Taiwanese warship, uh,

off the east coast, off Hualien. And at the end of the exercises, the, uh, the members of the Navy are kind of posing for photos. with the journalists jumping up in the air, all doing those sort of cutesy peace signs and stuff. Another time, we're at Taoyuan with the Army and the local reporters. for stations like Tvbs, you know, they're putting the microphones. in the flak jackets while they're holding guns, you know, racing through the obstacle course, doing pieces to camera.

Actually, it was pretty entertaining to watch it, but I did think, um, there was a casualness to it, a friendliness to it, which didn't scream. 'We're on a war footing.'. Whereas the PLA everything they put out from a propaganda perspective. every instance in which they try to portray their operations. They're trying to say, we're on a war footing. And this is one of the takeaways that I think. a lot of visitors have when they go to Taiwan. And they're somewhat surprised that, uh, civil society,

maybe the military to some degree, uh, just doesn't seem to have that ready. for action intensity that you might expect given the situation. So how will that actually affect the ability of Taiwan's forces. to respond in real combat? I'm not sure. But one thing I do want to ask William is here in Singapore. You know, we have a Singaporean colleague who's just done. the annual military service. He's into his mid 30s,

but he's still going back and having to do it every year. What exactly is the situation in Taiwan these days. when it comes to conscription and military service? Yeah, I think that's a very good question. Uh, you know, I think the Taiwanese government is also recognizing the need. for them to really beef up the training schemes, especially for the compulsory military, uh, servicemen. And at the same time, increasing the frequency of, you know, I think,

reservists to actually return to receive these routine trainings. But at the same time, they understand that. they can't just, you know, be as a forceful with all these demands, uh, as the Chinese government, because they pride themselves. as one of the freest democracies in the world and in Asia, and often use that as a big contrast to China. So I think that's where the Taiwanese government is really facing the dilemma. in terms of how much they can actually start pushing very forcefully.

with the implementation and changes to military training schemes. And they are already facing quite a bit of pushback domestically. On this podcast, We've been covering quite a lot on Hong Kong. and how Beijing has been tightening its grip there. Just wondering in terms of, you know, before the 1997 handover in Hong Kong, a lot of people left the city and, you know, some of them came back.

I mean, what's the mood among locals? You said that people still, you know, going to work doing their day to day stuff. And I was reading about this television show, Zero Day Attack, which is kind of a fictional drama about Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which was kind of criticized by some as fear mongering. So, you know, are Taiwanese thinking of leaving the city, given these escalating tensions or, you know, is it still seen as something in a, in, you know, in the future?

I think it's a very complicated situation. There are certainly Taiwanese people that are. looking for other options for immigration. And, you know, I think there are certain periods in the past. that the certain search keywords online would actually indicate. that there is a an increase of Taiwanese people looking, or at least inquiring about potential ways. to actually emigrate to other countries.

But at the same time, I think, you know, the Taiwanese people in general are still a lot of the times. not really thinking about, uh, Chinese military invasion. as something that would happen to them in the immediate future. Yeah. You know, Mariko, William talking about a segment. or many people in Taiwan who are just not thinking about the idea. of a Chinese blockade or invasion. I think it's one of these things that baffles a lot of,

foreign reporters when they go to Taiwan. They all remark on it about how if you do, you know, like a vox pop in television. where it's like the best and worst form of journalism. Right? Walking up to complete strangers on the street and asking them. for an opinion on something that they may or may not know anything about. But you know, it's a pretty common tool to try. and get a little bit of a gauge of public opinion. And, I always thought in Taiwan, whenever you get, say, five people on the street and you ask them,

how concerned are you about these Chinese drills that are becoming more. and more regular, the language from China. And I always thought about one out of five. would say very concerned, really, really worried. Another would probably say, yeah, pretty worried, but what can I do? And then it always felt to me like about three out of five people. would say something along the lines of, yeah, they always do that. Or, gee, they're full of bluster, a bit like North Korea, isn't it? They're not going to attack.

And I think that's something that baffles outsiders a lot. And I wonder because William was saying, I don't know, a portion of Taiwan, what percentage roughly of Taiwan Taiwanese would you break it down to. as to who what proportion is really, really worried. and what percentage is not that fast? Yeah, I think that's a very, you know, like a tricky question, but if you I really have to use my experience reporting on Taiwan.

and living in Taiwan to sort of like make a guess, I would probably say about 35% of Taiwan's population. would give you the answer that they are very concerned. about China preparing to attack Taiwan, while I would say maybe between 40 to 45% of the Taiwanese people. are still holding on to the last bit of the hope that, you know, the Chinese saying that Chinese people won't attack Chinese people.

would actually be hold true. And at the same time, you know, they are betting on the Chinese government, you know, not actually facing too many internal challenges. to actually be able to successfully carry out an attack on Taiwan. William, you said not many are concerned about the immediate attack by China, and many are hopeful that they would find a peaceful way. And so, in your opinions, I know this is like $1 billion question,

but are we going to see Taiwan invasion in our lifetime or no? You know, I think that likelihood seems to be higher and higher. I think as we I personally sense a, you know, a slight increase or gradual increase of impatience, uh, from the Chinese side. I think especially, you know, as public opinion in Taiwan remains very solidly against the idea.

of reunification in general, even though, you know, like, uh, how people think about the future for Taiwan remains very divided. But there somehow is a very vague consensus. among Taiwanese people that they don't want to accept, or they won't be able to accept living under reunification with China. So as China, I think, sense that the possibility of reunification. through peaceful means is really becoming less and less likely.

They would actually feel the need to actually tap. into the more extreme approaches, such as using brute force to actually force reunification to happen. What do you think, Bill? Yeah, I left, reporting on China in 2020. Absolutely. 100% convinced that the Chinese government at some point will go for it. My, my time reporting in Taiwan didn't really change my opinion much. But what they did do is ramp up military drills.

during that period and made them routine. So I am very, very convinced that they will go for it. Um, we mentioned earlier various timeline scenarios. Um, that centenary of the Communist victory in China 2049. seemed inconceivable to me that they would not seek whoever is the leader. by then would not seek to have Taiwan under PRC China control by 2049. XI Jinping, the Chinese leader, is currently 72.

There's a lot of talk about how if he wants. to go down with an incredible legacy, that would basically make him the greatest leader since Chairman Mao, or possibly greater. Taking Taiwan is how you do it. Uh, his mother is 99 and she's still alive. His father lived until he was about 88, I think. So Xi Jinping conceivably could still be alive in 2049. He'd be about 97, but it's probably less likely he would still be in charge at that age. But the point is, there's probably not.

the urgency to take Taiwan, which would be hugely risky, as Williams says in the next year or two. But I think the 2030s is quite possible. And I just left. Being in the environment of PRC, China, the media environment, the political environment, I left convinced that they've put themselves into a position domestically. where there's so much nationalism about this. There is so much domestic pressure about this.

that how could they just let it linger for another 20, 25 years? As always, a lot of speculation on what Beijing might do next, so we'll leave it there. William Yang in Taipei and Bill Birtles in our studio. Thank you. And thank you for watching Asia Pacific from the BBC World Service. with me in Singapore. If you have any questions or thoughts on what we covered in this episode. or any other stories from the region, please leave us a comment below. and click like and subscribe so you never miss an episode!

Until next time, see you!